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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and voluntary 
labour initiatives (codes of conduct and standards) with special reference to banana 
production in Costa Rica. Costa Rica is the third biggest supplier of bananas to the 
United Kingdom (UK), but market access is determined by the major UK 
supermarket groups, and the terms and conditions dictated by these powerful actors 
impact the labour conditions on banana plantations. In this regard the banana supply 
chain is increasingly viewed as ‘buyer-driven’ and as such, the theoretical framework 
employed in the research is based on global commodity chain studies (Gereffi 1994, 
Gereffi et al. 2005).
The thesis draws on interviews and focus groups organised with banana workers and 
their representatives over a two month period in 2006. However, the banana supply 
chain is not a simple linear model in terms of control and influence; there is a high 
degree of complexity regarding the social relations within it. The chain includes 
major transnational producers and trade unions, and an international framework 
agreement (IFA) is in place on some plantations, and there are also other interested 
parties -  audit groups, NGOs and civil society groups -  concerned with labour 
conditions on plantations. Interviews were conducted with these social actors both 
prior and following the period of fieldwork in Costa Rica. The thesis also reports on 
the Second International Banana Conference held in April 2005, a forum for the 
major players to debate the issues and conditions within the industry.
The thesis shows that the leading supermarkets have considerable power over 
suppliers/producers. However, it is argued that the supermarkets’ professed desire to 
act socially responsibly to those workers employed on plantations is contradicted by 
the downward pressure exerted on the price of bananas and that this contributes to a 
downward spiral of labour conditions.
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Chapter One
Introduction: The Beginning of a Research Study
Introduction
This research study is concerned with labour conditions in the global supply chain 
for bananas, a commodity chain where consumption and production are located in 
different parts of the world, but linked through a commercial relationship. A 
relationship which twists and turns as it brings together two very powerful 
corporate groups; supermarket retailers and international banana companies. The 
study focuses on one particular chain, the Costa Rica-United Kingdom banana 
chain and specifically examines the introduction and impact of voluntary labour 
initiatives within that chain. During the last ten years or so a plethora of labour 
initiatives have been introduced as a result of calls for greater corporate 
accountability in global supply chains. The initiatives promoted and adopted 
include: propriety (company) codes, labour codes o f conduct and certifiable 
standards, all of which incorporate standards which are intended to improve the 
labour conditions and welfare o f workers involved in the production process of 
global supply chains.
There are a wide range of social actors involved in promoting labour initiatives, at 
the global, regional, national and local level. Traditional actors include 
companies and their immediate stakeholders; employees (their representative 
groups), investors, equity partners and consumers (Carroll 1996, Urminsky 2001). 
But more recently, other stakeholders have taken an interest in the operational 
activities o f business, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social 
activist and campaign groups, and government regulators (Carroll and Buchholtz 
2000, Urminsky 2001). For the purpose of this study, the term ‘stakeholder’ 
refers to ‘individuals and groups who may affect or be affected by the actions, 
decisions, policies, practices or goals of an enterprise’ (Carroll 1996: 74).
My own interest in labour codes and standards is directly linked to my experience 
in the retail sector and a personal concern for social justice in the global supply 
chain. As a retail buyer involved in the product sourcing process representing a 
major supermarket group, I was constantly mindful of trying to reach a fair 
agreement for all parties engaged in the supply chain. I believed I was always 
sensitive to the labour situation in the supply base and the labour conditions of the 
workers that picked and packed food products for the UK retailer that employed 
me. However, there are always market pressures: that o f being competitively 
priced, of maintaining market share, and meeting sales targets and profit margins 
-  the bottom line, as it is referred to in the commercial world. My experience in a 
number o f retail companies only confirmed the fact that there were many 
individuals trying to ‘do the right thing’ -  to be equitable in their business 
practices. But somehow it seemed that circumstances outside any one person’s 
control would often prevent them from doing so. Together, labour codes of 
conduct and standards have become an important topic in the debate on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR).
My professional background as a supermarket buyer and a strategy consultant in 
the retail sector has influenced the structure and methodological approach of the 
study, both in terms of scope and access to potential respondents. This was 
particularly the case when initial contact with the international banana companies 
was required and previous work colleagues helped ‘open doors’ for me by making 
introductions on my behalf. The global trade of bananas is largely dominated by 
three big American agri-businesses: Chiquita Brands International, Dole Foods 
and Fresh Del Monte Produce. The dominant sway of the Trans-national 
Corporations (TNCs) in the banana sector needs to be contextualised and a 
summary of historical developments and current market position of the key 
producers is detailed in the study. Also pertinent to the discussion of social 
responsibility in global supply chains, is the level of producer engagement and 
involvement with labour codes o f conduct, standard certification processes and 
other forms of labour agreements, in particular International Framework 
Agreements (EFAs).
The theoretical framework used in my analysis draws on global commodity chain 
studies, which emphasise changes o f control and shifting relationships within the 
chain, and the dimension of governance (Gereffi 1994, Gereffi et al. 2005). This 
is particularly relevant in light of the on-going concentration in food retailing in 
the UK and the growing strength of supermarket buying power in global supply 
chains. Supermarkets are able to coordinate and control operations without direct 
ownership of production activities. However, the banana supply chain is not a 
typical buyer-driven chain as defined by Gereffi (1994). There are strong 
producers, major banana TNCs at the bottom end of the chain, which oversee a 
highly integrated operation. This is where the global commodity chains (GCCs) 
model developed by Gereffi (1994) comes into play. By employing the Gereffi 
(1994) GCCs model the level of control which key actors exert within the chain 
can be further explored. The chief aim of the study is to examine the influence of 
buyer-driven voluntary labour initiatives in the global banana supply chain and 
assess the importance o f voluntary initiatives as regards the working conditions 
on banana plantations. All the major UK supermarket groups have committed 
(with varying degree) to voluntary labour initiatives and are involved in the 
verification and monitoring systems associated with the implementation of codes 
and standards.
The primary source of empirical data presented in this thesis was gathered during 
a two month field study activity (February-April 2006) in the Republic of Costa 
Rica. My fieldwork investigation was facilitated by personal contacts within my 
retail network and through my attendance at a three day International Banana 
Conference at the Flemish Parliament, Brussels in April 2005. Between 
conference proceedings, there were many opportunities to informally discuss the 
‘burning issues and concerns of the day’ with key social actors in the industry. 
Such commentary, together with papers presented during the event, provided an 
additional source of empirical data. In order to make sense of the workings and 
complexity of the global banana supply chain, I conducted a number of interviews 
with supermarket buyers, CSR executives and technical managers, ‘the top of the 
chain’ during the early period of the research study, and reviewed the documented
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CSR policies of the major UK supermarket groups. This provided me with a 
greater understanding of the provenance of labour codes and standards prior to 
conducting my field study in Costa Rica. On my return to the UK, I engaged in 
discussions with other interested parties involved in promoting the regulation of 
environmental and social conditions in global supply chains, including global 
unions, NGOs, code and standards authorities, and audit groups. The comments 
and testimonies of these and other groups of participants involved in the study are 
drawn together in an attempt to explain the role of voluntary labour initiatives in 
the global banana supply chain and the impact such initiatives have on workers’ 
welfare.
1.1 The International Banana Conference Forum
Seldom do all the parties in an industry come together and discuss the structure 
and circumstances that affect the industry. In this sense, the Second International 
Banana Conference (IBCII) is a highly unusual event compared to other industrial 
sectors, both in terms of its coverage, representation of the major 
constituents/social actors engaged in the banana sector, and discussion of the 
issues and challenges facing the industry. Two conferences have been held 
during the last decade, with a working party on voluntary standards during the 
interim period. To a large extent, the second conference, held in April 2005, the 
key theme of which was ‘Reversing the Race to the Bottom’, can be seen as a 
microcosm of the industry. The conference helped me to crystallise my thoughts 
regarding voluntary labour initiatives and raised many o f the issues I will be 
referring to in my research study. As such, I will draw and comment on the 
presentations viewed, conversations held and discourses I observed during this 
event.
The First International Banana Conference (IBCI) was held in Brussels on the 4th 
to the 6th of May 1998. The key objectives of the conference were to promote a 
charter for workers’ rights on plantations and help small producers access the 
international market (IBCII 2004). Over three hundred delegates attended the 
conference, from forty-five banana producing and consuming countries, including
many of the key actors involved in the banana trade. Representatives of 
governments from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa and the 
Caribbean, national and international banana producers, banana plantation 
workers’ unions and cooperatives, scientists and other civil society organisations 
were present (IBCII 2004). The various constituent groups reached the general 
consensus that both the environmental and social conditions in the industry were 
unacceptable, and as a result the conference organisers drafted an International 
Banana Charter, which provided the basis for civil society initiatives for the 
following five years (Farquhar and Smith 2005). However, many of the key 
players in the industry (producers) did not sign up to the charter, preferring to 
improve conditions either by adopting a range of voluntary standards or in some 
cases accepting those quality standards that were thrust upon them by their key 
customers (supermarket groups and wholesalers). These standards included the 
ISO 14001 \  EurepGAP2 and propriety codes (Farquhar and Smith 2005).
The Second International Conference (IBCII) took place again in Brussels seven 
years later, between the 28th and 30th of April, 2005. The conference was 
convened by a broad coalition of trade unions, farmers’ organisations and 
workers’ groups, including the European Banana Action Network (EUROBAN), 
Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros (the Coordinating Centre 
of Latin American Banana Workers’ Unions: COLSIBA), the International 
Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied 
Workers’ Associations (IUF), the United States (US) Labor Education in the 
Americas Project (US/LEAP), the Association of Caribbean Farmers, based in the 
Windward Islands (WINFA), and a number o f environment and development 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Fair Trade organisations (further
1 The ISO is an inter-governmental institution responsible for developing and enforcing standards, 
the ISO 14001 standard is primarily concerned with environmental management (ISO 2006).
2 EurepGAP is a private sector body (equal partnership of retailers and agricultural producers) that 
sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products globally (EurepGAP 2006).
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details of convening organisations are noted in Appendix A). The impetus for the 
second conference came from both ends o f  the chain, from ‘key business actors’ 
who were ‘keen to participate constructively in a second genuinely international 
and multipartite forum’ and from ‘Southern counterparts for whom the first 
conference left “unfinished business’” (IBCII 2004: 4). Also in the immediate 
years following the first conference, the banana trade had entered a deep 
economic crisis, which threatened to be quite devastating, particularly for the 
Caribbean and Latin American trade (IBCII 2004). The EBCII preparatory 
committee prepared a document citing the difficulties and future challenges of the 
international banana trade, which helped to explain the pressing need for a second 
multi-stakeholder forum. Some of the key points made by the committee are 
noted below:
1. Developed countries get cheap fruit, but workers, small farmers 
and the environment in the countries where the fruit is produced 
pay the price -  the economic power in the banana chain remains in 
the hands of a few large businesses (US and European 
multinational companies and retailers in consuming countries).
2. The dramatic expansion of the international banana economy, 
especially in Ecuador and Costa Rica during the 1990s has resulted 
in a ‘global’ overproduction crisis.
3. The ensuing ‘price war’ among exporting countries has shifted the 
geopolitics of banana production and trade, and affected the 
livelihood of all the people involved directly in earning their living 
from it -  structural overproduction is keeping producer prices low 
and the banana industry is witnessing a ‘race to the bottom’ in 
prices, and social and environmental conditions (i.e. a downward 
spiral).
4. The three major TNCs (Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte) who 
control two-thirds of the international trade, and the two ‘new kids 
on the block’ the Irish Fyffes and the Ecuadorian Grupo Noboa 
(Noboa Group) are increasingly buying from cheap labour 
countries, i.e. Ecuador, Brazil, West Africa (the Cameroon and 
Ivory Coast) and Indonesia.
5. In economic terms the new ‘lords’ of the banana chain are the 
European and North American supermarket chains -  this 
concentration of power at the top of the chain is enabling the 
retailer to set the economic terms of trade with producers.
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6. The EU, the world’s only major managed market in the 
international banana trade is subject to change, with the soon-to-be 
implemented single tariff regime. This change will have important 
consequences for the future of banana workers, small farmers and 
the independent trade unions.
(IBCII 2004)
The IBCII preparatory committee identified a number o f stakeholders who would 
be impacted by the above situation and invited them to participate in the second 
conference, including retailers, producers, importers, governments, trade unions, 
farmers’ organisations, development organisations -  all o f which may have a 
common interest in solving the problems associated with the sector (EBCII 2004). 
The main objective of the second conference was to secure commitments by 
governments and banana companies to respect and enforce labour and trade union 
rights, and standards for workers in all producing countries (IBCII 2004). More 
specifically, this objective was broken down into a number o f key aims, which 
were:
• To secure commitments from marketing companies to a fair 
remuneration for small producers and plantation workers;
• To place the specific needs of women workers and small farmers 
firmly on the international agenda;
• To explore mechanisms to control over-production and to stabilise 
prices;
• To develop a definition o f a ‘fair price’;
• To analyse the implications of changes in the structure of the chain 
(notably the growing power of the supermarkets);
• To propose viable measures for an EU-25 banana import regime 
that would favour sustainable production and fair trade;
• To secure better protection o f the working, living and natural 
environment;
• To analyse the impact to date -  and discuss the future role -  of the 
voluntary labour and environmental standards initiatives (codes of 
conduct);
• To create a permanent mechanism/forum in which to continue 
dialogue (and/or negotiations) between the different actors.
(IBCII 2004)
The conference agenda was structured around what the organisers deemed the 
most pressing question in the banana industry ‘How to Reverse the Race to the 
Bottom’. This was a question of tackling the major issues of fair prices, living 
wages and labour rights (IBCII 2004). The core argument was that producers, 
driven by the major supermarkets to seek out ever lower production costs for the 
supply of cheaper and cheaper bananas, were crippling the industry and its 
workers (IBCII 2004).
There were over two hundred and seventy attendees from forty countries, 
representing all possible interests in the global supply chain for bananas, at the 
IBCII event. A variety o f stakeholders that included independent growers, major 
banana producers, retailers, trade unions, government officials, NGOs, civil 
society groups (fair trade, human rights and consumer organisations), and 
production workers from a number of the exporting countries: Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. (Details of countries represented at the 
conference are noted in Appendix B). The conference was organised to provide a 
forum for interaction and engagement of all interested parties in the global supply 
chain for bananas, and each group of attendees (stakeholders) were able to 
command attention during the question and answer session and give ‘voice’ to 
their concerns. Indeed, there were many heated debates, with microphones being 
passed from government official to trade unionist to corporate representative to 
production worker (IBCII Observations, April 2005). A booth of translators, 
specially hired for the event struggled to keep pace with the change of language 
from one commentator to the next -  English, Spanish and French were deemed 
the official languages o f the conference. Frequently voices would be raised 
during these interchanges, escalating into arguments and bitter recriminations 
(IBCII Observations, April 2005). As indicated by this exchange between
members of the audience in the plenary session discussing the soon to be imposed 
new banana tariff regime:
1st contributor: “The US banana companies caused this, they 
complained to the WTO, now they say the workers will suffer, so the 
tariff must be kept low... but then we will not be able to compete” 
(WINFA representative).
Such sentiments were echoed by another small producer group, who said:
2nd contributor: “If the tariff is set at $3.75 [per box] no one will buy 
our bananas... jobs will be lost, farms abandoned” (Independent 
producer, Latin America).
At this point, two workers stood up and voiced their concerns, the first stating 
that:
3rd contributor: “Soon we will have nothing... no jobs, no home... 
and our children will be forced to go hungry” (Banana worker, Latin 
America).
The second worker concurred, adding:
4 contributor: “The fields will be filled with cocaine... it will be the 
only way we can survive” (Banana worker, Latin America).
(IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005)
There were several times during the three day event when emotions ran high and 
discussions spiralled out of control, with chaos only being averted when one of 
the chief organisers stepped in and took command of the floor again (IBCII 
Observations, April 2005).
1.2 Research Themes
A number of key themes emerged from the conference proceedings: the power of 
the supermarkets, the dominance of the US-owned banana TNC producers, a lack
of trade union representation on plantations in certain producer countries, the 
diminished role o f governments and the impending doom of the new EU tariff 
regime, due to start in January 2006 (IBCII Observations, April 2005). It became 
evident over the course of the event, that these themes could be construed as three 
sets of issues: (i) control within the chain, (ii) divisions within the chain and (iii) 
governance within the chain.
To help contextualise this work, I have included a historical summary which 
charts the changes in consumption patterns, the growth and oligopolisation of 
food retailing in the UK with the rise of supermarkets. Over the last decade, one 
of the growing concerns of supermarket retailers is how they are viewed by their 
customers. As a consequence, certain UK supermarket groups have appointed 
themselves the guardians of consumer interest and included CSR principles into 
their business operations. Strategically, this allows supermarkets to dispel the 
negative comments of their critics and present an impression of being a socially 
responsible business in the marketplace. By engaging in ethical behaviour in 
global supply chains, supermarkets may be viewed as Good Corporations. As 
noted by one major UK supermarket company:
Sainsbury’s believes that its customers want excellent quality and 
value for money, but not at the expense of people working in 
developing countries who may be working in unsafe conditions and 
for poor wages.
(Sainsbury 2003: 2)
Tesco, the UK’s biggest supermarket had this to say in their Corporate 
Responsibility review 2007:
Tesco has strong employment and environmental standards and we 
are confident that trading with us can be an important force for good 
anywhere in the world. We also understand that although our 
customers want low prices, they also want fair prices and decent 
standards.
(Tesco 2007a: 67)
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Supermarket groups, in their view, have battled to provide the cheapest prices and 
exert their influence on manufacturers, producers and suppliers to fulfil the needs 
of their customers. How supermarkets will continue to ensure goodwill in an 
increasingly sophisticated market, with a more socially aware consumer-base is 
where voluntary initiatives (labour codes of conduct) enter the debate.
Many groups involved in the global banana supply chain were represented at the 
conference, but each appeared to have a different stance, based on their own 
agenda. There was little evidence of a consensus being reached, with producers, 
trade unions and government representatives (from exporting and consuming 
counties) too occupied fighting their own comer in the stmggle to survive in a 
market that was essentially oversupplied (IBCII Observations, April 2005). There 
was a clear division between the various actors involved in the banana supply 
chain, which made it difficult to focus the delegates on the ‘plight’ of the worker 
and the problem of labour conditions in the global banana supply chain. This led 
to a debate on ‘governance’ and the question of whose responsibility was it to 
oversee labour conditions in the global banana chain. A number of issues 
regarding governance emerged from the conference, including: the belief that 
voluntary systems of labour control would not ensure workers’ rights, the failure 
in some producer-countries regarding the enforcement of regulatory labour 
systems, and the problems o f an over-supplied market which was forcing down 
the working conditions on plantations.
Based on these main areas of concern, it was decided to interrogate the literature 
and debates on the prism of the chain. There are many active discussions, both in 
academic literature and practice, which tackle the question of governance in the 
global supply chain and the form it should take: voluntary or regulatory. In this 
way, the questions raised in relation to these issues could be explored, questions 
such as:
• What is the composition o f the banana supply chain, and how is it 
organised?
• Who dominates the chain, and why?
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• What are the disputes between the different ‘actors’ in the chain, 
and why?
• What is the role o f other ‘actors’ in the chain: trade unions, NGOs, 
civil society groups, audit groups and certification organisations?
• How is the banana industry developing and being governed?
• How does self-regulation work in the banana sector?
1.3 Approach
In attempting to answer the questions posed above, a number of decisions were 
made concerning the approach of the research study, which included the 
following requirements:
1) To focus on both ends o f the chain: buyers (supermarket retailers) 
and producers (banana growers and suppliers).
2) To examine the business operations of the dominant actors within 
the chain: supermarkets and producers.
3) To investigate the labour conditions in the production activity of 
the chain: work and employment.
4) To examine the effectiveness of voluntary labour initiatives 
(codes and standards) in terms of improving the conditions of 
workers.
5) To explore the role o f other actors in the global banana supply 
chain and their influence on the governance structure within.
By following this path, the aim was to explore how self-regulation was 
functioning in a global supply chain. The structure of the research study was thus 
refined to look at both ends of the global supply chain for bananas, which would 
require conducting fieldwork in a country producing bananas for export.
1.4 Structure
In the thesis, Chapter One sets the scene of the research study by highlighting the 
experience of attending, what participants themselves call, the OPEC meeting of 
the banana industry, the Second International Banana Conference (IBCII) in April
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2005. The IBCII event corresponded with the early stages of my research 
journey, and as such helped to both locate and situate my investigation. Also, the 
IBCII forum underpins several of the main themes of the study, and observations 
and discussions made during the conference are referred to at several points
i
throughout the thesis. Chapter Two explores in greater detail the growth and 
development of supermarkets in the UK and to some extent explains why this 
group in the chain are viewed by some as the ‘Lords of the Chain’ -  a controlling 
force. Chapter Three charts the history of the banana and provides an outline of 
the key events which created an export market for bananas and the growth of 
transnational producers. The industry summary includes details of the export- 
production process and a market breakdown of the global trade in bananas. 
Chapter Four provides a description of global supply chains and the theoretical 
approaches employed in examining such chains. The chapter also details the 
forms of labour regulation now prevalent in global chains, voluntary initiatives 
(codes of conduct and certifiable standards) -  a key research interest of the thesis. 
Chapter Five describes in great detail the approach and methods employed in 
conducting the research study. Chapter Six presents an understanding of the 
character and nature of the Republic of Costa Rica, a banana producing-country 
situated in Central America. The chapter gives an account of the political, 
economic and social changes that have shaped the country, rather than providing a 
comprehensive history, as the intention is to trace those events which have the 
most bearing on the way the country is today.
The chapters thereafter draw more heavily on the empirical data collected during 
the research study: respondents’ commentary, observations and discussions with 
key ‘actors’ engaged in the global banana supply chain. Chapter Seven describes 
the process of producing bananas for export and examines the labour conditions 
on banana plantations, specifically focusing on work and employment. Chapter 
Eight looks at the practice of codes on the plantations and attempts to establish a 
link between the codes and the labour conditions experienced by workers. 
Chapter Nine examines the role of the various ‘social actors’ involved in the chain 
and determines the level of influence of these groups, and their role in the
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promotion of codes o f conduct, which is a key CSR policy for the corporate actors 
in the chain. Chapter Ten considers the evidence gleaned from the research case 
study and assesses the impact of voluntary initiatives and self-regulation in the 
banana chain. The chapter draws the thesis to a close by discussing the
f
knowledge gained and insights of the study, and what possible impact these may 
have on future policy regarding labour regulation. Whilst at the same time the 
chapter acknowledges the fact that many social actors/stakeholders involved in 
the chain may well play a part in determining the form of labour governance in 
global supply chains in the future.
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Chapter Two
Food Retailing in the United Kingdom 
Introduction
The United Kingdom (UK) has witnessed a revolution in food retailing during the 
twentieth century, a revolution that has created a market dominated by a few ‘big 
grocers’ and a retailing system uniquely British (Bevan 2005). The traditional 
image of Britain as a nation of small ‘shopkeepers’ no longer exists, instead it has 
been supplanted by the advance of a group of giant retailing corporations 
(Beaumont 1987, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). These big grocers -  the supermarket 
groups -  with their head office specialist management functions, centralised 
distribution systems and extensive store networks control over 75 percent of the 
UK grocery market today (Key Note 2007b). The dominance of the major 
supermarket groups in UK food retailing reflects the broader picture of retail 
concentration which has been associated with radical changes in the world’s 
supply chains (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).
The aim of this chapter is to examine some of the processes -  political, economic 
and social -  which have moulded the food retailing system prevalent in the UK 
today -  and build an understanding of the influence supermarket groups have in 
global production systems. Following the approach of Harvey and his colleagues 
(2002), these changes are described through the characterisation of three phases 
over the last hundred and fifty years or so. The first phase concerns the birth of 
the independent grocery store and the emergence of the multiple retail chain, the 
second, the introduction of self-service and the demise of the independent retailer, 
and the third charts the arrival of the superstore and the ascendancy of the 
supermarket group. I will argue that following this concentration of retail capital 
in the UK food market, supermarket groups have gained greater control over the 
production chains that supply them. This control coupled with the ability to 
dictate consumer prices has seemingly given these corporates unparallel market 
dominance. However, as will be argued, with this dominance has come a 
consumer backlash in the form of concerns about ethical trading. O f critical
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importance here is the way supermarket groups control the global supply chains 
that service them. Paradoxically, the success o f the supermarkets in managing 
supply chains has also opened up the prospect of campaigns and opportunities 
which question the structure of relations within these chains. Supermarkets are 
being challenged for their role in the decline of labour standards in the fields and 
factories which supply the goods they sell. In response to public concern and 
scrutiny, regarding the labour conditions in global supply chains, the supermarket 
groups have introduced a number of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
policies, which will also be discussed in the chapter. This will lay the foundation 
for the analysis in later chapters.
2.1 Early Developments of Food Retailing in the UK
It was during the first phase of retail development in the UK that the Co-operative 
Society Movement and the multiple retail chain, both focused on meeting the 
changing requirements of consumers, gained prominence (Seth and Randall 2001, 
Harvey et al. 2002). In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain was largely an 
agricultural and rural society, and markets and itinerant traders serviced the urban 
and rural working classes (Jefferys 1954, O’Brien and Harris 1991). However, by 
the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century, continued 
industrialisation and urban growth helped to create new opportunities for fixed 
retail outlets (O’Brien and Harris 1991). There was a new industrial working 
class, who looked for mass consumer goods and a new urban middle class, who 
wished for an improved shopping experience (Jefferys 1954, Young 2004). The 
emergence o f these distinct consumer groups, the integration of distribution 
through rail transport, and the growing availability of cheap foods from overseas 
provided the opportunity to extend the fixed outlet model, and the beginnings of 
multiple chain retailing in the UK (Harvey et al. 2002, Young 2004). This first 
phase of retail development was in response to a quite distinctive and novel 
‘social organisation of demand’, which developed earlier than any other 
contemporary political economy, and constituted an ‘essential precondition for 
the distinctiveness’ of UK supermarket groups today (Harvey et al. 2002: 231).
The Co-operative Societies led the way during this first phase of change in the 
UK, pioneering both mass-production techniques and new retail outlets (Harvey
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et al. 2002). Most Co-operatives Societies were organised by workers and based 
on democratic principles, with the aim of establishing grocery shops that would 
sell goods at fair prices, serve the interests of their members, and earn surpluses 
for reinvestment and dividends (Seth and Randall 2001). The purpose of the Co­
operative Movement was to counter the abuses of the company shop system, and 
unlike other retail shops, they were not designed as a commercial venture or 
organised to make a profit (O’Brien and Harris 1991). The Co-operative 
Movement was a unique British solution3, a support network to help working 
families, often living on low wages, buy food and household goods without being 
at the mercy of unscrupulous retailers (Seth and Randall 2001). The first 
recognised Co-operative Society outlet opened in 1844 when the ‘Rochdale 
Pioneers’ recognising the need for a more equitable approach to market exchange, 
one ‘that was not driven solely by the demands of capital but also by human rights 
and social justice’, developed the first operational model o f co-operative retailing 
in North England (Nicholls and Opal 2005: 181). The Rochdale Pioneers built 
their reputation on fair pricing and eliminated credit, which had been the scourge 
of the nineteenth century working class. However, following the use of their 
strong market position to keep prices down they were ironically boycotted in the 
1870s for using ‘unreasonable amounts of muscle’ against the independent grocer 
(Seth and Randall 2001: 146). The Co-operative Movement continued to grow 
until the beginning of the twentieth century, but it was to change for ever with the 
arrival of the large-scale retail multiple chains (Seth and Randall 2001).
The Co-operative Movement was part of a much wider retailing market in the UK 
(Harvey et al. 2002). As noted by Seth and Randall (2001) groceries and 
provisions came from a variety o f outlets in the early and mid-nineteenth century 
-  from farmers, open air markets, and traditional grocers who were skilled 
craftsmen. In the 1850s, the working class chose to buy only the bare necessities 
from the local grocer, preferring to buy from open markets and the market halls 
that were beginning to appear in the cities (Young 2004). There was no universal 
or dominant form of independent shop which established the country as a ‘nation 
of shopkeepers’ at this time (Harvey et al. 2002). However, by the late- 
nineteenth century, full industrialisation with its large-scale manufacturing and
3 The Co-operative model developed in the UK spread around the world (Seth and Randall 2001).
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steam powered transport systems (with refrigeration) had a significant impact on 
food retailing in the UK (Seth and Randall 2001). The ability to mass produce 
and widely distribute goods coupled with the birth of an industrialised urban class 
with steady jobs and a buoyant economy helped to fuel a market for new products 
(O’Brien and Harris 1991, Seth and Randall 2001). This together with the decline 
of British agriculture and the availability of cheap food from overseas accelerated 
the need for new channels of supply to customers (O’Brien and Harris 1991, Seth 
and Randall 2001).
A new mercantile class rose to the challenge, developing commercial practices 
with economies of scale more akin to manufacturing, and capable of fulfilling the 
demands of the working classes for mass consumer goods (O’Brien and Harris 
1991, Young 2004). This led to the emergence of the multiple retail chain4 in the 
1870s and the passing o f the small independent trader thereafter (O’Brien and 
Harris 1991). The aim of the new retailing groups was to offer consumers a wide 
range of standardised products at competitive prices, which could be achieved by 
bulk purchasing and better economies of scale (O’Brien and Harris 1991). Each 
store in the chain was designed to look the same and organised to carry the same 
stock in order to build a corporate brand image (O’Brien and Harris 1991). The 
multiple retail chain’s brand became the standard assurance of quality, hygiene 
and bargain prices -  essentially value for money (Jefferys 1954, Freidberg 2004). 
One notable multiple chain to emerge at this time was Sainsbury’s, the UK’s third 
largest supermarket group today (Key Note 2007a). Sainsbury’s was founded in 
1869 by John Sainsbury to sell the basic provisions of butter, bacon and eggs 
(packaged goods were added later) (Young 2004, Freidberg 2004).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the retail trade was being transformed 
and the small shopkeeper was ‘losing ground daily’ (Marshall 1920 reset 1949: 
240). Small independents were characteristically organised around the shop 
counter, with most goods stacked behind or in a storeroom, and customers were 
served individually (O’Brien and Harris 1991, Lyon et al. 2004). Individual 
service was preferred by the more conservative middle-class shopper, and many
4 Multiple retail chains are defined as firms operating from 10 or more outlets (Census of 
Distribution 1961, cited in O’Brien and Harris 1991).
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local shopkeepers having developed good trading relationships with their 
customers were reluctant to break the tradition of personal service (Powell 1991, 
Lyon et al. 2004). However, in some ways the historical position of the small 
independent shop and its replacement by the retail multiple chain is a little 
misleading (Harvey et al. 2002). The independent sector of retailing in the UK 
was characterised by firms with fewer than 10 outlets, which usually operated one 
or two shops under sole proprietorships or through partnerships (O’Brien and 
Harris 1991). These independent shops (bakers, butchers, greengrocers and 
fishmongers) were far from being the universal form of food outlet during the 
nineteenth century (Seth and Randall 2001, Harvey et al. 2002, Young 2004). So 
although the emergence of the retail multiple chains is significant, because after 
the Second World War the independents were unable to compete with them, the 
small shop was part o f a more complex system of food provision in the UK which 
included open markets and farm shops (O’Brien and Harris 1991, Young 2004).
From the 1890s to the late-1930s the growth of multiple retail chains in the UK 
was quite remarkable, some of which emerged in relation to colonial trade in tea, 
whilst others, large chains (of 500 or more outlets) grew from expansion or 
through mergers and acquisitions (Harvey et al. 2002). Tesco, the UK’s largest 
supermarket group today, was founded by John Cohen in 1924 and did in part 
take its name from a shipment o f tea (Corina 1978, Key Note 2007a). Cohen 
bought a consignment of tea from the importer Torring and Stockwell to be sold 
in half-pound packets, but with no market brand a name was needed. This was 
quickly concocted from the initials of a partner in the importer, Mr. T. E. 
Stockwell and the first two letters of Cohen’s surname (Corina 1978). During this 
period, food retailing in the UK was dominated by many hundreds of small-scale 
firms, either single-outlet independents or very small multiple chains (Wrigley 
and Lowe 2002). The situation reflected the relative ease of market entry in terms 
of low initial capital investment (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). 
There was a concentration of food retailing in the UK, which signalled the growth 
of a nationally integrated retail market. Significantly, this occurred before any 
other country in the world and created a platform for the next wave of 
development of grocery shopping in the UK (Harvey et al. 2002).
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2.2 Food Retailing in Post-War Britain
The second phase in UK food retailing is best characterised by the demise of the 
small, often independent retailer and the growing strength of the multiple retail 
chain through the introduction of ‘self-service’ (Seth and Randall 2001). The Co­
operative store was the first real casualty of the second phase of food retail 
development in the UK (Birchall 1987). The Co-operative Movement was 
viewed as a group of ‘fiercely independent local retailers under consumer 
control’, exerting control on food producers for the benefit of its local customer 
and dividend members (Raven et al. 1995: 2). However, this commitment was 
also a serious weakness, because Co-operative Societies acted separately and in 
an autonomous fashion making them both vulnerable and unable to compete in 
the face o f the centrally controlled multiple retail chains with their competitive 
muscle (Seth and Randall 2001).
There were a number of political, economic and cultural forces which led to a 
change in the organisation of shopping and the move towards self-service 
retailing (Powell 1991). Food rationing ended in early post-war Britain making 
available a range of foodstuffs to the public, increasingly provided by the multiple 
chains (Powell 1991, Raven et al. 1995). A ‘change of tempo to life’ during the 
1950s also created a new ‘sense of urgency’ and ‘a feeling that time was at a 
premium’ (Powell 1991: 62). In the past, shopping trips had been viewed as more 
leisurely, but the growing number of working women and wives resulted in an 
emphasis on time-saving rather than personal service (Powell 1991, Hennessy 
2006). The recently elected Labour government’s drive to re-enlist women into 
industry and the emergent employment opportunities for women in health and 
education helped increase household incomes and transform domestic 
arrangements (Raven et al. 1995, Lyon et al. 2004). As newspaper restrictions 
were lifted, women’s magazines promoting ‘powerful images of new 
technologies, new styles and new expectations’ appeared (Lyon et al. 2004: 28). 
During this period, many families moved into new housing with better facilities, 
which coupled with a sharp rise in prosperity influenced the way people organised 
their lives (Lyon et al. 2004). Individual preferences became increasingly 
important in the way people chose to live their lives (Lyon et al. 2004, Hennessy
2006).
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Associated with these changing consumer requirements, a new model of food 
shopping was introduced, known as self-service (Harvey et a l  2002). The small 
independent grocery store with its friendly counter-service was pushed aside to 
make way for the self-service grocery store -  largely an American import (Corina 
1978, Powell 1991). The self-service store format had been observed by many 
UK multiple retailers, with both Tesco’s founder, Sir (then Mr) John Cohen and 
Lord (then Mr Alan) Sainsbury making study visits to the United States after the 
Second World War (Corina 1978). Yet, it was a London Co-operative Society 
and small grocery stores which initially provided the retail impetus for self- 
service stores in Britain, largely because an increase in school-leaver age reduced 
a ready supply of cheap labour (Corina 1978, Young 2004). However, as a result 
of higher wages being offered in manufacturing, staff shortages emerged in the 
retail sector, and other retailers turned to self-service (Powell 1991, Seth and 
Randall 2001). Tesco quickly adopted the new concept, and by the mid-1950s it 
had opened 150 small self-service stores across the country. The inherent lower 
price structure of self-service appealed to Tesco’s main customer base (Powell 
1991). In contrast to the more conservative middle-class shoppers associated with 
the Sainsburys’ brand of food retailing, Tesco’s customer base were quick to take 
advantage of the savings available through the economies of scale of mass 
retailing (Powell 1991, Seth and Randall 2001). It has been argued that the first 
phase of retail development created a dual market between the multiple retail 
chains with a limited range of low price goods aimed at a relatively 
‘homogeneous urban class’ and more specialist outlets with high value goods for 
the ‘middle and upper classes’ (Harvey et a l 2002: 235). At the time, Tesco and 
Sainsbury’s reflected these very positions in the market, as Tesco was viewed by 
its customers as cheap and cheerful (Powell 1991), whilst Sainsbury’s mainly 
located in the South of the country, was according to Seth and Randall (2001) 
viewed as the ‘grocer’ of the middle classes.
In many respects the 1950s was an important transitional period in the 
consumption practices o f the UK population (Lyon et a l 2004). Household 
relocation, stable employment in economic reconstruction and domestic changes 
due to new patterns of female employment were reflected in consumer behaviour 
(O’Brien and Harris 1991, Lyon et a l 2004). Nonetheless the implementation of
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the self-service format was restricted until food rationing finally came to an end in 
July 1954, but when these gave way, there was a wider choice of goods and 
improved product availability (Lyon et al. 2004). As the decade progressed, 
television broadcasting began to further influence buying habits and grocery 
shopping evolved yet again to capitalise on the change of consumer requirements 
(Seth and Randall 2001, Wrigley and Lowe 2002).
Fortunately for food retailers, the post-war reconstruction led to a property boom 
in the mid-1950s and the UK government decided to drop building licences. This 
provided the opportunity for store development, but for the first time smaller 
retailers had to compete on capital terms with the larger retail groups (Powell 
1991). It was during this time that the ‘supermarket’ format, which was classified 
as a self-service food store with a sales area in excess of 2000 square feet, 
eclipsed the comer shop (Wrigley and Lowe 2002, Lyon et al. 2004). As 
suggested by Kay (1989: 105), supermarkets ‘carved out their comer of the high 
street’. Yet this new format was slow to take shape -  Tesco opened its first self- 
service store in St.Albans in 1947 and Sainsbury’s followed with its first in 
Croydon in 1950 -  the first Tesco supermarket per se was not opened until 1956 
(Kay 1989, Lyon et al. 2004). By the late-1950s, there were only 175 food stores 
out of more than 150,000 stores meeting the supermarket criteria (Wrigley and 
Lowe 2002). By the early-1960s, there were still fewer than 600 supermarkets, 
accounting for less than 4 percent of food store sales in the UK (McClelland 
1962). However, new entrants were beginning to appear in the market, some of 
which were suppliers moving upstream to retail distribution (Young 2004). In 
1961, Morrisons the UK’s fourth largest supermarket group today opened its first 
supermarket (Morrisons 2006, Key Note 2007a). Morrisons grew from an egg 
and butter stall in a Bradford market, which began life in 1900 under the 
management of William Morrison Provisions Ltd (Morrisons 2006). In 1965, 
ASDA (Associated Dairies) the UK’s second largest supermarket group today 
was founded by a group of Yorkshire farmers (Young 2004, Key Note 2007a).
However, the catalyst that changed the food retailing market in the UK and made 
it into the one more recognisable today came in the mid-1960s, with the increased 
focus on retail price maintenance (Burke and Shackleton 1996). Grocery
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products had long been subject to trade practices which prevented or restricted 
price competition (Lyon et al. 2004). Retail price maintenance (RPM) sanctioned 
the practice whereby manufacturers could stipulate a fixed selling price for their 
products through all distribution channels, a price that retailers were obliged to 
charge or risk being refused future supplies. In principle RPM supported small 
shopkeepers, but in reality it artificially kept prices high by effectively reducing 
and even eliminating price competition (Burke and Shackleton 1996). As noted 
by Kay (1989: 91), RPM ‘allowed manufacturers to tell retailers what to charge 
the public in the name of preserving the maker’s muscle and the bank balances of 
the comer shop’. A growing band of multiple retail chains strongly favoured 
abolishing RPM, because the enforcement of minimum prices prevented them 
giving their customers the best price and value, and the opportunity to present 
their product offer in the best light competitively (Kay 1989, Lyon et al. 2004, 
Bevan 2005).
The practice of controlling prices in this way had prevailed for over a hundred 
years and was originally introduced to maintain orderly competition and fair 
prices in the market (Burke and Shackleton 1996). Opposition to the scheme 
began in the late-1940s, initially from the Co-operative Movement who planned 
to use customer dividends to offer discounts on fixed price goods and build 
customer loyalty, and then from Jack Cohen (as he became known), the Tesco 
entrepreneur who wished to drive sales by drawing customers into his stores by 
offering cheaper prices (Corina 1978). Attempts to abolish price maintenance 
included recommendations made in 1949 by Harold Wilson (then President of the 
Board o f Trade) to end all forms of price control, but the subsequent fall of the 
Labour government resulted in no changes to the system (Corina 1978). The new 
Conservative government intent on scrapping post-war controls also attempted to 
remove all price fixing, but the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, which 
banned suppliers collectively enforcing their list prices, still allowed suppliers to 
fix prices by individual retailer. Cohen, a member of the Conservative Party, felt 
let down by this decision and complained to his friends within the government, 
but to no avail (Corina 1978). In the early-1960s, frustrated by not being able to 
develop a stronger position in the market, Cohen approached Edward Heath (then 
Trade Minister) (Corina 1978, Powell 1991, Bevan 2005). In 1964, supported by
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the Institute of Economic Affairs (a free-market think tank) which in 1960 had 
published an influential pamphlet entitled ‘Resale Price Maintenance and 
Shoppers’ Choice’, Heath set about pushing a bill through parliament to abolish it 
(Bevan 2005). By removing fixed retail prices, the government hoped to reduce 
the cost of living (Corina 1978, Powell 1991). But, the abolition of RPM came at 
some cost to an already unpopular Conservative government, with the backlash 
from small shopkeepers watching their livelihoods disappear, often cited as one of 
the reasons for the downfall of the Conservatives in the 1964 election (Raven et 
al. 1995, Bevan 2005).
The demise o f RPM was a huge boost to the advancing multiple retail chains, 
heralding price competition and ‘the era of the “loss leader’” to entice customers 
with a bargain’ (Raven et al. 1995: 2). Discounted prices on loss leaders 
successfully drew shoppers to the multiples, and ‘value’ -  defined by price alone 
-  became the new consumer watchword (Raven et a l 1995, Lyon et a l 2004). 
The emphasis in food retailing had shifted to price and for the first time retailers 
could charge any price they wished and thereby ‘assert their power over 
suppliers’ (Kay 1989: 106). This was a critical change in the history of food 
retailing in the UK (Kay 1989, Raven et al. 1995). The 1964 Resale Prices Act 
changed the balance of power between supplier and retailer for evermore, as 
supermarkets ‘won carte blanche... to cut prices to whatever level they deemed 
manageable’ and to offer the customer ‘the best financial deal’ (Bevan 2005: 49). 
The abolition of RPM hit the independent and small multiple retail chains the 
hardest (Young 2004). Between 1965 and 1998, one of the biggest single retail 
players, the Co-operative Society Movement, shrank from over 35 percent to less 
than 10 percent of the market and the ‘independents and others’ sector from 50 
percent to under 15 percent (Seth and Randall 2001, Young 2004). By 
comparison, the main multiple chains (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, ASDA and Safeway) 
moved from under 10 percent to some two-thirds of the market during the same 
period (Young 2004). In order to capitalise on the new found era o f price 
competition post-1965 multiple chains relocated their shop premises to bigger 
sites, which resulted in the creation of the ‘superstore’ (O’Brien and Harris 1991). 
The superstore was defined as a single-level, self-service store with at least
25,000 square feet o f sales area, selling a wide range of food and related items,
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and supported by extensive car parking (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The (out-of- 
town) superstore was a key component of the marketing strategy of the lead 
multiple groups and transformed food retailing in the UK. The pace of change 
from conventional supermarkets to superstores quickened during the late-1970s 
and early-1980s, and led to the introduction of the hypermarket (Seth and Randall 
2001, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The hypermarket with a sales area of 50,000 
square feet or more enabled the multiple retail chains to continue to dominate 
during the 1980s (Raven et al. 1995, Seth and Randall 2001, Key Note 2003).
However, there were other forces which impacted on the development of the 
multiple retail chains, particularly the changing social and economic 
circumstances in the country. These included (i) employment stability -  rising 
‘real’ incomes and an improved income distribution, (ii) the proportion of 
personal income spent on housing, (iii) the growth of car ownership and mobility, 
(iv) the continued rise in the number of women in employment, and (v) higher 
wages (O’Brien and Harris 1991, Burke and Shackleton 1996). Post-war Britain 
experienced fundamental changes in its social structure and by the early-1970s, 
there was a steep rise in the country’s population with different forms of ‘family’ 
emerging. Widespread demographic changes and accompanying employment 
opportunities helped to drive up wages and with improved income distribution 
there was a growing condition o f affluence (O’Brien and Harris 1991). Economic 
stability in the country influenced customer purchasing habits and buying patterns 
and directly impacted public consumption in the UK (Marwick 1982). This was 
the period that, in the words of Marwick (1982:13) gave ‘rise to the birth of the 
consumer society’. New opportunities emerged for the populace to spend 
household income on houses, cars and domestic appliances, but such 
opportunities depended on security of employment, the availability of mortgages 
and a belief in the country’s future economic strength (O’Brien and Harris 1991). 
The increased expenditure on housing, personal transport, leisure and labour- 
saving devices (freezers and microwaves), coupled with increased car ownership 
and women working outside the home, reflected the changing patterns of personal 
consumption in the early-1980s. There was a shift towards bulk purchasing, 
which the superstore and hypermarket were able to capitalise on (O’Brien and 
Harris 1991, Seth and Randall 2001). Furthermore, increased car ownership
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made out-of-town shopping possible and the appeal of the ‘one-stop-shop’ 
provided by the likes of Sainsbury’s, Tesco and ASDA grew, as did the range of 
products on offer, including convenience products like ready-prepared meals’ 
(Burke and Shackleton 1996). The food manufacturing industry keen to exploit 
consumer demand, invested in the technological advancements of freeze drying 
and controlled atmosphere packaging. The result was an efficient process for the 
production of convenience foods and an onslaught o f new fresh and chilled 
product ranges (Traill 1997, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The increased leisure 
activity of watching television and the explosion of food advertising which tended 
to homogenise tastes across the nation and reduce regional and local differences, 
also impacted on consumer shopping habits and patterns of consumption (Burke 
and Shackleton 1996, Lyon et al. 2004). As more people became employed and 
engaged in leisure activities, individual time became a priority and convenience 
foods an opportunity for the multiple chains (Burke and Shackleton 1996). The 
distinct aspect o f change relating to the social organisation of demand during this 
period, was the growing presence of the big multiple retail chains in the 
marketplace and the way they developed to target different types o f consumer 
need and interest (Burke and Shackleton 1996, Harvey et al. 2002).
2.3 Arrival of the Superstore and Ascendancy of the Supermarket Group
The third phase in UK food retailing witnessed the launch of the superstore and 
the ascendancy of the supermarket groups, which today not only command the 
high street, but also wield authority over the supply chains that serve it (Wrigley 
and Lowe 2002, Bevan 2005, Simms 2007). The 1980s witnessed the increasing 
concentration of the food retailing sector in the UK and the rise of the retail 
corporation, the ‘mega-chain’ which became significant in the country’s economy 
(Gardner and Sheppard 1989, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The transition of the 
conventional supermarket to the superstore format arrived quickly in the 1980s. 
Supermarkets were primarily located on high streets and in town centres, whereas 
superstores were out-of-town emporiums with an extensive range of fresh foods 
and non-foods, such as household items, clothing and petrol (Wrigley and Lowe 
2002). As a consequence, spending on food and other goods was rapidly 
increasing at the local superstore (Key Note 2003). Previously, food retailing had 
primarily focused on price, but customer aspirations were changing, food quality
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was becoming a key requirement and Tesco in particular, responded by 
abandoning its ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ past and moving upmarket (Kay 1989, 
Powell 1991). Shoppers were beginning to have confidence that prices in 
particular retailers would be generally competitive, which allowed supermarket 
groups the opportunity to ‘lure’ consumers ‘upmarket into the tempting exotica 
and luxuries’ (Kay 1989: 94). As the supermarket groups grew, they faced an 
increasingly ‘demassified’ (segmented) consumer market, which they became 
increasingly adept at responding to by differentiating their offer (Seth and Randall 
2001, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The leading supermarkets developed targeted 
retail offers for particular consumer segments and actively orchestrated the 
market to create a unique position for themselves within it (Raven et al. 1995, 
Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The growing prominence of the supermarkets in the 
marketplace and their increased buying power provided the means for them to 
shape and capitalise on the consumer’s growing appetite for new and varied 
foodstuffs in a convenient self-service format. Increased consumer spending led 
to increased profits, which together with more easily obtained capital enabled the 
UK top tier supermarkets to expand at an accelerated rate (Seth and Randall
2001). In the last few decades of the twentieth century, food retailing in the UK 
was transformed through the ‘concentration of capital’ in an industry which was 
‘increasingly dominated by “big capital” in the form of large corporations’ 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002: 22).
No other country in Europe experienced the ascendancy of the supermarket group 
quite like the UK (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). During the 
1980s and early-1990s, the superstore had become one of the most important 
formats to drive the rapidly increasing sales and profit levels of the major UK 
multiple chains (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The supremacy of these groups and 
the success of the edge-of-city superstore retail format had been fuelled by 
demographic change, suburban development, the widespread increase of car 
ownership and changes in consumer requirements. However, it was both the 
liberalisation of planning policy and the attitude of the national government which 
was central to the rise o f the supermarket group during this period, particularly in 
terms of where food retailers could locate (O’Brien and Harris 1991, Wrigley and 
Lowe 2002). During the 1980s, a small group of food retail corporations emerged
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in Britain, ‘whose turnover, employment levels, profitability, and sheer market 
and political power came to rival the largest industrial firms in any sector of its 
economy’ (Wrigley and Lowe 2002: 31). The growth of these mega-chains -  
Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Argyll (later to be Safeway), ASDA, and Gateway (now 
Somerfield), was driven by both merger and acquisition, and by ‘organic’ 
expansion (new store development and store extensions) (Seth and Randall 2001, 
Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The 1980s saw an unprecedented wave of mergers and 
take-overs in the UK food retail industry. The Dee Corporation who already 
owned Gateway, bought International Stores from British American Tobacco and 
then Fine Fare, the Argyll group bought Safeway (Gardner and Sheppard 1989), 
and Tesco bought Hillards, a Yorkshire-based retail group in 1987 (Gardner and 
Sheppard 1989, Powell 1991). This spate of activity exacerbated the existing 
tendencies o f the industry to create ‘fewer and fewer firms controlling larger and 
larger shares of the market’ and a level of retail concentration which made British 
retailing ‘uniquely the province of big business’ (Gardner and Sheppard 1989: 24- 
26). In this regard, the British retailing experience was quite different from its 
European neighbours during the period (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). In Germany, 
the discount model developed by small retail groups dominated the market 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002). While in France the small market/specialist retailer 
prospered, which Breed (1998) suggests is largely due to local authorities in 
France being given the right in 1973 to veto the building of a supermarket over
1,000 square metres.
In comparison, there was a ‘frantic’ store-building boom by the leading 
supermarket groups in the UK during the late-1980s. New store growth had 
become the second line of attack for building market share, which led to intense 
competition for new sites (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Edge-of-city superstores 
operated on lower costs and with limited competition from rival stores of the 
same ‘vintage’, so the format became a key driver of increased sales and profits 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002). New store development offered a comparative 
advantage and quickly became the new critical arena o f competition between the 
supermarket groups (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Subsequently, 
the late-1980s and early-1990s was ‘widely characterised as an era of store wars' 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002: 78, emphasis as stated). However, faced with an ever-
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changing and increasingly segmented consumer market, the supermarkets also 
needed to maintain the interest and satisfaction of the consumer (Gardner and 
Sheppard 1989, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Product innovation became a critical 
requirement and supermarkets developed an array of new product ranges -  ready 
prepared chilled, frozen, canned and dried ambient meals based on both ethnic 
and traditional cuisines (Traill 1997). The majority of the new products were 
launched under the retailers’ own-brand and supermarket groups became skilful 
in their use of design principles to create a distinctive corporate identity 
associated with these new ranges (Traill 1997, Gardner and Sheppard 1989). By 
extending their product offer and creating a distinct ‘own-label’ position in the 
market, the supermarkets were able to differentiate themselves from the 
opposition (Gardner and Sheppard 1989). As noted by O’Brien and Harris (1991:
109), own-label products also gave the supermarket ‘a strong visual identity and 
appeal’ in the ‘pursuit of a distinctive image’. New stores, store extensions and 
the refurbishment of existing stores helped maximise the use of space and 
accommodate these new product ranges (Seth and Randall 2001, Wrigley and 
Lowe 2002).
The retail groups Sainsbury’s, Tesco, and Marks & Spencer Food, significantly 
shifted their focus to the premium market by widening their product ranges to 
include ready packaged meals, prepared meats, fresh fish, continental breads, 
ethnic chilled foods, patisserie and fresh dessert ranges, and exotic, previously 
difficult to obtain fruits and vegetables -  ‘new high-value-added speciality 
convenience foods’ (Burke and Shackleton 1996: 26). Supermarkets were 
stealing the march on quality and product ranges were designed to appeal to the 
upwardly mobile and socio-economic classes A and B -  an important factor in 
ensuring higher profit margins (Raven et al. 1995, Burke and Shackleton 1996, 
Wrigley and Lowe 2002). However, this strategy carried the risk of neglecting 
the interests of many poorer consumers and helped to create a market niche for 
such operators as Kwik Save and encouraged the continental discounters Netto, 
Aldi and Lidl to enter the UK market (Burke and Shackleton 1996, Harvey et al. 
2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). During the more difficult trading times of the 
early-1990s, the leading supermarkets were forced to respond to such discount 
operators (Wrigley and Lowe 2002).
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However, food retailing critically relies on market information about changing 
consumer tastes and shopping behaviour, at which the larger established 
supermarkets excelled (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). By 
exploiting data both in-store and further upstream in the supply chain, 
supermarkets were able to source products more effectively, thereby reducing 
their cost-base (Young 2004, Simms 2007). From the late-1970s to the mid- 
1990s food retailing in the UK underwent an organisational and technological 
transformation in supply chain terms (Womack and Jones 1996, Wrigley and 
Lowe 2002). The introduction of self-service had pioneered the standardisation 
of packaging, pricing and quality, which paved the way for the introduction of 
bar-scanning and automatic replenishment systems (Seth and Randall 2001, 
Harvey et al. 2002). To meet customer demand and ensure continued product 
availability, ‘the very core of retailing’, supermarkets became inevitably 
‘concerned with planning, coordinating and controlling the flows of product and 
information into their companies in order to get the right products in the right 
place at the right time’ (Wrigley and Lowe 2002: 83). In the past, valuable selling 
space was taken up by storage in the retail store and the system of distribution to 
replenish stocks was both inefficient and costly. There was a distinct lack of 
control over the distribution process, few if any retailers could trace the progress 
of a pallet of goods through the network (Rudd 1987). The activity of 
strategically managing the supply chain; the movement and storage of inventory 
from suppliers through store to the customer, became known as logistics 
management, with the management of that flow beginning at the source of supply 
and ending at the point of consumption (Christopher 1986, Wrigley and Lowe
2002). All the major supermarket groups created sophisticated logistics systems 
which played a decisive role in the streamlining of supply chains (Raven et al. 
1995, Womack and Jones 1996). One of the key enablers o f these developments 
was bar-coding, the ability to give every individual product a unique reference, a 
series of numbers (bars) which could be electronically scanned (Gardner and 
Sheppard 1989, Raven et al. 1995).
Another link in the chain which was to transform supply management was the 
advancement o f information technology, resulting in Electronic Point of Sale 
(EPoS) systems. EPoS enabled automatic scanning of product bar codes and a
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much more rapid check-out operation (Gardner and Sheppard 1989, Wrigley and 
Lowe 2002). The process of taking the supply and servicing of individual stores 
out of the hands of food manufacturers and suppliers had first begun during the 
1970s, but it was not until the mid-1980s that the supermarkets had the 
sophistication in their own distribution systems to take command of the extended 
supply chain (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Supermarkets own 
centralised distribution systems were extended to include Regional Distribution 
Centres (RDCs) where branded and own label manufacturers could supply goods 
to a central store (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The RDCs 
removed the need for direct deliveries to every store in the supermarket chain and 
through a process of consolidation, whereby products could be grouped from a 
number of food manufacturers by individual store demand and shipped, 
supermarkets were able to engineer great efficiencies and cost savings (Raven et 
al. 1995). Further technological developments in the retail supply chain of multi­
temperature vehicles gave supermarkets the opportunity to manage the upstream 
supply chain all the way from the country of origin and producer of goods, and 
helped to create further comparative advantage for those positioned at the top o f  
the chain.
By the late-1980s, supermarkets managed a fully integrated system, in which 
EPoS scanning data was used to automate product reordering and the linkage 
between in-store stock levels, the warehouse/distribution network, and central 
administrative/financial functions was complete. Furthermore, these systems 
were increasingly linked back to suppliers via EDI (electronic data interchange), 
which allowed for the ‘paperless’ control o f the supply chain and sophisticated 
sales-based ordering (SBO) (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). EPoS and SBO -  an 
automatic stock replenishment system -  revolutionised the retailing industry 
(Gardner and Sheppard 1989). These developments determined how supply 
chains would be managed, whether directly or through the adoption of just-in- 
time (JIT) supply strategies (Gibbon 2001). The tightness o f linkages in the chain 
did not create a reciprocal dependency between supermarkets and their supply 
base, as each supermarket frequently sourced from a number of different suppliers 
in a given product sector (Dolan and Humphrey 2000). By the early-1990s, the 
EDI links of the key supermarket groups covered more than 80 percent of goods
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supplied, and lay at the heart of the ‘demand-pull’ system of supply-chain 
management which changed the relationship between supermarket retailer and 
supplier for ever (Wrigley and Lowe 2002, Bevan 2005). The drive to secure 
market advantage brought the coordination of supply chains squarely under the 
control of the supermarkets, with ‘lead’ players choosing to both organise chains 
and externalise supply functions to preferred suppliers, as in the case of vendor 
managed inventory (VMI) (Raven et al. 1995, Gibbon 2001).
The major supermarket groups, with their sophisticated centralised logistic 
systems and immense buying power were transforming the UK marketplace, but 
there was a glitch in their accelerated growth. The superstore building boom, 
which had been quite dramatic up until this point, started to experience 
restrictions during the early-1990s (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). 
The pressing difficulties of planning permission, planning appeals and the 
subsequent reduction in new development sites coupled with the saturation of 
many towns by the supermarket groups themselves, led to a renewed focus on 
mergers and acquisitions in the sector (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). In a heavily 
contested battle with Sainsbury’s in 1994, Tesco secured the purchase of the 
William Low Group (a Scottish grocery chain), and in 1999, the world’s biggest 
retailer Wal-Mart bought ASDA, while in 2003, Morrisons merged with Safeway 
(Seth and Randall 2001, Young 2004, Simms 2007). Thus, by the end of the 
twentieth century, the supermarket groups dominated the UK food retail market. 
They continued to revolutionise the customer experience, in terms of breadth of 
product choice and availability, whilst still ensuring cost benefits from continuing 
technological innovation in the supply chain were passed on to the consumer in 
the form of lower prices (Seth and Randall 2001, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). In the 
1980s, Sainsbury’s developments in its information technology (IT) and 
distribution systems produced faster stock/inventory turns than any of its rivals 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002). However, by 1995, it was Tesco that had reduced its 
supply chain stockholding to just two weeks through the exploitation of new 
advances in information technology and JIT deliveries (Gibbon 2001, Wrigley 
and Lowe 2002). The supermarket groups had capitalised on large scale growth, 
reaping the benefits of market economies o f scale and better buying terms, which 
coupled with centralised logistics (distribution systems) and new labour practices
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(flexible working patterns) made the supermarkets ‘the triumph o f free markets’ 
(Raven et al. 1995: 2). The benefits of the free market are ‘held to be low prices, 
extensive choice, convenience and efficiency -  defined in its broadest sense as the 
optimum allocation o f resources over the long term for the benefit of society’, 
which the supermarkets are credited with doing (Raven et al. 1995: 6). 
Supermarkets were ‘the all-conquering heroes of the retail revolution’ in the UK, 
offering ‘the widest choice at the lowest prices’ (Kay 1989: 91). With their ‘vast, 
gleaming superstores -  the cathedrals of Thatcher’s Britain’, the supermarkets 
transformed the buying experience and life of the shopper (Seth and Randall 
2001: 272). They providing an ever changing range of products within a new and 
dynamic store environment -  all that a consumer could wish for provided under 
the one roof (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley and Lowe 2002).
However, there were other social factors that impacted on the development and 
the ascendancy of the supermarket groups, including the evolving structure of 
female employment, changes in personal credit, and growing consumer demand 
and expectation (Gardner and Sheppard 1989, O’Brien and Harris 1991). More 
women were working and contributing to the family household income and 
supermarkets increasingly recognised their purchasing power (Gardner and 
Sheppard 1989, O’Brien and Harris 1991). The working patterns of women 
(often part-time and structured around childcare) created a need for shopping at 
weekends which helped create more pressure for the reform of store opening 
hours and the liberalisation of the 1950 Shop Act (O’Brien and Harris 1991, 
Burke and Shackleton 1996). Shopping hours had been tightly regulated by the 
UK government with store opening hour restrictions dating back to the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and in the words of Burke and Shackleton, had ‘cast a 
pall over retailing’ for more than forty years (1996: 60). There were many 
attempts to reform the law but it was not until the defeat of the Store Opening 
Reform Bill in 1986 and the anomaly of Sunday trading legislation falling into 
disrepute, that the Sunday Trading Act permitted seven day trading in 1994 
(Burke and Shackleton 1996, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). In 1997, the bill was 
further amended and twenty-four hour round the clock US style supermarkets 
could be seen in the larger towns and cities in the UK (Wrigley and Lowe 2002).
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Changes in financial regulations and personal borrowing in the 1990s also made 
their mark. Growing credit card ownership, increased consumer purchasing 
power and supermarkets’ acceptance of credit cards in 1990 had a dramatic affect 
on sales (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). By 1994, 40 percent of people aged 18 and 
over held credit cards (Credit Card Research Group cited in Burke and 
Shackleton 1996). Other social changes added to the phenomenal growth of the 
supermarket, such as cultural changes in food, the growth in the number of single 
households, lifestyle changes, experience of travel, foreign foods, maturity of the 
‘baby-boomer’ generation, all of which gave rise to unprecedented spending on 
new types of food (Traill 1997, Seth and Randall 2001, Harvey et al. 2002, 
Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Consumption in the UK was undergoing a 
transformation through the dynamic expansion in new foods; chilled foods, 
convenience meals, ‘ethnic’ meals (Indian, Chinese, South Asian) and Italian 
dishes (Harvey et al. 2002). In part, the transformation generated in food 
consumption was due to the sheer choice of products. This was in stark contrast 
to earlier times, when food supplies were limited5 and purchasing habits were 
dependent on what was available (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). 
The limited range of seasonal produce in the local food store was overtaken by 
supermarkets scouring different parts of the globe for countries whose natural 
seasons were complementary to that of the UK. Where previously there had been 
‘seasons’ in the UK food retail market, now there was all year-round supply of 
fresh produce (Harvey et al. 2002). The development of production expertise and 
distribution systems ensured reliable delivery over enormous distances (Harvey et 
al. 2002, Friedland 2003). By the early-1980s, extended supply chains from 
southern hemisphere locations were providing ‘counter-seasonality’ produce to 
the UK. There were table grapes from Chile and South Africa, speciality 
horticulture from Africa, and kiwi fruit from New Zealand (Raynolds 1994, 
Gwynne 1999, Friedland 2003). The impatient wait or quiet anticipation of the 
new season’s crop of home grown English strawberries or Spanish oranges was 
relegated to the past (Harvey et al. 2002). This increased level of globally 
sourced fresh produce in UK supermarkets necessitated new levels of 
coordination between retailer and supplier/producer, and goes some way to
5 Many product ranges, particularly some varieties of produce, such as exotic fruit and vegetables, 
only became readily available in the early-1980s (Key Note 2006).
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explain the adoption of standardised planting, picking and packing practices in 
agricultural production (Friedland 2003, Phillips 2006).
The explosion of television cookery shows in the early-1990s also played an 
important role in how food was consumed, helping to position many of the chefs 
presenting such programmes as ‘brands’ in their own right (Ashley et al. 2004). 
The arrival of the celebrity chef not only helped communicate the value of fine 
food but also raised consumer awareness of what could be done with new globally 
sourced produce and ingredients being supplied by the supermarkets. By the mid- 
1990s, the UK witnessed a scramble for celebrity chef endorsements and 
collaborative new product development, with numerous articles by the doyenne of 
traditional cookery, Delia Smith regularly appearing in the Sainsbury’s Magazine 
and the launch of Tesco’s new fresh pasta dishes in 1992 under the culinary 
auspices of Valentine Harris, an Italian chef, being only a few examples of this 
phenomenon (Ashley et al. 2004). However, by focusing on product quality, 
merchandising and marketing of the consumer offer, supermarkets built cost into 
their business and although there were seasonal and cyclical price cutting, the 
supermarkets lost their dominant position on price (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley 
and Lowe 2002). This allowed new entrants to the market and by mid-1993, the 
expansion of the discounters had gathered pace, with discounters (including Kwik 
Save) forecasted to capture 15.5 percent of the total UK market by 1995 (Wrigley 
and Lowe 2002).
Initially, the UK experienced very low levels of penetration of the discount 
grocery model exemplified by the likes of Wal-Mart and Aldi, Netto and Lidl. 
This was largely attributed to the nature of the UK food retailing market, which 
was highly concentrated and as such, created substantial barriers to entry for 
potential new entrants (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). Thus, only companies with vast 
capital resources could enter the ‘first division of the UK food retailing sector in 
the medium to long term’ (Raven et al. 1995: 41). But with the onset o f a 
recession in the early-1990s, there was a resurgence o f the discounters, which 
made for turbulent times for the supermarkets. Nevertheless, true to their origins, 
the big three supermarket groups (Tesco, Sainsbury’s and ASDA) fought back, by 
returning to the 1970s style of price cutting and a number of local price wars
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broke out (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). In order to maintain the 
local spatial monopoly critical to the economies of scale and profitability of the 
supermarket groups, and with the experience of a squeeze on profit margins due 
to price cuts, the market leaders introduced in-expensive own-label ‘value’ and 
‘essential’ product ranges to compete (Raven et al. 1995, Wrigley and Lowe
2002). In June 1993, Tesco launched its ‘no frills’ Value range, by late October, 
ASDA froze its prices on 5,000 grocery lines and in November, Sainsbury’s 
announced long-term price cuts on its ‘essentials’ Basic range (Raven et al. 
1995).
The introduction of customer loyalty schemes and reward cards, led by Tesco in 
1995, further changed the growth dynamic of the discounters in the UK market. 
The supermarket groups were able to leverage their competitive advantage due to 
their advanced technical and logistical systems, and embarked upon new 
marketing strategies (Wrigley and Lowe 2002). The development o f store loyalty 
schemes enshrined a new form of trading relationship between supermarket and 
consumer (Harvey et al. 2002). Each time a consumer used a specific retailer’s 
loyalty card, every detail o f the transaction could be traced, for instance: the 
products bought, the proportion of own-label to branded goods, the average 
spend, the frequency of visit and much more (Harvey et al. 2002, Humby et al.
2003). This range o f information allowed the retailer to continuously upgrade its 
socio-economic profiling of its ‘captive audience’, and monitor trends in 
consumer demand. Store loyalty cards created a new linkage between consumer 
and retailer, with the supermarket group understanding the shopping habits of 
consumers probably better than consumers themselves (Harvey et al. 2002, 
Humby et al. 2003). The relationship between retailer and consumer took on a 
new configuration, and there is much to suggest that supermarkets were able to 
capitalise on this position of power -  an enhanced understanding of consumer 
behaviour (Harvey et al. 2002). During this phase of development in UK food 
retailing, supermarket groups emerged with their ‘full-range one stop shop’ 
(Harvey et al. 2002: 240), and a ‘progressively tightened’ grip on the market 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002: 23).
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Supermarkets in the UK have created a retail culture which pervades everyday 
life, they have become the epitome of Thatcher’s free marketers; the saviour of 
better times for an ailing manufacturing based economy (Raven et al. 1995) and 
the ‘baddies’ of modem capitalism (Blythman 2004: 295). Supermarkets have 
‘reached such a level of concentration that they wield enormous power’ and have 
become an oligopoly (Seth and Randall 2001: 278). An oligopoly is defined as a 
market dominated by a few companies (Porter 1985). In many ways, food 
retailing in the UK can be characterised by oligopolistic competition -  a small 
number of supermarket groups battling for market share, through product 
differentiation, quality and availability, and heavy investment in retail outlets and 
logistic systems (Wrigley and Lowe 2002, Young 2004). Although in the past, 
supermarkets played a valuable role breaking down previous oligopolies -  
particularly where manufacturers were concerned -  they have now become an 
oligopoly themselves (Seth and Randall 2001). The birth o f Co-operative 
retailing, the provision of low priced goods, the liberalisation of planning laws 
and the support of successive governments to big retail corporations have helped 
to create a market which, today, is dominated by a small number of supermarket 
groups (Blythman 2004, Young 2004, Bevan 2005, Simms 2007). In this regard, 
the evolution o f food retailing in the UK during the last century has been dramatic 
and uniquely British (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002).
2.4 Power of the Supermarkets
In a market worth in excess of £96bn annual sales in 2006, four major 
supermarket groups dominate: Tesco PLC, ASDA Group Ltd., J Sainsbury PLC 
and Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC, the so called big four, which in 2006 
accounted for over 75 percent o f all UK grocery sales (Key Note 2007b) (a 
breakdown of supermarket groups’ sales and market share is noted in Appendix C 
and Appendix D respectively). There are some other notable retailers in the 
marketplace such as Somerfield PLC, The Co-operative Group, Waitrose Ltd. and 
Marks and Spencer PLC, but their combined market share barely crept over 12 
percent during the same period (Key Note 2007b). The dominance of the big four 
in UK food retailing today is the consequence of the radical changes which took 
place during the last forty years. The UK food market moved from one o f mass 
consumption to one more fragmented and based on the changing attitudes,
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aspirations and lifestyles of a more multi-faceted society (O’Brien and Harris 
1991). Better educated and more sophisticated customers demanded and expected 
quality, service and reputation and the large supermarket groups were well 
positioned to meet these expectations. The competitive drive to fulfil consumer 
needs facilitated the gradual and deliberate growth of the major supermarket 
groups, and led to a marked concentration in the hands o f a small number of 
players in the market (Raven et al. 1995, Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 
2002).
Relationships between supermarkets and suppliers/producers have changed in 
many ways during the last few decades (Duffy and Feame 2004). Up until the 
late-1970s, the distribution function in retailing was firmly under the control of 
the supplier, but during the late-1980s the realisation that sustainable competitive 
advantage could be achieved by jointly managing supply chains, led to many 
collaborative efforts between supermarkets and suppliers (Rudd 1987, Bourlakis 
and Bourlakis 2004). By the early-1990s, many of the major supermarkets were 
engaged in supply chain initiatives, including supplier partnerships and what is 
termed efficient consumer response (ECR) projects (Duffy and Feame 2004). 
The aim of ECR is to review the whole supply chain to eliminate unnecessary 
costs and add value to products, thereby responding to consumer needs more 
effectively. Because ECR depends on sharing information along the supply chain 
and working collaboratively, the effectiveness of projects depended on a 
cooperative relationship, as opposed to a more typically adversarial relationship 
(Duffy and Feame 2004). However, the type of relationships formed between 
supermarkets and suppliers has been subjected to intense scmtiny in the UK over 
recent years, particularly in respect of the supermarkets’ attitude to their supplier 
base. The UK Competition Commission published a high profile enquiry into 
supermarket behaviour in 2000, in which many supplier complaints and alleged 
abuses of power by supermarkets were noted (Duffy and Feame 2004, Blythman 
2004). Complaints made included claims that supermarkets demanded various 
non-cost related payments or discounts, imposed additional charges for doing 
business, made changes to contractual agreements without adequate notice and 
unreasonably transferred risks to suppliers (Competition Commission 2000). As a 
consequence of the enquiry, the big four -  Tesco, Sainsbury’s, ASDA and
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Safeway -  adopted a voluntary code of practice, the Supermarket Code of 
Conduct in March 2002, which was designed to improve relationships with 
suppliers and establish a climate of trust and mutual commitment as a basis for 
greater collaboration (Duffy and Feame 2004). Ironically, this very code has 
recently been highlighted in the press as being flouted during the recent round of 
price cuts in the market introduced by Tesco and ASDA. This is an allegation 
which the Competition Commission is currently investigating as part of their 2007 
review of the market position of UK supermarkets (Competition Commission
2007).
Nevertheless, the vertically integrated supply chain is part o f the comparative 
advantage toolset, a ‘competitive weapon’ in the fight for market dominance 
(Bevan 2005: 26) and as such, supermarket groups continue to exercise control 
and grapple for more power in supply chains (Blythman 2004, Simms 2007). 
Claims are made continuously that supermarkets capture much of the profit in the 
supply chain and, ultimately, have the last say in how the chain is managed 
(Vorley 2003, Blythman 2004, Young 2004, Bevan 2005). Yet the market 
dominance of supermarket groups in UK food retailing is a late-twentieth century 
phenomenon, and the absolute power of supermarkets in global supply chains 
remains difficult to assess (Harvey et al. 2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). 
However, it is quite evident that supermarkets increasingly depend on 
sophisticated and well managed supply chains to maintain competitive advantage 
(price and product range) and thus, they will continue to be a key controller in 
global supply chains, often in place of the producer or supplier (Blythman 2004, 
Lawrence 2004, Young 2004, Bevan 2005). It is the buyer (the supermarket 
representative) who dictates when and how a product is offered to the consumer 
and determines which products will make the most profit (Wrigley and Lowe 
2002, Young 2004). This scenario is aptly described as retail capital dominating 
manufacturing capital (Harvey et al. 2002) and is indicative of the power wielded 
by supermarkets in modem food retailing in the UK (Blythman 2004, Bevan 
2005, Simms 2007). How such power is exercised remains a burning question for 
many social actors involved in debates on corporate responsibility in global 
supply chains.
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2.5 Corporate Social Responsibility
In a globalised world corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an 
important issue, because societal actors are constantly looking to the corporation 
to take an active role in improving the conditions of labour (Henderson 2001, 
Waddock et al. 2002). The 1990s saw growing concerns over corporate 
behaviour, particularly in the retail and manufacturing sectors, where there were 
numerous exposes of exploitative labour practices in global production chains 
(Klein 2000, Waddock et al. 2002). This resulted in a mounting pressure being 
placed on companies to adopt business practices that were more responsible 
(Klein 2000, Waddock et al. 2002, Hertz 2004). Waddock and others (2002: 133) 
identify such growing pressure as coming from three major sources: (i) ‘primary’ 
stakeholders (customers, employees, owners and suppliers), (ii) ‘secondary’ 
stakeholders (NGOs, social activists, local communities, governments and 
institutional or societal forces), and (iii) the initiation of ‘global standards and 
performance indexes’ based on ‘best of rankings’. As noted by Henderson (2001) 
there has been a growing trend towards greater stakeholder participation on issues 
of environmental and social responsibilities of corporations.
The response of supermarket groups has been to try and shape the needs and 
expectations o f customers, arguably one of the retailers’ key stakeholder groups, 
and develop a market positioning vis-a-vis their competitors (Henderson 2001, 
Waddock et al. 2002). Hence, the first sighting of ‘social responsibility’ in retail 
organisations has largely been in relation to business strategy, and more often 
associated with minimising external threat, such as consumer boycotts, than with 
altruistic motives (Porter and Kramer 2002, Waddock et al. 2002). In describing 
the supermarkets’ attention to detail in their business, O ’Brien and Harris (1991:
110) noted that ‘careful consideration is given to every imaginable aspect of the 
retail operation that can in some way influence the consumers’ perception of the 
chain’. These comments are chiefly made in relation to the design and ambience 
of the retail format, but such sentiments are equally applicable in the current 
debate on social responsibility, because whatever influences the image or view of 
the supermarket in the consumer’s mind, must be managed (Blythman 2004, 
Young 2004).
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However, it has been suggested by Johnson and Scholes (2002: 9, italics in the 
original) that the CSR strategy of retailers is affected not just by societal forces, 
but also ‘by the values and expectations of those who have power in and around 
the organisation’. In this respect, the strategy adopted by supermarkets could be 
viewed as ‘a reflection of the attitudes and beliefs of those who have most 
influence’ on the organisation. Hence, where the boundaries are drawn may say 
more about the values o f those who influence strategy, the stakeholders o f the 
organisation -  financial institutions, employees, customers, and perhaps suppliers 
(Johnson and Scholes 2002). In the UK food retailing market ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ has moved up the corporate agenda and been assigned a new role 
and purpose, with ‘corporate citizenship’ being embraced through the 
development o f closer working partnerships and relationships between 
supermarkets and their key stakeholders (Henderson 2001, Hopkins 2004). Every 
major supermarket regularly states their CSR objectives, publishes reports on 
their social responsibility programmes and has announced supplier codes of 
practice, which detail their socially responsible values towards their supply base. 
Often supermarket annual reports provide progress updates, with achievements 
listed against indices on a scorecard, key performance measures that have been 
agreed internally, but which are heavily influenced by the various social audit 
organisations and special interest groups emerging in this domain (Hopkins
2004). Indeed, this can be observed from the CSR mission statements made by 
the key supermarket groups, most of which highlight their commitment to 
operating fairly in their business, in order to meet their customers’ expectations of 
a socially responsible company. Tesco, the UK’s biggest supermarket 
exemplifies this point in their Corporate Responsibility review 2007, stating:
Tesco has strong employment and environmental standards and we 
are confident that trading with us can be an important force for good 
anywhere in the world. We also understand that although our 
customers want low prices, they also want fair prices and decent 
standards.
(Tesco 2007a: 67)
In Sainsbury’s Ethical Trading Report 2003 there are similar sentiments:
Sainsbury’s believes that its customers want excellent quality and 
value for money, but not at the expense o f people working in
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developing countries who may be working in unsafe conditions and 
for poor wages.
(Sainsbury 2003: 2)
Sainsbury’s have recently published a second CSR report in which they 
acknowledge there is greater consumer awareness of the impact their business has 
in the world, and they restate the social imperative of ‘sourcing with integrity’ 
and their commitment to ensure their operations stand up to inspection and 
challenge (Sainsbury 2007: 4-5).
ASDA, the second largest supermarket, does not produce a CSR report in the 
same way as their competitors, but on their corporate website under the heading 
‘ethical trading’ there is the following statement:
ASDA is committed to ensuring that the goods that it sells are 
produced without exploitation and in acceptable working conditions.
(ASDA 2007)
Morrisons make a similar claim in their 2007 CSR report, stating:
Source Responsibly: We seek to ensure that own brand products and 
the ingredients that go into them are produced as responsibly as 
possible.
(Morrisons 2007a: 10)
However, there is a lack of clarity about what ‘responsibly’ actually means in 
some of the supermarkets’ reports or on their websites, which creates the 
difficulty o f how consumers are able to judge the CSR credentials of their local 
supermarket. It seems that CSR in the UK food retailing sector has moved from 
the social dialogue stage to one of reporting, and even with the number of case 
studies and success stories cited by supermarkets, it is still unclear as to what CSR 
actually means in respect of global supply chains (Bendell 2001, Barrientos and 
Dolan 2006). This raises the concern that the displays of social responsibility by 
supermarket groups reflect ‘an enlightened self-interest’ in the phraseology of 
Smith (2003: 53). During the 1990s, supermarket groups were able to build 
market share through a combination of product quality and range, investment in 
new stores, loyalty schemes and sophisticated supply chains (Wrigley and Lowe 
2002, Harvey et al. 2002). But in the current age, when consumer awareness is at
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its greatest, supermarket groups are being challenged to improve the conditions in 
those extended supply chains, where it is considered their realm of influence is 
great (Jenkins et a l 2002, Hopkins 2004).
2.6 Summary
The successive revolutions in food retailing in the UK during the last century 
have created a retailing empire like no other. The industry has evolved from the 
birth of the independent store, to the introduction of self-service and the multiple 
retail chain, through to the arrival of the superstore and the growth of the leading 
supermarket groups of today. The industry has emerged from the growth of the 
multiple chains (demand driven), followed by the market push of the supermarket 
groups (supply driven) through to the consumer demand of today (market pull). 
The large multiple retail chains (the current supermarket groups) have competed 
on price, new store development, innovative and new product ranges, efficient 
supply chains, and today it would seem on their social responsibility policies. 
The period of supermarket growth foreshadows the development of a retail 
industry in the twentieth-first century, where the supply of goods to UK 
households is dominated by a small group of retailing behemoths. A number of 
dynamic changes have taken place in the industry which have impacted the 
relationships between these supermarket giants and other social actors in the retail 
supply chain (suppliers, consumers and civil society). But one of the most 
pertinent to this research study is the shift in control o f determining consumer 
prices in the market. In 1964, the abolition of retail price controls gave 
supermarkets the right to dictate the market price of goods manufactured by large 
companies and small producers alike. This change shaped and determined the 
nature of the relationship between supermarkets and their supply base, which is 
important to the focus of the thesis. The ascendancy of the supermarket groups in 
the latter half of the twentieth century was dependent on two key factors, the 
ability to control consumer prices in the market and the technical capabilities to 
manage a sophisticated integrated supply chain. The key events discussed in this 
chapter chart the development and rise of the supermarket empire and 
demonstrates why this group of social actors command a ‘lead’ position in global 
supply chains today.
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Chapter Three
The Emergence and Development of the Banana Trade 
Introduction
The UK retail market for fresh produce (fruit and vegetables) was worth £7.7bn in 
2005, a growth of 21.7 percent since 2001. During this period, fresh produce 
accounted for 14.8 percent of weekly expenditure on food and drink, and bananas 
-  the most consumed fruit in the UK -  grew to an annual retail market worth in 
excess of £570m (Key Note 2006). In 1998, the banana replaced the apple as the 
most eaten fruit in the UK and today, the British public consumes approximately 
a hundred and forty million bananas each week, almost seven billion a year (Key 
Note 2003, 2006). Bananas are the biggest selling grocery item in terms of 
volume and provide the greatest return of profit to sales for UK supermarket 
groups (Griffiths and Lawrence 2007). Hence, this ubiquitous fruit is a very 
important commodity in the UK food retailing market.
The aim of the chapter is to present the story of the banana and the developments 
that have helped shape the growing and eating of this simple fruit. Like many 
tropical commodities, the production of bananas has its own unique history and 
characteristics. Some o f the key moments and details of the industry are 
discussed, which in part helps to explain how the banana is the most popular fruit 
on the shelves of UK supermarkets today (Key Note 2006). A chief proponent of 
the export trade is the banana producer and an exploration of how the banana 
trans-national corporations (TNCs) have evolved is critical to understanding the 
global supply chain for this fruit, thus a summary of these key players is provided. 
The banana export trade is dependent on a sophisticated supply chain, including 
refrigerated shipping, ripening centres and distribution facilities in the importing 
country (Raynolds and Murray 1998, Myers 2004). The level of integration in the 
banana supply chain has led to the trade being highly capital-intensive and 
resulted in an industry which is dominated by a few major TNCs (Roche 1998, 
Myers 2004). The chapter will chart those historical events that have helped to 
define the global export trade of bananas.
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3.1 The History of the Banana
The banana is one of the oldest known fruits, the fourth most important staple 
crop in the world and a major subsistence crop throughout the tropics (FAO
2003). But unlike other tropical fruits, such as mango and papaya, the banana has 
been traded in world markets for over a century (Cook 2004, Myers 2004). It is 
an ancient fruit, evolving thousands of years ago in Southern Asia6, from where it 
was carried by travellers and traders westward to become the basic food of 
African slaves on colonial estates in Latin America (Enloe 1989, Davies 1990). 
Although these bananas were red in colour, their stems were taken to the West 
Indies and on to Central America by Spanish missionaries in the sixteen century, 
where the plant quickly evolved in the tropical climes to become the more 
familiar yellow banana of today (Enloe 1989, Soluri 2003). The first record of 
the yellow fru it being brought to New York from Havana was in 1804, but the 
fragility of the fruit made its transport to far-away markets unprofitable (Enloe 
1989, Roche 1998). Thus it was not until 1875 when bananas were served as ‘an 
exotic delicacy’ in the homes of affluent Bostonians that the fruit took off as an 
international commodity (Enloe 1989: 127). The banana became the height of 
good taste and luxury in American society in the early-1880s, but the highly 
perishable nature of the fruit meant it would not keep on the long transatlantic 
journey to Europe (Enloe 1989).
Soon however, with the advancement of steam-powered ships and refrigeration, 
such journeys were less problematic and bananas could be transported further 
afield (Enloe 1989, Myers 2004). With the launch of the so named banana boat 
in 1884, small but regular shipments arrived at London, Liverpool and other 
European destinations (Davies 1990, Sheller 2003). A major British shipping 
company, (which later merged with a tea importer to become Fyffes) started a 
regular trade to Liverpool from the Canary Islands, which were only six days 
away by steamer (Davies 1990, Myers 2004). The export of bananas from the 
Canaries to the UK rose from an estimated 10,000 bunches in 1884 to 50,000 
bunches in 1886, but demand soon outstripped the supply of the Canaries (Davies
6 The word banana is derived from the Arab word banan, which means finger (Roche 1998).
-45 -
1990). By the late-1890s, an American company United Fruit (later to become 
Chiquita International) capitalising on the growing requirements of the British 
market began shipping bananas to the UK from Costa Rica (Davies 1990). 
However, the British government somewhat concerned by a growing American 
influence in the banana industry, provided a subsidy in 1901 to a large British 
shipping firm Elder Dempster to operate a service to transport bananas from 
Jamaica to the UK (Davies 1990, Grossman 1998). This was the beginning of the 
struggle between British and American interests in the banana industry that would 
continue for more than a century (Davies 1990, Myers 2004).
By the end of the nineteenth century, consumption levels o f bananas grew 
exponentially in Europe, and the banana emerged as an international commodity 
(Roche 1998, Sheller 2003). From an estimated 90,000 bunches being imported 
in 1886, the trade grew to an estimated 1.5 million bunches by 1901 (Roche 
1998). The banana moved from being a rare and expensive luxury, available to a 
privileged few to that of a mass consumed food across Europe -  bananas were no 
longer the preserve of the rich, but the fruit of the poor (Sheller 2003, Myers 
2004). In order to meet growing consumer demand banana plantations were 
expanded and developed in most tropical regions (Sheller 2003). Increased 
demand also led to an intensification in the banana production process, which 
included the introduction o f modem cultivation practices (the elimination of 
unsuitable soils, development of efficient draining practices, selection of proper 
planting material) and in particular, the introduction and use of fungicides, 
insecticides, and other chemicals to control diseases on the plantation (Roche 
1998, Murray and Raynolds 2000). Banana cultivation techniques are relatively 
simple, but supplies are prone to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and disease 
(Roche 1998, Chapman 2007). Bananas, like other plantation crops, underwent a 
period of intense research during the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to make the 
growing process more scientifically based (Soluri 2003, Myers 2004).
The banana is of the botanical genus Musa and the subgenus Musa sapientum, 
and there are a number of varieties of this edible fruit, but all are vulnerable to 
disease (Davies 1990, Chapman 2007). Until the late-1950s, the Gros Michel (the 
Big Mike) was the most abundantly produced banana clone and the basis of the
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great American trade from the tropics to the US and Europe (Roche 1998, Myers 
2004). The Gros Michel was economically efficient, being more sizable that 
alternative varieties at the time, such as the stubby Red Macabu and the small 
yellow Lady Finger (Chapman 2007). It also travelled well, and with a thicker 
skin than some, it arrived at its destination with less bruising (Chapman 2007). 
Its susceptibility to Panama disease (fusarial wilt) caused it to be replaced by the 
Musa cavendishii, the Cavendish in the 1960s (Soluri 2003, Myers 2004). 
Panama disease is a soil fungus that destroys the root system of the banana plant 
and substantially reduces production yields (Soluri 2003). It also has the potential 
to ruin a whole plantation (Myers 2004). Initially the big producers responded to 
the outbreak o f Panama disease by abandoning vast amounts of land, but this only 
helped production levels in the short-term (Soluri 2003, Myers 2004). The 
interconnected system of a densely planted monoculture (a genetically similar 
host) ensured that the disease reached most of the major banana growing areas of 
Latin America between 1899 and 1930 (Soluri 2003).
Fortunately, the Cavendish variety was wilt-resistant and its shorter structure 
made it less susceptible to wind damage, which is a common problem in tropical 
climes (Roche 1998). However, the Cavendish also had its drawbacks, including 
a tendency for bruising and a vulnerability to leaf spot, Sigatoka disease (Roche 
1998, Soluri 2003). But more worryingly for the international trade, it had a 
shorter shelf-life after ripening (Roche 1998). The majority o f plantations in 
Latin American, Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and Asia grow 
the Cavendish banana and nearly all international trade is conducted in this 
variety today (FAO 2003, Lines 2005). This is largely due to the fact that the 
Cavendish is high-yielding (almost double that of the Gros Michel), easily 
transportable, lasts up to 25 days after harvesting and is more disease resistant 
(Roche 1998, Soluri 2003). In 2004, the total world production of bananas 
(dessert variety) was estimated at 70.5 million tons. The Cavendish accounts for 
approximately 47 percent of global banana production, of which about a third is 
destined for the export market while the remainder services the more localised 
market (FAO 2005a). In itself the change to the Cavendish was a significant 
moment in the history of the international banana trade, but it also generated a
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revolutionary change in the way bananas were transported (Soluri 2003, Myers 
2004). Because of the delicate nature of the Cavendish variety the industry 
switched from exporting bananas on the stem to exporting them in boxes. This 
was a momentous change in the business and the benefits were great, the stalk 
could be left behind, the cardboard box better protected the fruit during handling, 
the boxes were palletised and modem mechanical handling equipment introduced, 
and less space was required on the ship and in the ripening room (Soluri 2003). 
The change to boxing also provided the opportunity for branding through the 
fixing of company logo labels on the bunch of bananas, helping to establish the 
producer’s brand and its associated characteristics, such as quality (Myers 2004).
3.2 The Evolution of the Banana Industry
There is a complex and difficult history of multinational companies’ political 
entanglements, international trade wars and worker insurrections in the banana 
industry (Roche 1998, Myers 2004). From the beginning of the twentieth century 
there was concern over the US-multinationals’ control o f the banana market, 
especially in Latin America where the majority of bananas were harvested (Roche 
1998, Bulmer-Thomas 2003, Sheller 2003,). According to Sheller (2003) the 
massive production and export of bananas in the later half of the nineteenth 
century was part of the process of market concentration and echoed the approach 
used to protect such commodities as coffee, tea, mbber and palm oil in the past. 
Thus, the colonisation of tropical regions by the US government could be 
considered quite normal during this period (Enloe 1989, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). 
The regions adopted by the US during the 1890s included: the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Nicaragua and helped the US- 
multinationals develop major banana plantations in Central and Latin America, 
the Caribbean and Africa, and establish their prominent position in the sector 
(Enloe 1989, Sheller 2003, Chapman 2007).
Consequently, three big American agri-businesses: Chiquita Brands International, 
Dole Foods and Fresh Del Monte Produce; the so-called dollar producers who 
run highly integrated operations in Latin America, dominate the world trade in 
bananas. These major TNCs own or control by contract much o f the production, 
own and organise the shipping, and own and manage the ripening facilities in the
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export country (Roche 1998, Myers 2004, Chapman 2007). The perishable nature 
of the banana requires the entire supply chain -  from production to retail sale -  to 
be closely controlled. A vertically integrated operation provides the means by 
which producers can guarantee sufficient levels of quality fruit reach the market 
(FAO 2003). However, the level of capital investment made by the dollar 
producers in refrigerated shipping, ripening chambers and distribution systems 
has made the industry somewhat oligopolistic in nature (Read 1994, Myers 2004). 
As an oligopoly, these corporations receive substantial economies of scale in 
distributing the product and as such, they not only control a large share of the land 
suitable for cultivating bananas, but also monopolise the marketing system 
through which many independent growers sell their produce (IB C II2004).
3.2.1 The Banana Commodity Chain
Bananas are cultivated in two different systems, the first is export-directed 
plantations and the second, is smallholdings directed at domestic markets (FAO 
2003, Kasteele and Stichele 2005). The large export-directed plantations cover 
vast swathes of land and employ industrial and highly intensive production 
methods to help guarantee a steady supply throughout the year, whereas 
smallholdings typically have lower yields, lower labour productivity, and poorer 
quality fruit (Read 1994, FAO 2003, Kasteele and Stichele 2005). However, 80 
percent of the world’s bananas destined for export are under the control of the 
dollar producers, the US-banana TNCs (FAO 2003, Kasteele and Stichele 2005). 
The TNCs are mostly known for their vast banana enclaves in Latin and Central 
America, but the big three also grow and source bananas from the more recently 
fast-developing producer states in West Africa, the Cameroon and the Ivory Coast 
(IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). As previously noted the movement of 
cargoes of bananas over long distances in prime condition is a very skilled and 
specialised business, and has resulted in a highly integrated supply chain.
An organised and well-managed supply chain is critical in terms of providing 
bananas to the UK supermarket groups, who expect certain conditions of supply 
from producers regarding product quality and delivery specifications. The 
diagram below charts the flow of product from a banana farm/plantation to the 
consumer, but of particular interest is the journey of the fruit through to the
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supermarkets. This is the commodity chain, which supplies the supermarket 
banana -  the virtually flawless, under-ripe fruit of uniform length and breadth.
Diagram 3.1 A Typical Banana Commodity Chain
Retailer Country
Producer Country
Supermarkets
Independent
Retailers
Importer
Distribution
C entres
Ripening Centres 
(producer owned)
Ripening Centres 
(exporter owned)
Ripening Centres 
(importer owned)
Shipping 
(Exporter owned 
reefers)
Retailer
Distribution
Centres
Exporters
(Fyffes)
Shipping 
(Producer owned 
reefers)
W holesaler
Distribution
C entres
A ssociated  
Independent 
Growers 1
Independent / 
Co-operative  
Growers 2
Shipping 
(Private /  
contracted reefers)
Consum ers
Producers 
(Chiquita, Dole, 
Del Monte)
Notes: 1 Associated Independent Growers have supplying contracts with major producers or exporters
(typically contracts are for 12-18 months).
2 Independent Co-operative Growers are drawn upon to provide further supply requirements when 
the capacity o f  the preferred/associated supplier is reached or when climatic and production 
problems result in a shortfall o f  available supply from the primary associated grower.
Source: Interviews producers, Feb-April 2006
However, the dominant US-owned TNC producers largely own and manage the 
global banana supply chain. The origins and developments that have helped 
shape these key players in the industry are somewhat different and a summary is 
provided to inform later discussions on the role they play in the chain.
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3.2.2 Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. is an international producer, marketer and 
distributor of fresh and processed foods, and employs approximately 25,000 
people in more than 70 countries worldwide (Chiquita 2006a). Chiquita’s net 
sales were approximately $4.5 billion in 2006, of which $1.93 billion was 
bananas. The company manages 119 farms in Latin America, which produce 
about half the supply of bananas distributed with the other half coming from 
independent producers in Latin America, the Philippines and the Ivory Coast 
(Chiquita 2006a). However, Chiquita has a chequered and complex past as the 
outgrowth of the United Fruit Company, which for years influenced the politics of 
Central America and gave rise to the phrase banana republics (Silver 2004). 
United Fruit built its empire from bananas and through the process, helped to turn 
the so called small states of Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama into banana republics (Chapman 2007).
The beginnings of the company stretch back to the mid-1880s, when an American 
entrepreneur Minor Cooper Keith, commissioned to build a transnational railroad 
by the Costa Rican government, began planting bananas alongside the track for 
export to the US (Roche 1998, Chapman 2007). The venture proved so 
successful, that Keith acquired more land and expanded his banana production to 
Guatemala and Honduras (Read 1983). In 1899, Keith’s business and the Boston 
Fruit Company merged to form the United Fruit Company, the first truly 
integrated fruit company due to its’ alliances with shippers and wholesalers 
(Roche 1998). In many respects the history of the United Fruit Company (UFC) 
is the history of the international banana industry (Chapman 2007). The UFC 
became the first established multinational banana producer and maintained a 
virtual monopoly over the industry until the 1950s (Read 1983, Chapman 2007). 
It accounted for one in three bananas traded internationally at the time, and since 
the introduction of a steamer boat service to Manchester in 1902, the company 
indirectly controlled the UK market (Roche 1998). Being the first banana 
multinational, the UFC set the template for capital development in the sector: it 
sought control of land, railroads, wharves and steamships (Langley and 
Schoonover 1995, Chapman 2007). The company expanded its operations along
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the Central America coastline and developed a network of vast plantations with 
only a company town at the centre; it was the chief architect of the ‘banana 
enclave’, a term used to describe isolated centres of extraction, exploitation, and 
production, which have largely been built by foreigners (Langley and Schoonover 
1995, Chapman 2007).
During the 1940s and 1950s, UFC tried to promote a more positive image, 
claiming it had been a modernising influence on Latin America by transforming 
‘jungle wastelands’ into productive agricultural compounds, complete with 
railroads, hospitals and schools (Soluri 2003, Chapman 2007). However, the 
company was a law unto itself and regarded the republics in which it operated as 
private fiefdoms. It had a reputation for promoting repressive regimes and coups 
d’etat, which were supposedly launched to support the development of banana 
production (Chapman 2007). United Fruit has been accused of helping suppress 
labour rights in Colombia in 1928, supporting the events leading up to the Cuban 
Revolution7 in the early 1950s, of facilitating the overthrow of a democratic 
government in Guatemala in 1954 and supporting the 1973 military coup in Chile 
against Salvador Allende (Roche 1998, Gow 2001, Chapman 2007). During its 
history, the company was known by many names, but El Pulpo -  the octopus, 
with its tentacles everywhere was perhaps the most apt (Chapman 2007). United 
Fruit started with only a few banana stems on the Atlantic Coast of Costa Rica, 
but it grew into a global power (Roche 1998, Chapman 2007). It controlled 
millions of acres of land, of which only a relatively small part was used but held 
nonetheless to keep its competitors at bay. The company had no need to establish 
cartels in order to control prices; it could do so through its monopoly control of 
the market (Chapman 2007). However, the UFC was challenged by US 
institutions for abusing its power in the market and a number of anti-trust actions 
forced the company to divest assets, which indirectly resulted in the development 
of both Dole and Del Monte (Myers 2004, Chapman 2007). In 1909, following a 
congressional inquiry into complaints of abuses in Panama and Costa Rica, UFC 
sold off a subsidiary to the Vaccaro Brothers Company, which later became
7 Angel Castro (Fidel Castro’s father) worked for the United Fruit Company (Roche 1998).
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Standard Fruit and subsequently Dole (Raynolds and Murray 1998, Myers 2004). 
In 1954, the US government filed another anti-trust action against UFC, resulting 
in further divestment and the opportunity for Del Monte to acquire plantations in 
Guatemala, making Del Monte the third largest banana exporter (Myers 2004).
In 1969, UFC changed hands and was merged with Eli Black’s AMK Corporation 
to become the United Brands Company (UBC) (Myers 2004). Black’s autocratic 
rule proved to be disastrous for the company and following the involvement of 
UBC in a Honduran bribery scandal8 in 1975, the dissipated asset base together 
with the subsequent loss of market share resulted in the company’s stock price 
plummeting. Bankruptcy loomed and Black committed suicide, but the company 
was rescued by a group of investors (Myers 2004, Chapman 2007). In 1985 a 
major shareholder, Carl H. Lindner, took charge of the company and in 1990 re­
named the company Chiquita, which also became the brand for its quality fruit 
(Chiquita 2001a, Myers 2004). Lindner streamlined the company operations by 
disposing of a number of peripheral businesses, one of which was Fyffes, a UK 
based subsidiary (Davies 1990, Scherer 2001). Also, Lindner who had many 
business interests was a long time political giver and made contributions to both 
the Republican and Democrat political parties, despite his more conservative 
leanings. This bipartisan patronage appeared to pay dividends in 1996, when the 
then-US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor serving in President Clinton’s first 
cabinet, and supported by a Republican Congress brought a formal complaint 
before the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the EU, alleging that its’ 
banana quota system violated global trade accords (Fox and Firor 1998). This 
action was critical for Chiquita, as Europe was and still is its biggest market (FAO 
2003, Key Note 2006). However, following the difficult trading conditions of the 
1990s which culminated in the US-EU banana dispute, Chiquita announced a 
major debt restructuring effort in January 2001 (Chiquita 2001a). After more than 
a hundred years dominating the international banana trade, Chiquita was facing 
difficult times (Chapman 2007). In May 2007, the company again attempted to 
reduce its debt through the sale and leaseback of its Great White Fleet (shipping
8 This event led to the enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Chiquita 2001a).
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company) (Nelson 2007). Shipping had been a central part of the company’s 
business since the late-1880s, when Keith painted his ships white to reflect the 
tropical sun (Nelson 2007). By breaking its own maritime tradition, Chiquita 
previously the world’s second largest banana shipper, has acquiesced control of 
one link in its vertically integrated global supply chain (Nelson 2007).
3.2.3 Dole Food Company, Inc.
Dole Food Company, Inc. is the world’s largest producer of fresh fruit, fresh 
vegetables and fresh-cut flowers, and the world’s largest producer of bananas and 
pineapples (Dole 2007). Dole Food Company, Inc. and Castle & Cooke, Inc. are 
privately held companies owned by Mr. David H. Murdock, who has served as 
chairman and chief executive officer of both companies since 1985. Formerly 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Dole Food and Castle & Cooke 
were acquired by Mr. Murdock in 2003 and 2000 respectively (Dole 2005 a). The 
joint group separated its food and real estate businesses in 1995, with Dole Food 
operating as a food producer and distributor, and Castle & Cooke operating as a 
developer and builder of residential real estate, resorts and commercial real estate 
(Dole 2005a, 2007). The combined companies make up one of the largest 
privately held companies in the US, with approximately 64,000 employees 
operating in more than 90 countries around the world (Dole 2005a).
Castle & Cooke emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a food wholesaler in 
Hawaii and later developed interests in shipping and the sugar industry. The roots 
of Dole Food stretch back to 1899, when its founder James Drummond Dole 
arrived in Hawaii straight from the Harvard School o f Horticulture and 
Agriculture with the ambition of starting a farming business (Dole 2007). James 
Dole began by growing pineapples, and in 1901 his business was incorporated as 
the Hawaiian Pineapple Company (Roche 1998, Dole 2007). James Dole 
developed the pineapple growing and canning business into Hawaii’s second 
largest industry (Dole 2007). He was able to successfully grow and harvest 
pineapples in a country where many others had failed, and the company became 
synonymous with superior quality. Realising the significance of quality in the 
marketplace, James Dole decided to stamp the DOLE name on cans of pineapples 
in 1933, and helped to establish one of the major premium brands in the food
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industry (Roche 1998, Dole 2007). A year earlier, Castle & Cooke acquired a 21 
percent share of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company and during the late-1940s, 
Castle & Cooke continued to develop its food interests by investing in a seafood 
packer and helping to organise the Hawaiian Macadamia Nut Company. Castle & 
Cooke merged with Dole in 1961, but because the DOLE brand was so well 
known it became the key marketing brand of the new partnership (Dole 2007). In 
1964, Castle & Cooke purchased a 55 percent interest in the Standard Fruit and 
Steamship Company of New Orleans, which was the first time either party of the 
merged company had embarked upon developing a trade in bananas (Myers 2004, 
Dole 2007). In 1968, the Standard Fruit Company -  the second largest producer 
and importer of bananas -  was fully acquired by Castle & Cooke, and by 1972 all 
bananas produced by Standard Fruit adopted the DOLE label and were 
merchandised as a premier brand. A year later, the company developed two large 
plantations on the coasts of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and became the leading 
supplier o f bananas to the US market (Roche 1998, Dole 2007).
Initially, Dole expanded its position in the international banana market through 
acquisition and joint ventures with amongst others, Fyffes and the Jamaica 
Producers Fruit Distributors (JPFD) (Roche 1998). In 1993, it made a bid for 
Fyffes, but the bid failed with Dole being accused of undervaluing the smaller 
producer/wholesaler (Roche 1998). It is also widely believed that Dole attempted 
to buy Del Monte Fresh Produce, which was bought in 1996 by the privately 
owned IAT Group Incorporated (International Agro Trade) based in Chile (Key 
Note 1998, Roche 1998). However, in 1994 Dole acquired 35 percent of the 
JPFD business in an effort to overcome the difficulty o f importing to EU 
countries, and in 1996 it acquired Fyffes’ Guatemalan operations (Roche 1998). 
Further investments have been made by Dole in countries with EU duty-free 
quotas, such as the Ivory Coast and the Cameroon, which suggests the producer is 
particularly agile in its manoeuvrings around the EU banana regime (IBCII Forum 
Discussion, April 2005). At the end of 2006, the remaining 65 percent of JPFD 
was purchased by Dole for $2.59 billion, helping to further consolidate Dole’s 
position in the European market (Dole 2006, JPG 2006).
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Today, Dole Food is a diversified fresh produce business in terms of both product 
and geography (Dole 2005a). For the fiscal year 2005, Dole generated revenues 
of approximately $5.9 billion (Dole 2006). Bananas represent about one-third of 
the company’s sales, of which approximately one-fifth are in Europe (Dole 2006). 
The US represents the company’s biggest market, where Dole is the number one 
supplier of bananas (Dole 2006). Dole produces or sources bananas from a vast 
number of countries including: Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panama, the Philippines, the Ivory Coast and the Cameroon. Dole has 
a fully-integrated operation, which includes sourcing, production, shipping, 
ripening, distribution and marketing (Dole 2005a). The company both owns and 
leases land for banana production and sources bananas from associated producers 
and independent growers. Dole also provides varying degrees of storage, 
shipping, stevedoring and marketing services for its associated producers and 
other independent producers (Dole 2005a).
3.2.4 Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc.
The producer Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc. also dates back to the late-nineteenth 
century both as a fresh and canned fruit business, but the ownership of the 
company has changed many times (Roche 1998). The Del Monte name first 
appeared on a premium blend of coffee packaged for the prestigious Hotel Del 
Monte in Monterey, California in 1886 (Del Monte 2005). The California 
Packing Corporation (CalPak) which owned the Del Monte name developed 
stringent quality specifications for its premium range of food products, and early 
advertisements in the 1920s used the strap line not a label, but a guarantee (Del 
Monte 2005). But with prices plummeting in 1929 and many low-cost brands 
appearing in the market, CalPak focused on the value of dependable quality of the 
Del Monte brand. In 1955, CalPak introduced Del Monte Pineapple Grapefruit 
drink and Del Monte Stewed Tomatoes (Del Monte 2006). As the company 
became better known for the success of its food products, CalPak changed its 
name to the Del Monte Corporation in 1967 (Del Monte 2005). In the same year, 
the United Fruit Company (UFC) bought a 6 percent stake in the Del Monte 
Corporation as a precursor to a full takeover bid (Roche 1998). But in an attempt 
to block the UFC bid, Del Monte acquired a Tampa based banana company called
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the West Indies Tropical Fruit Company in 1968, and started to develop an 
international share in the banana market (Roche 1998, Del Monte 2005). During 
the early-1970s the company expanded, setting up its own plantations in Costa 
Rica and purchasing new reefers (refrigerated boats) to enhance its transportation 
system and ship bananas to Europe (Roche 1998). In 1972, Del Monte’s West 
Indies Tropical Fruit Company bought the sole remaining division in Guatemala, 
Bananera of UBC (formerly UFC, incorporated into Chiquita) (Roche 1998). The 
deal included the existing purchase contracts of Bananera and for the first time 
since the 1920s, a major competitor for the two leading producers Chiquita and 
Standard Fruit (later to become Dole) emerged (Roche 1998).
From 1979 to 1989 the company was owned by R.J. Reynolds Industries, when it 
was bought by Polly Peck International pic for US$875m (£557m) (Roche 1998). 
However, the Del Monte Corporation was separated into two distinct entities; Del 
Monte Tropical Fruit and Del Monte Foods (Roche 1998, Del Monte 2005). Like 
its rivals, it suffered the price falls o f the early 1990s and in financial distress, Del 
Monte Tropical Fruit was sold to a Mexican consortium for US$600m in 
November 1992 (Roche 1998). The new owner changed the name of the 
company to Fresh Del Monte Produce, but only a few years later in 1996, the fruit 
producer was taken over by the IAT Group, a holding company of the Jordanian 
Palestinian Abu-Ghazaleh family (the current owners) (Del Monte 2005, 2006). 
The company was floated on the NYSE as Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc. in 
1997, but although the business was now a separate entity from the Del Monte 
Group it retained a licence to use the Del Monte brand in its fresh fruit business 
(Roche 1998, Del Monte 2005). Fresh Del Monte Produce sells direct to retailers, 
wholesalers and distributors in the US and UK, and in the rest o f Europe sales are 
made to marketing associates with whom the company shares profits and losses 
(Roche 1998, Del Monte 2005). In 1996, Costa Rica supplied 29 percent of the 
company’s bananas (Roche 1998), and the country continues to provide the 
largest share of the company’s supply for the European market today (Del Monte 
2006). The producer’s main markets are the US and Europe, and bananas account 
for the majority of sales, although it is also the market leader for pineapples in the 
UK. Del Monte is the UK’s third biggest supplier of bananas (Del Monte 2006,
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Key Note 2006). Del Monte chiefly owns and part-owns operations in Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and the Cameroon (Del Monte 2006). The producer has 
experienced considerable growth over the past few years, especially with its 
exclusive supply arrangements for bananas with the Wal-Mart retail group, whose 
subsidiary in the UK is the ASDA supermarket group (Del Monte 2006, Key Note 
2006). In 2006, Del Monte employed 37,000 people across the globe, and its net 
sales were $3.21 billion, of which $1.11 billion was bananas (Del Monte 2006).
3.2.5 Fyffes PLC
Fyffes PLC started life as a British tea company exporting colony bananas in the 
late-1880s (Davies 1990). Fyffes had been one of the first companies to capitalise 
on the growing demand for bananas in the UK by introducing steamers in the 
early-1890s (Sheller 2003). Elder Dempster, a British company involved in 
shipping bananas from Jamaica to the UK in 1901, was later that year 
amalgamated with Fyffes & Co. to form the company Elders and Fyffes (Davies 
1990, Roche 1998). Fyffes, chiefly an importer and wholesaler, sourced its 
bananas direct from independent growers in the Caribbean, but the company also 
sourced from growers in Latin American, which was a bold move at the time 
(Roche 1998). Fyffes saw its role ‘as one of strengthening the production and 
commercial efficiency of the local grower in his own country, supporting the 
grower in achieving a more viable business and improving production and 
quality’ (Fyffes company statement, quoted in Roche 1998: 143). Sourcing from 
Latin America was also due to the fact that the United Fruit Company had taken a 
share in the Elder and Fyffes business in 1902 (Roche 1998). United Fruit 
gradually increased its control over the Elders and Fyffes business when it was 
facing financial difficulties in 1913, and acquired all its share capital by 1914 
(Davies 1990, Grossman 1998). However, Fyffes still traded as a separate entity 
making agreements with principal banana growing countries and maintained a 
virtual monopoly on exports into the UK, before the importer Geest was 
encouraged by the British government to source bananas from the Windward 
Islands in the mid-1950s (Davies 1990, Roche 1998).
The current Fyffes Group was formed in 1986 after the share holding of the 
United Fruit Company was bought by the Fruit Importers of Ireland (Roche 1998,
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Myers 2004). The Group expanded during the 1990s by adding more UK fruit 
wholesalers to its business and concluding an exclusive supply agreement for 
bananas with the Dominican Republic, but it was unsuccessful in trying to raise 
the capital to buy Del Monte in 1992 (Roche 1998). Fyffes first developed its 
European market by wholesaling, but to fully establish itself as a player in the 
international banana market, the company needed to grow faster so as to compete 
with the big three. A series of acquisitions followed through the mid-1990s, the 
most important being the Eurobanane Canaries Company of Spain (Roche 1998). 
However, the most high profile takeover Fyffes was involved in was that of 
Geest, an enterprise that promoted Dutch market gardening (Davies 1990). Geest 
was established as an importer of bananas in 1930s through the help of the British 
government, who were intent on enabling the export of Caribbean bananas 
(Davies 1990, Roche 1998). This was the first in a long series of import policies 
by the British government that provided preferential treatment for banana 
producers in the then colonial empire (Grossman 1998). But Geest experienced 
some difficulties when the EU banana market regime was harmonised and the 
importer was exasperated by the discovery that land bought in Costa Rica for 
$100m was to be excluded from the EU quota (Roche 1998). Geest traded for 60 
years sourcing only from small growers, but in 1996 the banana business was split 
into two (Davies 1990, Roche 1998). A joint venture company established by 
Fyffes and its partner the Windward Islands Banana Development and Exporting 
Company (WIBDECO) acquired 50 percent of the Geest business and the loss 
making Costa Rican plantation was sold in 1997 (Roche 1998).
Today, Fyffes is Europe’s leading fresh produce distributor and wholesaler, 
selling fruit, vegetables and flowers, and the leading supplier of fresh produce in 
the UK (Key Note 2006). Fyffes and its joint venture operations employ 
approximately 4,800 people and its turnover was €408 million in 2006. It is the 
fourth largest produce company in the world and bananas represent about one- 
third of Fyffes’ fruit sales and more than 50 percent of the group’s operating 
profit (Fyffes 2006). The banana business is an integrated operation, with long­
term supply contracts with growers in Costa Rica, Panama, the Caribbean, and the 
Canary Islands (Fyffes 2006, Key Note 2006). However, Fyffes has largely
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dispensed with its own shipping operation having subcontracted this activity to 
other key players in the sector, and focuses instead on the wholesaling and 
marketing o f its produce (Fyffes 2006).
As discussed above, a small number of companies dominate the international 
banana trade. In 2002, the estimated market share of world banana exports for the 
main producers in the sector were Chiquita 22.5 percent, Dole 20.1 percent, Del 
Monte 15.7 percent, Noboa 7.6 percent, and Fyffes 4.1 percent (FAO 2003). 
Grupo Noboa is a privately owned company and operates solely in Ecuador 
(Vorley 2003). However, the share of world banana imports of the TNCs is 
higher than their share of exports, because in addition to their own exports, they 
also purchase fruit from independent growers and independent exporters (FAO
2003). Thus, market shares differ significantly and as companies are reluctant to 
communicate the exact volumes of bananas sold in the main markets (the US and 
the EU) the exact percentages are difficult to confirm (FAO 2003, Kasteele and 
Stichele 2005). However, the expected share of the three TNC companies in the 
US market is close to 90 percent, and in the EU market it is believed that they 
control around 80 percent (Chambron 2005, Kasteele and Stichele 2005).
3.3 Banana Trade in the Modern Era
As previously described, banana production for export is centred in Latin 
America, where the key producer countries are Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Panama. Between 1998 and 2000, 80 percent of the bananas destined for the 
export market originated from this region. During the same period, Africa (the 
Cameroon and Ivory Coast) supplied 4 percent, the Caribbean (the Dominican 
Republic and the Windward Islands) 3 percent, and the remaining 13 percent 
came from Asia (FAO 2003). The strongest growth of exports during 1985-2000 
was observed in Latin America, followed by Africa, with exports doubling in both 
regions, 5 to almost 10 million tons and 200,000 to 400,000 tons respectively 
(FAO 2003). The expansion of the international banana economy during the 
1990s, especially in Ecuador and Costa Rica, and to a lesser degree in Colombia 
and West Africa, led to a structural overproduction in the market with increased 
competition between exporting countries (IBCII 2006). The industry experienced 
a ‘global’ overproduction crisis, which resulting in a number o f price wars, most
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notably in 1993, 1999, 2001 and 2002, when the major producers reduced their 
prices to European supermarkets and consumer prices tumbled (IBCII 2006).
3.3.1 Banana Dramas
A third of the world’s banana exports arrive in the EU, the bulk of which come 
from the dollar producing countries in Latin America, but the EU market has 
proved difficult for the major banana TNC producers. One of the chief reasons 
for these problems is the import structure of the EU banana market (FAO 2003, 
IBCII 2006). The trouble began with the implementation of the EU banana 
market reforms in 1993. Both Chiquita and Dole objected to the fact that the new 
market regime upheld the rights of EU countries to import bananas from their 
former Caribbean colonies (Fox and Firor 1998). During the 1980s, both US- 
owned TNCs had invested heavily in expanding their production in Latin 
America, and exports to the EU had risen every year from 1987 to 1992 (Myers 
2004). However, by the early-1990s, production was beginning to outstrip the 
growth in demand, which led to an oversupplied market and a subsequent drop in 
prices. The fall in price was particularly steep in the EU, where the dominant 
traders were trying to position themselves for import quotas in whatever new 
market regime would be adopted in 1993 (Reed 1994, Myers 2004). Chiquita the 
world’s largest banana producer with 25 percent of the market at the time and 
Dole the second largest, were hit hard by the new market regime (Myers 2004). 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for bananas was introduced in its 
initial form in July 1993, following the completion of the Single European Market 
(SEM) (McCorriston 2000). The previous national schemes for banana imports 
varied considerably and there was a requirement to harmonise these and establish 
a common system for all EU member states (McCorriston 2000). In the past, 
countries were given preferential market access based on favouring territorial 
suppliers (France, Portugal, Greece and Spain) or ex-colonial ties (France, the UK 
and Italy) under the auspices of the Banana Protocol of the Lome Convention 
(McCorriston 2000).
Under the Lome Convention, preferential access to the EU market was arranged 
based on a zero tariff, whereas third country sources -  largely where the dollar 
producers operated -  were normally subjected to the full Common Commercial
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Tariff (CCT) o f 20 percent (Read 1994). The Single European Act required 
Member States to permit the free circulation of imports upon entering the market; 
unhindered by internal barriers. One of the key objectives o f the SEM was to 
increase consumer welfare via greater competition in the market, both in terms of 
choice and lower prices (Read 1994). By maintaining traditional bilateral 
obligations in the SEM, consumers were effectively being expected to subsidise 
favoured producers at the expense of third-party (dollar area) suppliers and were 
artificially depressing world prices (Read 1994, Myers 2004). The EU was 
therefore faced with a conundrum, how to harmonise the import regime whilst not 
affecting the interests of preferential suppliers or antagonising the US-banana 
TNC producers. The solution was the Common Market Organisation for Bananas 
(CMOB) introduced in July, 1993 (Myers 2004). The CMOB was to regulate 
banana importation through a system of tariff-rate quotas, of which there were 
four: A, B, C and Additional Quantity and each had a set quantity in tons that 
could be imported into the EU. Bananas from ACP countries could be imported 
duty free under any of the quotas, but bananas from other countries could only be 
imported under quotas A, B and the Additional Quantity, and required a tariff of 
€75 per ton (Myers 2004, FAO 2005a).
The EU had become the w orlds largest market for bananas (35 percent of world 
trade) through the formation of the SEM and the dismantling of the preferential 
regime was crucial for the US-banana TNCs (Sheller 2003). The introduction of 
a tariff-quota system, which allocated EU imports between alternative sources, 
was an attempt to resolve the issue of the preferential regime (Myers 2004). The 
new system stipulated bananas could only be imported into the EU by traders 
holding import licenses, which would be allocated on the basis of past-trade 
volumes (Myers 2004). This system was intended to improve the competitiveness 
of the ACP producers by enhancing their ‘vertical integration’ in the chain 
through closer links with established importers (Read 1994). The new market 
system was a compromise and gave rise to some hostility from the US-banana 
TNCs, who claimed the system continued to offer preferential trade arrangements 
for EU territories and ex-colonies, whilst perpetuating the un-competitiveness of 
dollar producing countries in Latin American (Read 1994, McCorriston 2000).
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The new system was also accused of exacerbating the problems in the industry, 
because at times the complex licensing scheme allowed for various country- 
specific quotas, as licences were allocated on the basis of past-trade volumes 
(Myers 2004). The underlying argument was that quotas and licences generated 
monopoly power, which trade liberalisation was expected to eliminate. But in 
reality, the introduction of a free trade regime for bananas in the EU actually 
favoured dollar producers, because of their vertically integrated global supply 
chains and the vast economies of scale in their production operations (Read 1994, 
Myers 2004).
One of the key opponents to the new EU quota system, Chiquita blamed its net 
losses of more than $350 million since 1992, on its restricted access to the EU 
market (Fox and Firor 1998). Following the introduction of the new EU regime, 
Chiquita claimed it would lose up to 65 percent of its EU market share (Myers
2004). The quota allocated to Chiquita represented a cut of 20 percent on its’ EU 
imports in 1992, and thus reduced its potential market, while the licensing system 
effectively transferred its trade to European companies by granting 30 percent of 
the dollar quota to importers of ACP and EU bananas (Myers 2004). Following 
heavy lobbying by both Chiquita and Dole, the US government pressed the WTO 
to look into the matter, claiming the EU banana quota system violated global 
trade accords. A year later, the WTO ruled against the EU and demanded the EU 
open up its markets (Fox and Firor 1998). The EU argued against the ruling, 
stating that the quotas were vital to the Caribbean economies, but nonetheless the 
EU was ordered to comply with the new standards by 1999 (Ryle 2002). The 
WTO insisted that the EU open up its markets, in spite of the fact that the quota 
system was designed to sustain banana growing in impoverished former colonies, 
such as the Windward Islands in the Caribbean and to help avoid the disastrous 
alternative of marijuana and coca growing (Ryle 2002). As noted earlier, the 
WTO ruling followed a history o f political donations from Chiquita, but it was 
not alone; Dole also made hefty contributions during this period (Fox and Firor 
1998, Ryle 2002). There had been a mobilisation of American political apparatus 
against the EU preferential system with prominent opponents, such as Senator 
Bob Dole, a major recipient of donations from Lindner (the CEO of Chiquita),
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regularly speaking of the injustice of the banana trade regime in Europe (Fox and 
Firor 1998).
However, the trade quota system proved only an interim solution and further 
problems erupted in the late-1990s, resulting in further altercations between the 
dollar producers and the EU (Sheller 2003, Myers 2004). President Clinton’s 
administration yet again escalated the US-banana TNCs’ complaints to the WTO 
and also introduced punitive measures for European countries by imposing tariffs 
on imported products, such as French cheese and Scottish cashmere (Fox and 
Firor 1998, Scherer 2001). After several WTO rulings for the EU to open up its 
markets, the EU finally initiated a process in July 2001 to phase out all quotas and 
move towards a new tariff system by January 2006 (Myers 2004). However, the 
new system was still dependent on a tariff rate set by the EU, which had the 
potential to create future dissent amongst the many interested parties in the sector 
(IBCII 2005b).
3.3.2 The Market
The world banana market was created through European colonialism and the 
EU’s preferential arrangements for ACP producers and the ‘increasingly 
hegemonic United States and their corporations’ (Raynolds and Murray 1998: 8). 
It is not surprising therefore, that the two biggest markets for export bananas are 
the US and the EU (FAO 2005a). In 2003, world imports totalled over 12 million 
tons with the US achieving the position of biggest banana importer, with just over 
34 percent of world imports and the EU15 and the new EU10 receiving net 
imports of 28 percent and 6 percent respectively (FAOSTAT 2004). The total 
banana exports from the key producing countries for this period are noted 
overleaf.
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Table 3.1 Banana exports in metric tons (MT) for 2000, 2002 and 2003 (selected 
countries)
Country 2000
(‘000MT)
2002
(‘000MT)
2003
(‘000MT)
Ecuador 3,939 4,199 4,643
Costa Rica 1,883 1,612 1,723
Colombia 1,680 1,570 1,543
Ivory Coast 217 226 243
Cameroon 238 259 314
Dominican Republic 80 113 122
Windward Islands 130 n/a 76
Total world exports 11,932 12,256 12,867
Source: FAO Trade Policy Technical Notes, FAO 2005a
One third of the world’s banana exports arrive in the EU market, the bulk of 
which come from dollar producing countries; chiefly Ecuador, Colombia, Costa 
Rica and Panama. Together, the dollar producing countries supplied over 2.5 
million tons of bananas in 2003 (FAO 2003). The EU banana supply for the 
period 1999-2003 is detailed below:
Table 3.2 EU banana supply by origin in metric tons (MT) for 1999-2003
Regions 1999-2000 
(‘000 MT) 
average
2002-2003 
(‘000 MT) 
average
2002-2003 
/ 1999-2000 
percentage (%) 
change
EU production 755 772 2.2
ACP countries 715 757 5.7
Dollar zone* 2,533 2,569 1.4
EU + ACP + Dollar zone 4,004 4,098 2.3
* Includes Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama
Source: Calculated from European Commission DG AGRI 2003, cited in FAO Trade Policy 
Technical Notes, FAO 2005a
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The total European supply in 2003 of 4.1 million tons came from domestic 
production (the Canaries) (18%), Africa (12%), the Caribbean (9%) and Latin 
America (63%), (FAOSTAT 2004). As indicated in Table 3.2, there was only a 
modest increase in the bananas supplied by the dollar producing countries 
compared to the supply from ACP countries. This is partially due to the creation 
of supply categories (preferential, dollar zone and licensing) within the EU 
regulation, which led to some divestments in Latin American countries and the 
transfer of production to other locations, chiefly in West Africa (Myers 2004, 
Kasteele and Stichele 2005). The provision of market protection for EU 
producers, traditional and non-traditional ACP countries encouraged the dollar 
producers to diversify their banana sources to obtain more EU import licences 
(Myers 2004). By making a bigger footprint in the ACP countries, the US-banana 
TNCs would be assured of qualifying for the 30 percent dollar licences reserved 
for this category in the future (IBCII Conference Notes, April 2005).
Following its enlargement to include an additional 10 countries in May 2004, the 
EU is now the largest banana market in the world (FAO 2005a). After Germany, 
Europe’s second largest importer of bananas is the UK (FAOSTAT 2006). In 
2005, UK banana imports amounted to £342.8m, at around 861,202 tons, and the 
leading supplying countries were the Cameroon, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic and Belgium (re-exports) (Key Note 2006). Bananas are the 
leading fruit imported into the UK and represented up to a fifth of overall fruit 
imports until the lowering of costs by producers to enable supermarkets to reduce 
the retail price of bananas in 2004, as noted in the table below (Key Note 2006).
Table 3.3 UK imports of bananas and total fruit by value (£000) for 2001-2005
2001
(£000)
2002
(£000)
2003
(£000)
2004
(£000)
2005
(£000)
Bananas 302,352 327,903 324,276 311,240 342,753
Total Fruit 1,432,350 1,565,984 1,664,243 1,787,736 1,943,930
% Bananas 
of Total Fruit
21.1% 20.9% 19.5% 17.4% 17.6%
Source: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) cited in Key Note 2006
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3.4 The UK Supermarket Banana
Bananas have long been part of the UK culture, from the arrival o f the first 
banana boat in the port of Liverpool in 1884 to the reintroduction o f the fruit post- 
the Second World War (Davies 1990, Hennessy 1993, Lawrence 2004). The war 
caused a number of major problems for the UK banana trade (Davies 1990). 
There was a wave of unrestricted attacks on the merchant ships o f Allied powers 
by the German Navy and many banana boats were sunk (Davies 1990). Then in 
November 1940, the UK government Ministry of Food banned banana imports 
(Roche 1998). Following the end of the war, Clement Attlee (Britain’s Prime 
Minister at the time) instructed the United Fruit Company to send a shipload of 
bananas to herald the idea of a bright new future (Chapman 2007). This was to be 
the beginning o f ‘Social Democracy’, the age of the ‘welfare state’, and ‘the boat 
had a banana on board for each child and pregnant mother in the land’ (Chapman 
2007: 17-18). According to Hennessy (1993: 274), for children who grew up in 
the war the banana seemed to be ‘an object of magical veneration’. However, it 
was some time before regular shipments arrived in the UK market either from the 
Caribbean or Latin American producing countries (Davies 1990).
Today, banana supplies to the UK come from two main groups of producers: the 
large US-banana TNCs (Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte) and the ex-colonial 
Windward Islands Co-operatives9. However, the greater volume of bananas 
imported are provided by the major TNCs and the wholesaler Fyffes, and a large 
proportion of banana sales are achieved through the major supermarket groups 
(FAO 2005a, Key Note 2006). In 2005, 85 percent of all retail sales of fresh fruit 
and vegetables in the UK went through grocery multiples (Key Note 2006). The 
banana is particularly important for the supermarket groups, because it outsells 
every other grocery item in volume terms, is the third highest selling product in 
terms of value, and provides the greatest return of profit to sales (Griffiths and 
Lawrence 2007). Supermarkets use bananas as a key promotional tool to show 
price competitiveness and ‘value for money’ (VFM) in the continuous battle to
9 The Windward Islands Banana Growers’ Association (WINBAN) was formed in 1958 to help 
distribute and market Caribbean bananas, the association works with small and large growers 
(Sheller 2003).
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attract customers (Blythman 2004, Lawrence 2004). In essence, bananas are 
generic in their market position; they are less associated with any one producer’s 
label and synonymous with the supermarket brand (Ryle 2002, Lawrence 2004). 
Chiquita in particular fought hard to position their bananas as a quality brand in 
the market and many producers try to distinguish their produce by attaching 
branded labels to the fruit, this is still very much the case (Soluri 2003, Blythman
2004). The consumption of fresh fruit in the UK is driven by the characteristics 
of quality and price, thus there is a tendency for loose/non-packed fruit to be more 
associated with the supermarket’s brand than that of the producer (Gwynne 1999, 
Blythman 2004). Bananas are defined as one of the ‘known value items’ (KVIs), 
the same as bread, milk, sugar and baked beans (Ryle 2002, Blythman 2004). 
KVIs are core weekly staples, shopping ‘traffic generators’, due to their frequency 
of purchase and as such, are considered extremely price sensitive (Blythman 
2004: 258).
Supermarkets daily compare the prices on these items with key competitors and 
where a competitor is cheaper, they will react immediately by dropping their price 
(Blythman 2004). An example of such a response occurred in 2002, when the 
supermarket ASDA (owned by Wal-Mart) cut the price of bananas from £1.08 to 
85p per kilogram (Ryle 2002). The situation was somewhat precipitated by Wal- 
Mart awarding its entire business to a single supplier; an exclusive deal with Del 
Monte (Blythman 2004, IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Fresh Del Monte 
Produce, the world’s third largest banana supplier was able to ‘severely undercut 
the prices’ of other banana producers in the annual round o f sourcing discussions 
with the supermarket group (Bevan 2005: 167). This was viewed at the time by 
both the media and the retail industry as a major price war (Blythman 2004). In 
January 2005, heavy price cutting returned with ASDA reducing its ‘smartprice 
economy’ offer to 65p a kilogram (Key Note 2006). Tesco responded by 
reducing its ‘value’ offer to 59p a kilogram, the lowest market price for bananas 
in some years (Key Note 2006). One supermarket group follows another 
regardless of supply and demand (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). 
However, bananas are listed in the UK shopping basket index (the barometer of 
food inflation) and as such, regular price reductions influence the inflationary
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condition of the British economy (Blythman 2004, Bevan 2005). The 
supermarkets have long been heralded by successive UK governments for 
championing the fight to maintain low inflation through the provision of cheaper 
food (Blythman 2004, Bevan 2005). Between 2000 and 2005, bananas suffered a 
40 percent price deflation and critics of the price-cutting strategy claimed no-one 
in the banana supply chain was making any money (Key Note 2006). But in 
March 2006, the round of price cuts began again, sparked off by ASDA who cut 
their price this time by 25 percent (Banana Link 2006). The competitive 
positioning of price in the UK food retailing market continues, with both ASDA 
and Tesco recently announcing a range of price cuts -  bananas are naturally 
included on the list (Key Note 2007a).
3.5 Another Banana War?
The challenge of the new EU tariff system was to appease the US-banana TNC 
producers in Latin America, whilst retaining the support of the EU producers in 
Spain’s Canary Islands, Portugal’s Azores and the French territories of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe (Key Note 2006). The difficulty in the continued 
debate on tariffs is how to square the circle, as a TNC producer representative 
succinctly put it, ‘how do you manage prices up in an oversupplied market’ 
(IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). At the close of the ICBII conference the 
audience was left with the burning question of whether the high tariffs proposed 
for the Latin American producers would simply cut supply volume, and 
ultimately trigger another banana war (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). A 
supermarket retail buyer responsible for sourcing large quantities of bananas from 
the Windward Islands reiterated this point:
“Bananas are in such a state of flux and trauma at the moment... the 
end of the current banana regime... is creating a state of flux... and the 
trauma is the prices at which they are being retailed at, compared with 
how much they are costing to produce, you know there has been about 
a third, 33 percent deflation in the last two and a half years, and the 
costs haven’t gone down, and now the costs are actually significantly 
started to go up ... it’s put a lot of pressure on demand... a number of 
retailers are putting intense pressure on their importers and ripeners to 
reduce their costs, so that’s where the trauma comes in” (Interview 
Retail Buyer GB@T1, April 2005).
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Either way, whether it is the wide open plains of Latin America or the lower 
labour cost operations of West Africa, the US-banana TNCs producers have a 
substantial competitive advantage over the Caribbean producers, where the terrain 
is mountainous and there are much smaller farms and owner/grower networks 
(Grossman 1998, Sheller 2003, Myers 2004). This situation is well recognised in 
the industry, as another supermarket buyer puts it “the trouble with the Windward 
Islands is that they are hopelessly uncompetitive at producing bananas” 
(Interview Retail Buyer MB@T5, June 2005). The new levy was due to be 
imposed on approximately $1.45bn of Latin American banana imports to the EU 
(Key Note 2006). The new tariff rate of €176 per ton of bananas -  an increase 
from the previous €75 per metric ton -  was implemented at the beginning of 2006 
(Banana Link 2007b). Immediately, the new levy together with the elimination of 
the volume quota previously applied to Latin American banana imports 
contributed to a drop in banana prices in the major European markets. By mid- 
2006, the new banana regime was already creating difficulties for the industry and 
its workforce (Banana Link 2007b).
3.6 Summary
Bananas are a major staple export crop for many countries in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the Canary Islands. They have been traded internationally for over 
a century. However, the world trade in bananas has been shown to be dominated 
by an oligopolistic system of a few large corporations. These US-owned TNC 
producers continue to grow sales, maintain their market share and dominate the 
international banana market. In part, this is because they are able to achieve great 
economies of scale from their vertically integrated operations, and in part due to 
the fact that bananas are a relatively simple fruit to produce and can be harvested 
all year round.
The market appeal of the banana is strong; it is viewed as a healthy food option 
and is often referred to as nature’s truest convenience food. However, the 
favoured fruit of many has experienced and continues to experience turbulent 
times. Despite its oligopolistic nature, trade in bananas is extremely competitive 
and costs have to be tightly controlled, which is somewhat hindered by the state 
of flux in the industry post the implementation of the new EU tariff system in
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January 2006. During the early-1990s weak international banana pricing 
squeezed producers’ profit margins to the point some producers were near to 
bankruptcy. Also, producers large and small are suffering the difficulties 
associated with an over-supplied market. This is exacerbated by the competitive 
drive of supermarkets to push down the price of bananas. The pressure for low 
prices continues unabated, whilst the demands for high quality produce by the 
major supermarket groups still remains. The continued cuts in the retail price of 
bananas make them cheaper now than they were four years ago, leading to an 
ever-increasing downward pressure on companies and workers engaged in the 
production process -  the only cost in the global supply chain that many suggest is 
being squeezed.
The current state o f the banana market brings into question how corporate social 
responsibility policies and commitments, made by both supermarkets and 
producers to improve the labour conditions of workers engaged in the production 
process of global supply chains, can be realistically achieved, and indeed who 
will be the parties (social actors) to bring this about.
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Chapter Four 
Global Supply Chains
Introduction
The main aims of the chapter are to present the literature on theoretical 
frameworks appropriate to the research of global supply chains and to review the 
governance systems that have emerged within these chains, such as voluntary 
labour initiatives. Since the early-1990s, there has been a growing public 
awareness and interest in how labour standards are developed and implemented in 
global supply chains. Following which, a number of labour initiatives including 
codes, standards and certification schemes have been applied to global supply 
chains (Jenkins et al. 2002, Christopherson and Lillie 2005). Many of these 
initiatives have been implemented by companies that have adopted CSR 
programmes in their international business operations (Jenkins et al. 2002, 
Hopkins 2004). As such they have been introduced either as the result of 
collaboration between parties involved in global supply chains (companies, 
workers and their representatives) or as a response to the campaign activities of 
other interested parties (NGOs, civil society groups and consumers) (Jenkins et al. 
2002, Nicholls and Opal 2005). This suggests that the development of labour 
enforcement mechanisms is embedded in the relationships between the various 
constituents within the chain (Freidberg 2004, Christopherson and Lillie 2005).
The major outlet for food products in the UK is the supermarket and this has an 
effect on the hierarchy of control and the relationships within the food global 
supply chain (Wrigley and Low 2002, Young 2004). As suggested by Friedland 
(2003: 6) there is a need to consider such ‘economic concentration in commodity 
systems’ particularly as supply chains become more global. Control in a global 
supply chain can be exercised in various forms, from ensuring certain 
circumstances are maintained along the chain to actively coordinating the 
activities within the chain to ensure that these circumstances are achieved 
(Kaplinsky 2000). In order to understand better how control within the chain has 
influenced the introduction of voluntary labour initiatives, there is a need to
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explore the theoretical models that may be applicable to the research. The models 
of most interest are those that draw on global commodity chain studies and 
emphasise changes of control within the chain and the dimension of governance 
(Gereffi 1994, Gereffi et al. 2005). This is particularly important in a sector like 
food retailing, where there is a concentration of supermarket buyer power, which 
can affect the way supply chains are organised.
In many instances, it is the supplier relationship strategies of the major 
supermarket groups that influence the development of labour codes of conduct in 
global food supply chains (Christopherson and Lillie 2005, Hale and Opondo 
2005). This raises the question: whose interests do voluntary initiatives reflect, 
business or workers? As regards unilateral corporate codes, these would seem to 
be both driven and in the interest of business. However, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives that are more inclusive of organised labour often fail to reflect workers’ 
interests. This is particularly so when there is no mechanism for the relevant 
worker representatives to monitor compliance of the codes (Jenkins et al. 2002, 
Christopherson and Lillie 2005). One labour initiative that has recently been 
developed which seems to overcome this difficulty is international framework 
agreements (IFAs) (Riisgaard 2005). The argument is that, while corporations are 
primary actors in the construction and organisation of supply chains, particularly 
in the food sector, other actors (labour, trade unions, nation-states, consumer 
focused NGOs) also have an interest in the organisation of the chain. These other 
groups of social actors are also crucial in the process of analysing governance in 
global supply chains.
The chapter is therefore concerned with four main areas of discussion that relate 
to the topic of research presented in the thesis: (i) an understanding of what 
constitutes a global supply chain, (ii) developments of governance systems in 
global supply chains, (iii) voluntary labour initiatives adopted by 
suppliers/producers providing goods to supermarket groups in the UK, and finally 
(iv) international framework agreements. Broadly speaking, there are two main 
themes presented in the chapter; the first is the theoretical positioning of the 
global supply chain and the second is the classification of the voluntary labour 
initiatives (codes of conduct) and the more formalised agreements (IFAs) that
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have been introduced in the production operation of some global supply chains. 
In this way, the chapter aims to position the research topic and build towards a set 
of key research questions.
4.1 Commodity and Supply Chains
When discussing commodity chains, value chains and supply chains in a 
globalised context, it is helpful to distinguish what is meant by such terms. The 
more commonly accepted and most quoted definition of a commodity and a 
commodity chain, is that of Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) who describe a 
commodity as a ‘good’ or ‘service’ and a commodity chain as:
‘A network of labour and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity... a commodity chain is a series o f inputs and 
outputs that are linked together’.
Gereffi (1994: 96) draws on the work of Hopkins and Wallerstein and develops 
further the concept of a commodity chain into a global commodity chain, a set of 
‘linkages between various economic agents -  raw material suppliers, factories, 
traders, and retailers’ across a geographic space. Gereffi and others (1994) 
describe global commodity chains (GCCs) as the economic networks linking 
firms, states and industries that span producers, distributors and consumers to one 
another within the world-economy. Nevertheless, the globalisation and expansion 
of commodity chains has given rise to other ideas to describe the path a 
commodity follows, i.e. from its origins in production to its point of consumption 
(Gereffi et al. 1994). In relation to the food sector, I draw on this conceptual 
approach to examine the relations that define harvesting of crops, sorting and 
preparation, transportation and storage and finally retail and consumption.
Thus, there are a number of theoretical concepts that may be used to analyse inter­
firm relations in productive systems. The majority of these concepts examine the 
key productive activities of design, production, marketing and distribution, and 
attempt to determine how such activities are divided between different enterprises 
involved. For instance, Porter (1990) employs a ‘value chain analysis’ to explore 
how the ‘value system’ of a company drives its business strategy in terms of 
forming and managing relationships with other firms in the productive system.
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Porter (1985: 26) characterises international business as a ‘value chain’ of 
primary activities from extraction to production through to distribution, activities 
that are ‘involved in the physical creation of the product and its sale and transfer 
to the buyer as well as after sales assistance’. Within the production system, the 
individual firm is expected to determine which of the chain’s activities it will 
pursue, in what locations across the globe and with what form of organisational 
structure. Porter (1985, 1990) through his analysis of value chains, argues these 
decisions are driven and dependent on the overall business strategy and value 
system of the enterprise or firm. In this regard, Porter (1985: 26) employs the 
construct of the value chain as a ‘basic tool for diagnosing competitive advantage 
and finding ways for enhancing it’. By following a ‘value chain analysis’ 
approach, he identifies the inherent advantage of multinational companies 
(MNCs) over domestic firms, as MNCs can conduct their operational activities 
anywhere in the world. Porter developed his theories of strategic management in 
relation to MNCs, but since the multinational firm conducts its business across 
national boundaries, the more commonly used term of ‘transnational’ is employed 
in discussions here (Gilpin 2001). The premise of strategic management in 
Porter’s (1990: 43-4) model is that a firm’s ‘competitive advantage’ is 
increasingly a function of how well that firm can manage the entire value chain. 
Thus, the transnational corporation is encouraged to pursue a number of strategic 
options, including alliances with producers, subcontracting supply and 
outsourcing production (Porter 1990).
Drawing on Hopkins and Wallerstein’s (1986) analysis of commodity chains and 
Porter’s (1990) work on value chains, Gereffi (1994) developed a global 
commodity chains model (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Ponte and Gibbon 2005). 
Gereffi’s (1994) GCCs model ‘tied the concept of the value-added chain directly 
to the global organisation of industries’ (Gereffi et a l 2005: 82). Gereffi (1994) 
focused on the inter-firm linkages of GCCs, in order to assess the degree of 
coordination and control of firms involved in international business activities. 
This model identified three main dimensions in commodity chains, which helped 
evaluate the economic behaviour within the chain. The first dimension is 
concerned with the input-output structure; ‘a set o f products or services linked
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together in a sequence of value-adding economic activities’ and the second, 
relates to territoriality; the ‘spatial dispersion or concentration of production and 
distribution networks, comprised of enterprises of different sizes and types’ 
(Gereffi 1994: 97). In this way, Gereffi situates the GCC model in production 
systems that frequently involve cross-border activity between independent firms, 
which creates a particular pattern of coordinated trade. The third dimension is a 
governance structure; ‘authority and power relationships that determine how 
financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’ 
(Gereffi 1994: 97). By including the issue of governance in the GCC model, 
Gereffi (1994, 1999) highlights the point that authority and power in the chain has 
consequences, both in terms of which firms are included/excluded and the 
opportunities available to firms for upgrading (i.e. moving into more sophisticated 
functions or producing more sophisticated commodities).
The governance structure that identifies the key notions of entry barriers and 
chain coordination is the most used aspect of the GCC analytical framework in 
food supply chain studies (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). Gereffi (1994: 97) makes the 
distinction between two main forms of governance in commodity chains, a 
producer-driven chain and a buyer-driven chain. He defines the producer-driven 
chain as a highly centralised system in which TNCs ‘play the central role in 
controlling the production system’ and the buyer-driven chain as a highly 
decentralised administrative structure where large retailers, buyers and trading 
companies ‘play the pivotal role’ in shaping the production network without 
actually controlling it centrally through their own headquarters (Gereffi 1994: 97). 
Gereffi suggests that a producer-driven chain is most often observed in sectors 
where production is capital-intensive and technology-intensive, and where 
companies controlling technology and production facilities, such as in 
automotive, heavy machinery and electronic components, exercise governance. 
In comparison, a buyer-driven chain is generally found in sectors where 
production is more usually labour-intensive, but in which design and marketing 
play an important role, and in which retailers and brand-name companies exercise 
key governance functions. In this respect, buyers determine what to produce and 
when, without actually producing the goods themselves and consequently buyer-
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driven chains are more typically found in consumer commodity industries, such 
as apparel and food (Gereffi 1994). Global commodity chain analysis addresses 
the issue of who controls the chain and helps to identify the opportunities and 
constraints presented by different forms of integration/coordination of global 
production and trade in specific commodities (Gibbon 2001). Gereffi and others 
(1994) use the GCC concept as a means to examine the economic activities of 
firms in a globalised world, where there is a spatial dimension of production and 
distribution, and a governance dimension of competing levels of authority and 
power. Primarily, the focus on ‘global commodity chains’ as units of analysis 
reflects the importance assigned to the emergence of production sites that are 
geographically dispersed and integrated on a global basis, but in which power (or 
control) is mainly associated with system coordination, rather than direct 
ownership. As noted by Gibbon (2001), the importance o f the GCC approach is 
its focus on the forms of integration within the chain, as chain coordination allows 
‘driving’ agents to institute measures that reduce costs and risks, whilst 
maintaining supply and ensuring sales.
However, Gereffi’s GCC model has been critically assessed. Two sets of analysis 
(Froud et al. 1998, Harvey et al. 2002) suggest that the GCC perspective is too 
narrow and does not allow for the complex economic activities that occur within 
supply chains. Froud and her colleagues (1998: 293) acknowledge Gereffi’s work 
in developing the chain concept, but state that the GCC model ‘constructs supply 
in over-simple linear terms and constructs demand as a series o f reverse relations 
within the production/distribution chain’. They argue that ‘global capital is no 
respecter of linear commodity chains’ and point out that under ‘restless late 
capitalism these chains are being fractured and broken’ (Froud et al. 1998: 332). 
Froud and her colleagues (1998: 294) propose an alternative form of analysis -  a 
‘sector matrix’ approach -  that ‘de-emphasises the organisation of production’ 
and instead analyses ‘the two webs of demand and supply relations which meet at 
the points of product and service consumption’ separately. They construct the 
demand side in terms of ‘complementary and competing demands made by end 
uses’ and the supply chain in terms of ‘corporate consolidation of surplus from 
different activities inside and outside a specific demand matrix’ (Froud et al.
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1998: 293). However, this approach is more suited to the analysis of an industry 
where products can only be consumed along with a bundle of services that require 
end-user choice and are constrained within a complex supporting infrastructure, 
such as motoring services or healthcare. In part, this is due to the emphasis the 
sectoral matrix concept places on non-manufacturing activities and the 
interactions of firms at an intra-sectoral level (Froud et al. 1998). Indeed, Froud 
and her colleagues (1998: 301) acknowledge that different theoretical concepts 
may be applicable when examining the economic activities of firms in different 
sectors, as indicated by their comments:
‘Chain analysis works reasonably well for commodity foodstuffs or 
simple, durable, throw away manufactured products, like sports 
trainers, which require distribution before they can be sold but do not 
require complicated infrastructure and complementary services before 
they can be used’.
The GCC approach has also more recently been viewed as appropriate for agri­
food studies, as agricultural commodities tend to fall into the category of buyer- 
driven chains (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Murray and Raynolds 2000, Raikes et 
al. 2000, Hale and Opondo 2005). As noted by Murray and Raynolds (2000) and 
Raikes and others (2000), a commodity-based approach can provide better 
insights in terms of the types of firm structure and forms o f coordination than a 
sectoral approach. However, having observed changes taking place in the last 
few decades of the twentieth century, Gereffi (1999) acknowledged some 
weaknesses in the GCC perspective himself. He recognised that global supply 
chains were being transformed, partly because producer-driven chains were 
changing into buyer-driven chains and partly due to the tendency for commodity 
chains to be more globally dispersed in the growing world-economy. He also 
noted that these changes influenced the way resources (raw materials, human and 
financial) were allocated in the chain, which resulted in the forms o f coordination 
between different entities engaged in the chain to shift (Gereffi 1999).
Gereffi (1999) concluded that contemporary global commodity chains were 
becoming more decentralised, more flexible, and more complex, which is one of 
the reasons he added a fourth dimension to the GCC model -  the ‘institutional
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framework’. The purpose of the new dimension was to help identify local, 
national and international conditions and policies that shape the globalisation 
process at each stage of the chain. As Gereffi (1999) confirmed, he developed the 
fourth dimension chiefly to show the conditions that may influence access to 
markets. The indication is that market access in developed countries was 
becoming increasingly dependent on the participation in global production 
networks governed by ‘lead’ firms in those markets and consequently, governance 
was increasingly independent of its institutional context (Gibbon 2001, Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2002). This aspect of the GCC model was used mainly to delineate 
the conditions under which ‘lead’ agents incorporated ‘subordinate’ agents 
through their control of market information and market access (both technological 
and market knowledge) (Raikes et al. 2000: 393). In this regard, it may be 
possible to explain the circumstances in which firms shift from a high level to a 
low level of drivenness in production chains based on the power asymmetry of 
market access (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). Initially, Gereffi’s (1994) GCC model 
focused on the ‘vertical’ relationship between buyers and sellers and the 
movement of goods from producer to consumer, but the inclusion of the fourth 
dimension and the recent work by Gereffi and others (2005) has helped to 
advance the model (Raikes et al. 2000, Ponte and Gibbon 2005). According to 
Ponte and Gibbon (2005), empirical and theoretically based discussions on global 
value chain analysis, which focuses on the changing aspects o f chain coordination 
and policy-related upgrading in supply chains of developing countries, have 
together created the environment for a refinement of governance structures in 
global supply chains.
These debates have led to efforts to redefine governance in global supply chains 
in terms of how particular firms set, measure and enforce certain parameters 
under which other actors in the chain operate (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005). As noted by Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) governance 
in these chains is more a process of exercising control through the specification of 
what product needs to be delivered, in what quantity and when, and how it should 
be produced and at what price. When a group of firms can take this directive 
position and shape who does what in and along the chain, they can be viewed as
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the ‘lead’ firm. In this way, the global value chain (GVC) approach can focus on 
inter-firm relationships and the institutional mechanism through which non- 
market coordination of activities can be achieved (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). 
In contrast, market coordination activities tend to include standards relative to 
product attributes, such as product range and pricing proposition (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2002, Ponte and Gibbon 2005). As observed by others (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000, Raikes et al. 2000, Gibbon 2001, Hale and Opondo 2005), this 
new type of behaviour is more typical of buyer-driven chains, especially those led 
by branded retailers and supermarkets. In particular, fresh fruit and vegetable 
supply chains have been characterised by an increasing degree of buyer 
‘drivenness’, which has been attributed to the concentration of supermarket 
retailing and the supermarket group’s control over market information (e.g. 
consumer purchasing trends) (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Hale and Opondo 
2005). Also, supermarket groups sell the majority of fresh fruit and vegetables in 
the UK and in this respect, tend to dominate the global agri-supply chain by 
controlling the final link in the chain (to consumers) (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, 
Harvey et al. 2002, Key Note 2006). This is especially the case as regards market 
access and the organisation of supply agreements relative to quality specifications 
and delivery schedule (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Harvey et al. 2002).
Accordingly, Gereffi and others (2005) developed a more complete typology of 
value chain governance, which goes beyond the original distinction between 
‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-driven’ chains. The authors proposed a governance 
structure that re-emphasised the importance of the organisational context and 
more adequately specified the variety of ‘network forms’ in the global economy. 
Gereffi and his colleagues (2005) explain the changing governance patterns in 
global value chains (GVCs) by employing a theoretical framework which traces 
three variables: (i) the complexity of the information and knowledge required to 
sustain a particular transaction, (ii) the ability to codify and transmit efficiently 
this information between the parties involved, and (iii) the capabilities of the 
supply-base in relation to the requirements of the transition. These variables play 
a key role in determining how global supply chains are organised and in turn, 
generate five ‘dynamic’ forms of governance -  markets, modular, relational,
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captive and hierarchy -  which range from low to high levels of ‘coordination’ and 
‘power asymmetry’ (Gereffi et al. 2005: 78). In this regard, Gereffi and his 
colleagues (2005: 99) affirm that forms of governance develop ‘regardless of the 
institutional context’ and therefore, ‘power’ in global chains is de-coupled from 
the impact of state regulation and trade regimes. Instead, power is linked with the 
system of coordination and control exercised by the ‘lead’ firm in the chain -  the 
‘degrees’ of drivenness (looser or tighter) of the firm in their production/supply 
network (Gereffi et al. 2005). Their analysis of power relations suggests that, as 
forms of coordination move from hierarchy to market, the degree of power 
exercised by the dominant actor in the chain decreases (Ponte and Gibbon 2005).
However, as noted by Ponte and Gibbon (2005), the GVC framework captures 
some of the more important aspects of coordination between different functional 
and organisational positions in the chain and contributes to a more systematic 
(value-chain) understanding of the global economy. In this regard, the Gereffi 
(1994) GCC model and the governance structure developed by Gereffi and 
colleagues (2005) create the ideal basis for a theoretical framework for this 
research study. There are a number of reasons for this including firstly, the model 
recognise the types o f relationships and forms of coordination in the chain, and 
therefore show how the chain is being managed. Secondly, the dimension of 
governance (authority and power) aids the analysis of ‘drivenness’ in the chain 
and can be used to build understandings of how ‘key’ or ‘lead’ firms build, 
coordinate, and control the linkages in the chain (Raikes et al. 2000). This is 
most appropriate to the focus of the research study, which is how UK supermarket 
groups influence the production link (or node) of the chain. Thirdly, the inclusion 
of ‘power’ in economic relations, not just in terms of barriers to entry but more 
notably in supply-chain management (Gibbon 2001) is pertinent to the way 
supermarkets’ policies on social responsibility shape global supply chains. 
Fourthly, the model focuses on how control shifts within the chain over time, 
which is important in terms of how various labour initiatives (forms of labour 
regulation in the chain) are instigated by different actor groups within the chain 
(producers and buyers) (Gibbon 2001, Hale and Opondo 2005). Finally, as Ponte 
and Gibbon (2005) acknowledge, the original distinction of producer-driven and
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buyer-driven forms of governance remains a key one for understanding current 
changes in the global economy.
The research study draws on a value-chain centred framework that is based on the 
strategic management approach of Porter (1990) and the early work of Gereffi 
(1994, 1999) on GCC, whilst drawing on the more recently evolved perspective 
of the GVC framework developed by Gereffi and his colleagues (2005). The 
approach adopted by Gereffi and others (2005) reaffirms the relevance of ‘social 
processes’ in terms of power relations (Henderson et al. 2002) and as such, 
provides a more systematic approach to understanding how governance is enacted 
within global supply chains (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). The GVC framework does 
not explicitly link power relations as a form of governance to labour conditions in 
global supply chains. Nevertheless, the analytical type of governance defined as 
‘market’, by Gereffi and his colleagues (2005) in the GVC framework is an 
interesting one for the banana sector.
The ‘market’ form of value chain governance is described as having market 
linkages that are typical of spot markets, that is they can persist over time with 
repeat transactions, but the essential point is that ‘the costs of switching to new 
partners are low for both parties’ (Gereffi et al. 2005: 83). The banana sector has 
been suffering from overproduction and oversupply in the market for some years, 
which has made the switching costs from one source of supply to another low, but 
chiefly this only applies to one party in the chain, the supermarket group (IBCII 
2005b, 2006). The continual downward pressure on costs in the banana supply 
chain and demands by supermarkets (particularly in the UK) for lower prices has 
led to producers switching some of their production from higher-cost countries in 
Latin America to low-cost operators in West Africa (IBCII 2005b, 2006). 
However, equally applicable to the banana sector are the forms of governance 
defined as ‘modular’ and ‘relational’. The ‘modular’ value chain is characterised 
by suppliers making products to a customer’s specifications and committing to 
capital outlays on their behalf (Gereffi et al. 2005). There are certainly examples 
where banana producers, like other suppliers, adopt quality, packaging and supply 
specifications dictated to them by the supermarket groups (Dolan and Humphrey 
2000, Gibbon 2003). The ‘relational’ value chain is described as a network where
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more complex interactions between buyers and sellers take place, often with a 
high degree o f mutual dependency (Gereffi et al. 2005). This form of governance 
could be considered in the banana sector, as some relationships between 
producers and supermarkets are more embedded than in other fresh produce 
supply chains (Murray and Raynolds 2000, Gibbon 2003). One o f the criticisms 
of the GVC framework is that it overlooks the fact that ‘market’, ‘modular’ and 
‘relational’ forms of coordination may exist in the same value chain and hence, 
these categories do not characterise governance in the chain overall (Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005).
Clearly, the GVC typology developed by Gereffi and his colleagues (2005) 
captures some important forms of coordination between actors in different 
functional positions in the value chain and can provide insights into how the chain 
is being managed by these actors. However, it does not explicitly link governance 
to external groups that also play a part in shaping the chain, which is a notable 
omission. Both the GCC model (Gereffi 1994) and the GVC framework (Gereffi 
et al. 2005) may be used to explore the power dynamics and relations between 
two ends of a chain (supermarkets and producers), but neither considers other 
patterns of power relations in the production chain. The linearity of the chain is 
important and the Gereffi (1994) GCC model is particularly helpful in 
determining how the level of drivenness in the chain ensures the implementation 
of supermarkets’ CSR policies regarding labour conditions in global production 
chains. But what of the other actor groups involved in the chain -  nation-states, 
trade unions, worker representative groups, NGOs, civil society groups and 
consumers -  whose relations with producers and (supermarket) buyers are not 
linear. These groups, often referred to as stakeholders, participate in global 
supply chains and have a voice regarding their governance. They form a different 
set of relations in the chain, which are not considered by Gereffi and his 
colleagues (1994, 2005).
What drives the form of governance in the banana chain, be it the demands of 
corporates or the influence of other actor groups, is the focus of this research. 
Thus, it is important to develop an understanding of what sort of actor is involved 
and what part they play in terms of governance, and to determine how the
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‘interests’ of these different groups are promoted within global supply chains. In 
attempting to understand these relations, particularly as regards the labour 
conditions of workers in the production operation of the banana chain, it is 
necessary to develop the theoretical framework further. It is hoped that such 
development will be achieved through the analysis of the empirical data collected, 
when the role of each group of social actors (stakeholders), whether internal or 
external parties to the chain, will be more clearly identified.
4.2 The Development of Governance in Global Supply Chains
It was during the late-1990s that the term ‘governance’ came to prominence, not 
as a ‘synonym for government’ (Rhodes 1996: 653), but as a new or changed 
process for governing within a globalised world (Hirst 2000). In this respect, 
governance was considered as distinguishable from government (Du Gay 2000). 
As suggested by Jessop (2002: 51), governance can be used as a concept to 
address the ‘incompleteness of the capital relation, the contradictions and 
dilemmas of accumulation, and the limitations of the spatiotemporal fixes that 
develop to contain, displace and defer these problems’. He goes on to use the 
term to refer to ‘any form of coordination of interdependent social relations -  
ranging from simple dyadic interactions to complex social divisions of labour’ 
(Jessop 2002: 52). The internationalisation of supply chains and the weakening of 
nation-state control over globalised production provide corporations the 
opportunity to act in a decisive way in the construction and operation of their 
supply chains. Relationships between producer and supermarket, supermarket 
and consumer influence the development of supply chains and the forms of 
governance within them. There are a series of links and interdependencies in 
global food chains, from farm to plate; the chain is a managed process within a 
framework of rules and standards. Of course, not all o f these are enshrined in 
law; some forms of co-ordination are voluntary and dependent on the social 
relations within the chain. As noted by Rodriguez-Garavito (2005), codes of 
conduct are a novel form of governance that relies on coordination among non­
state actors (companies, worker representative, NGOs and other civil society 
groups). Codes as a dimension of governance are in addition to the state and the
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market, and do not depend on top-down state regulation or rely on market 
correction (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005).
However, non-state actors respond in different ways and there appears to be four 
types of governance structure emerging in global supply chains, the first three of 
which are self-regulatory. They can be classified as:
1. Corporate and industry independently sponsored initiatives -  
codes of conduct
2. Tripartite responses -  mutually agreed codes of conduct 
between a number o f social actors (Corporates, Trade Unions 
and NGOs)
3. Certification and verification systems of control -  independently 
monitored standards
4. International Framework Agreements (IFAs) -  between 
corporations and global unions.
The first, second and third types indicate new patterns of regulation, following a 
period of deregulation for business, although such re-regulation is on the basis of 
voluntary and informal agreement on the part of corporate actors. As noted by 
Christopherson and Lillie (2005), this would suggest corporate strategies are 
driving towards a private mechanism for labour regulation. The last type raises 
the question of more formal regulatory control of supply chains in a globalised 
world. However, it is also possible to suggest a fifth type, which is no regulation 
-  essentially let ‘market forces’ prevail -  but this can be problematic because 
companies may use competitiveness in the market as an excuse for the labour 
conditions workers are faced with (Burawoy 1985). In this respect, workers can 
be made to feel the threat of losing their job as a result o f the threat to the viability 
of the firm if they do not accept their working conditions (Burawoy 1985). In 
some regards, companies are able to turn the market regime against workers, 
relying on the mechanisms of coordinating interests to command consent to 
sacrifices -  a form of concession bargaining (Burawoy 1985).
The demand for minimum social requirements in international trade and greater 
accountability of TNCs in global supply chains is not a new phenomenon
-85-
(Malanowski 1997, Scherrer and Greven 2001, O’Brien 2002). However, they 
became more relevant in the last three decades, as parts of the Third World were 
integrated into the industrial division of labour and export-processing zones have 
given TNCs the opportunity to tap into large labour reserves without the 
obligation of adhering to local labour laws (Malanowski 1997, Scherrer and 
Greven 2001). The opportunity for companies to give themselves ‘unfair 
competitive advantage by maintaining low standards’ and ‘reducing countries to 
the lowest cost levels’ was a potential threat for labour conditions in developing 
countries (Malanowski 1997: 11). Both developing countries and organised 
labour, wary of the power being wielded by large multinational corporations 
demanded minimum social standards (O’Brien 2002). The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) responded with a declaration of principles concerning 
multinational enterprises and social policy, which was adopted in 1977 (Scherrer 
and Greven 2001). The ILO, a tripartite United Nations body is responsible for 
the development of labour standards in the form of recommendations and 
conventions (Block et a l  2001). The membership of the ILO is made up of 
governments, employers and employees or their representatives, and all have 
equal rights (Malanowski 1997). However, whilst recommendations made to 
member states only provide guidance on labour standards, the conventions when 
ratified by member states have the status of treaties (Block et a l  2001).
In 1977, the ILO agreed the ILO Tripartite Declaration o f Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Scherrer and Greven 2001). The 
Tripartite Declaration applies globally to governments, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), employers and workers. As a whole, the system offers an international 
framework for the development of voluntary labour-related commitments in codes 
of conduct and other social initiatives (Urminsky 2001). The Tripartite 
Declaration followed the introduction of the Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) the year before, which contained
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Guidelines fo r  Multinational Enterprises10 (OECD 1996, Jenkins 2001). Both 
instruments of control were set at an intergovernmental level and sought to 
protect the sovereignty of countries by defining the responsibilities of 
international commerce and were endorsed by business (Jenkins 2001, Urminsky 
2001). Essentially, both sets of guidelines were concerned with business social 
policies, and included operational programmes and agreements to follow certain 
standards affecting conditions of work (Urminsky 2001). The Tripartite 
Declaration reflects ILO standards and as in the case o f the OECD guidelines 
includes a commitment to good industrial relations and trade union rights (Jenkins 
2001). However, the obligations incorporated in the OECD guidelines were 
voluntary and not intended to be legally enforceable -  they were intended to 
provide a guide to ‘good practice’ (OECD 1996, Jenkins 2001). The Declaration, 
the narrower of the two and as such more precise, focuses on employment 
relations and labour rights, but this is also unenforceable in law (Beek 1998a, 
Jenkins 2001). Since both the Tripartite Declaration and the OECD guidelines 
place a crucial reliance on national laws and practices, they do not establish an 
international legally binding instrument (Scherrer and Greven 2001). Hence, the 
impact of both has been relatively limited (Beek 1998a, Jenkins 2001, Scherrer 
and Greven 2001).
However, in 1998, the ILO adopted a Declaration o f Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, which stated that certain rights were fundamental (Block et al. 
2001). These rights included: (i) freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining (conventions 87 and 98), (ii) the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (conventions 29 and 105), 
(iii) the effective abolition of child labour (conventions 138), and (iv) the 
elimination o f discrimination in respect of employment and occupation 
(convention 111) (ILO 1998). The conventions, which are often referred to as 
core conventions, have a broad-based ratification by member countries, but even 
where member states have not ratified the conventions they are expected to 
comply with the standard (Block et a l  2001, Jenkins et al. 2002).
10 The OECD guidelines apply only to enterprises operating in OECD countries (Urminsky 2001).
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As noted by Block and others (2001) there are a number o f existing models of 
International Labour Standards regulation (governance), which include:
• the legislative model (a more traditional model of labour standards 
regulation within a country or within jurisdiction of enforcement, e.g. in 
the EU)
• the trade sanction model (whereby labour standards and social clauses are 
linked to trade preferences, e.g. sugar and cocoa)
• the multi-lateral enforcement model (a model which encourages the 
voluntary adoption of labour standards, e.g. ILO core conventions)
• the voluntary standards model (an emerging model in response to political 
and social pressure)
By the mid-1990s, (i) the absence of state regulation, (ii) the failure to incorporate 
social clauses in international trade agreements and, (iii) the difficulties facing the 
ILO to enforce both the obligations detailed in the OECD guidelines and the core 
conventions, led to a proliferation of private and corporate codes being introduced 
(Beek 1998b, O’Brien 2002, Jenkins 2001). A key question regarding the core 
conventions was how they could be enforced, and this was where the ILO lacked 
power (Jenkins 2001, Block et al. 2001). Although, the ILO provides a vehicle to 
investigate cases o f non-compliance, without the power to issue sanctions against 
the violating country or company it has relatively little power. In addition, 
participation by nation-states and TNCs to ensure conventions are upheld is 
voluntary (Block et al. 2001, Scherrer and Greven 2001).
The failure of governments to enforce labour standards has been an important 
catalyst in the increase o f corporate voluntary initiatives in global supply chains 
(Jenkins 2001, Scherrer and Greven 2001). Trade unions, developmental NGOs 
(the more vocal being Christian Aid, Oxfam and the World Development 
Movement) and consumer groups mobilised to tackle the issue of poor labour 
conditions with business directly (Jenkins 2001, Hale and Shaw 2001, Scherrer 
and Greven 2001). In addition, there was a growing awareness of the working 
conditions of labour involved in global production chains through media 
campaigns -  the transmission of information enabled by new technologies -  and
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civil society campaigns (Jenkins et al. 2002, Barrientos and Dolan 2006). 
Certainly, new technologies such as mobile phones and the internet helped social 
movements create greater visibility of labour conditions in far-flung production 
sites (Jenkins et al. 2002). Accusations of reputable companies selling everyday 
goods made by exploited workers, helped to galvanise consumers into action, and 
demand that companies take greater responsibility for the conditions in 
production chains and the fate of the overseas worker (Hale and Shaw 2001, 
Jenkins et al. 2002).
4.3 Voluntary Codes and Standards
By the mid-1990s, NGOs and civil society groups had markedly raised their 
profile and the pressure of media campaigns coupled with the threat of direct 
action, such as consumer boycotts, forced companies to review their position 
(Hertz 2001, Porter and Kramer 2002, Hopkins 2003). As noted by Klein (2000) 
the consumer boycott challenged the ‘political clout’ of companies as well as their 
market dominance. In this instance, the compelling case to adopt more 
responsible behaviour in global supply chains was much related to protecting the 
corporate brand, as few organisations were able to build a business case for CSR 
activity, other than one based on the premise of risk management (Porter and 
Kramer 2002, Hertz 2004). Retailers and manufacturers became acutely aware of 
the damage to their image of exposes of poor labour conditions, particularly as 
regards child labour (Klein 2000, Dolan and Humphrey 2000). Subsequently, a 
number of CSR policies were developed, which incorporated the introduction of 
labour codes o f conduct and certifiable standards in global supply chains (Jenkins 
et al. 2002, Hertz 2004). The key objective was to ensure that social and 
environmental standards were being maintained in global production chains 
(Scherrer and Greven 2001, Jenkins et al. 2002, Hertz 2004). By their very 
nature, the policies developed by companies under the auspices of social 
responsibility were voluntary and often informal (European Commission 2001, 
Hopkins 2004).
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Although there is no generally accepted definition o f the term CSR, it is most 
often used to apply to corporate environmental and social initiatives that go 
beyond legal requirements11 and are voluntary in nature (ILO 2003, Hopkins 
2004). The European Commission (EC) define CSR as ‘a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’ 
(European Commission 2001: 8), the description most often quoted in CSR 
debates (Urminsky 2001). In this regard, labour codes of conduct and certifiable 
standards are also voluntary, and as such largely promote self-regulation for those 
corporations involved in producing or sourcing their products globally (Jenkins et 
al. 2002). In this way, labour standards are increasingly enforced through TNCs 
compliance to voluntary initiatives implemented in global supply chains rather 
than through national labour regulation (Jenkins et al. 2002, Christopherson and 
Lillie 2005). These new forms of labour governance have emerged at many 
different levels: (i) the individual firm, e.g. supermarket propriety ‘responsible 
sourcing’ codes and producer private labelling schemes, (ii) industry sector, e.g. 
the ETI Base Code and, (iii) across several sectors, e.g. SA8000 Standard 
(Jenkins 2001, O ’Brien 2002, Barrientos and Dolan 2006).
Codes of conduct vary according to the areas they cover. Establishing 
distinctions between codes, labour standards, social labelling and certification 
systems can therefore be problematic (Urminsky 2001, Hopkins 2004). Codes 
also vary depending on the sponsoring organisation or partnership (different 
groups of stakeholders involved), the level of commitment, and monitoring 
processes (Scherrer and Greven 2001, Hopkins 2004). Thus, determining the 
boundaries of the schemes, which invariably overlap, makes categorisation of the 
various initiatives difficult (Urminsky 2001). The ILO report edited by Urminsky 
(2001: 13) defines a ‘code of conduct’ as a ‘written policy, or statement of 
principles, intended to serve as the basis for a commitment to particular enterprise 
conduct’. Essentially, a code o f conduct is a guide for taking action, which
11 In terms of legally binding laws at the national and international levels, such as laws applicable 
in the country of production or in the country where a product is sold (ILO 2003).
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stipulates certain ways of working in business (Urminsky 2001, Hopkins 2004). 
Such codes move beyond current legislation to form a set of voluntary 
commitments which, according to Urminsky (2001: 13) are by their very nature 
‘often made in response to market incentives with no legal or regulatory 
compulsion’. However, there is a general acceptance that as public statements, 
codes usually have some legal implication under laws regulating business 
representation and advertising (Urminsky 2001).
During the last two decades, there has been a plethora of labour codes o f conduct 
introduced by retail and supplier/producer organisations, which are applicable to 
global supply chains (Klein 2000, Jenkins et al. 2002). The majority of these 
have been developed as a key component of the CSR policies of such 
organisations (Hopkins 2004). The increasing pressure of public scrutiny placed 
business on the defensive and pressed companies to show greater attention to their 
social commitments (Carroll and Buchholtz 2000, Henderson 2001). The 
continual charges held against business for not caring for the social implications 
of their actions and the effect companies had on developing countries, fuelled the 
call for greater social responsibility and social justice (Carroll and Buchholtz 
2000, Henderson 2001). According to Henderson (2001) these demands were 
somewhat tempered by the introduction of voluntary codes of conduct and self­
regulation. Since the late-1980s and the early-1990s, companies have been 
reacting to union and NGOs’ criticisms of their poor labour conditions by 
publicly announcing their codes of conduct (O’Brien 2002, Jenkins et al. 2002).
Codes are important for workers, because they help regulate labour practices 
across national boundaries and provide a new form of governance for globalised 
business. First, they seek to improve the working conditions of those employed in 
the production operation of global supply chains -  they aim to ensure certain 
principles and standards are implemented and maintained -  and second, they seek 
to promote and protect labour rights in the workplace (Block et al. 2001, Jenkins 
et al. 2002). In many respects, the codes introduced by companies have become 
the very means by which they are held to account (Jenkins 2001, O ’Brien 2002). 
However, in practice these voluntary initiatives serve many purposes, including 
internal management of geographically dispersed sites, the strengthening of a
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company’s position to prevent bribery and corruption, and on occasions simply an 
attempt to enhance or improve the company’s image or brand reputation (Beek 
1998b, O’Brien 2002).
4.3.1 Corporate and Industry Codes
Retailers, producers and a number of trade associations in the food sector have 
introduced many labour codes of conduct (Urminsky 2001, Vorley 2003). In 
particular, supermarket groups introduced CSR polices which incorporated codes 
relating to the conditions of workers who were directly employed by 
suppliers/producers (Urminsky 2001). In this way, supermarkets were able to 
scrutinise and become more involved in the governance o f the production chains 
in their supply base (Jenkins et al. 2002, Hopkins 2004). All the major UK 
supermarket groups have an ethical purchasing code and publish details of their 
CSR commitments and achievements in annual statements, as part of their annual 
reporting structure -  a move in the direction of triple bottom line reporting. The 
producers involved in the global supply chain for bananas have also been active in 
their engagement o f voluntary initiatives relating to social and environmental 
conditions. In November 1998, the UK Banana Group consisting of a number of 
the major banana importing companies -  Fresh Del Monte, Fyffes, JP Fruit 
Distributors Ltd and S.H. Pratt -  produced a ‘Code of Best Practice’ (Banana 
Group 1998, Fyffes 2004). The UK Banana Group was originally formed in 1984 
by banana importers, ripeners and handlers to raise the profile of the fruit and 
communicate the benefits of eating bananas to consumers in a drive to increase 
consumption (Key Note 2006). The group’s ‘Code o f Best Practice’ provides 
guidelines for the engagement between UK retailers and overseas suppliers, and is 
specifically based on the ILO core conventions numbers 87, 98, 135 & 143 on 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, numbers 100 & 111 on anti- 
discrimination and equal remuneration, number 138 on forced and child labour 
and numbers 111, 29 & 105 on labour conditions and freedom to choose 
employment (Banana Group 1998). At the time, the companies within the 
Banana Group accounted for over three-quarters of all bananas imported into the 
UK -  equivalent to approximately 665,000 tons per annum, so the coverage of the 
code was substantial (Key Note 2006). Notwithstanding this, in recent years the
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Ethical Trading Initiative’s Base Code has largely superseded the Banana Group 
Code (Banana Link 2005).
4.3.2 The Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code
During the 1990s, a number of different forms of code related activity took place, 
including the Fair Labor Association (FLA) in the US, which produced an 
agreement whereby clothes would be produced under fair conditions and the 
creation of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) in the UK (O’Brien 2002). 
Urminsky (2001) describes these developments as multi-stakeholder codes, as 
they involve business enterprises, trade unions and NGOs. Indeed the ETI fits 
these criteria, and is defined as a tripartite alliance of corporate, trade union and 
development NGO members interested in improving the social conditions of 
workers employed in the global supply chains, which provide goods to the UK 
retail market (O’Brien 2002, ETI 2003). Corporate members are predominantly 
from the textiles and food industries (both manufacturing and retailing). Whereas 
union membership is largely from the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) 
(which were re-designated Global Union Federations (GUFs) in 2000), and the 
International Department o f the Trades Union Congress (TUC) as opposed to the 
individual UK based unions in the industry sectors (Hale and Shaw 2001, 
Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). However, the UK Department of International 
Development is also involved in the ETI, which gives an international feel to the 
alliance (ETI 2003). At its inception in 1997, the ETI stated its chief aim as:
To develop and encourage the use of a widely endorsed set of 
standards, embodied in codes of conduct, and monitoring and auditing 
methods which will enable companies to work together with other 
organisations outside the corporate sector to improve labour 
conditions around the world.
(ETI 1998: 2)
The ETI evolved from the initial attempts made by developmental NGOs to agree 
effective procedures to monitor and verify company codes being implemented in 
global supply chains (Hale and Shaw 2001). In 2003, the ETI introduced its own 
code of practice entitled ‘The Base Code’, which included nine clauses and 
reflected the more relevant international standards in respect of global labour 
practices. The code and the accompanying ‘principles of implementation’ were
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negotiated and agreed by the corporate, trade union and NGO members o f the ETI 
and have two related functions, which are:
1. To provide a basic philosophy or platform from which ETI 
identifies and develops good practice; and
2. To provide a generic standard for company performance.
(ETI 2005a)
The nine clauses incorporated in the ETI Base Code include: (i) employment is 
freely chosen, (ii) freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are 
respected, (iii) working conditions are safe and hygienic, (iv) child labour should 
not be used, (v) living wages are paid, (vi) working hours are not excessive, (vii) 
no discrimination is practiced, (viii) regular employment is provided, and (ix) no 
harsh or inhumane treatment is allowed (ETI 2005a).
The ETI is more specifically concerned with ‘ethical sourcing’, which it defines 
as a way of working that ‘establishes a company’s responsibility for labour and 
human rights practices in its supply chain’ (ETI 2003: 2). The ETI aims to 
improve the conditions o f workers through promoting the joint development of 
good supply management practices and encouraging retail organisations to work 
with its suppliers to implement internationally accepted labour standards. The 
ETI stipulates that the labour standards incorporated in its’ Base Code constitute a 
minimum requirement for any corporate code of labour practice focusing on good 
supply chain management (ETI 2005a). When corporate members join the ETI, 
they commit to implementing the ETI Base Code in their supply chains and in 
doing so, report annually on their progress. Many of the UK supermarket groups 
are members of the ETI, including Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and the Co-operative 
Group, as are many of the producers and wholesalers who supply and import 
bananas into the UK, such as Chiquita, Del Monte and Fyffes (ETI 2007).
4.3.3 Social Accounting 8000 Standard
In 1996, Social Accountability International (SAI) a US-based, non-profit 
organisation dedicated to the development, implementation and review of 
voluntary verifiable social accountability standards introduced a generic
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management system for corporations, with a third-party certification process 
called ‘Social Accountability 8000’ (SA8000) (SAI 2005). The SAI evolved 
from the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) and its’ advisory board includes 
representatives from corporates, NGOs and trade unions (SAI 2001). The 
SA8000 certification system is an independent and auditable standard for the 
social accountability of corporations, based on the international workplace norms 
stipulated in the core conventions of the ILO and the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and Convention on Rights of the Child (O’Brien 2002, Scherrer 
and Greven 2001). The SA8000 Standard is also modelled on the International 
Organisation for Standardisation management systems of IS09000 and ISO 14000 
(SAI 2005).
The SA8000 Standard can be applied to any industry and incorporates many of 
the elements that trade unions and NGOs consider essential for labour codes of 
conduct. These include: (i) no child labour, (ii) no forced labour, (iii) a safe and 
healthy work environment, (iv) freedom of association and right to collective 
bargaining, (v) no discrimination, (vi) no corporal punishment, (vii) working 
hours to comply with the applicable law, (viii) compensation/wages at the legal 
and industry norm, and (ix) integration of the standard into the organisation’s 
management systems and practices (Scherrer and Greven 2001, O’Brien 2002, 
SAI 2005). The SA8000 Standard does not purport to be multi-stakeholder, as it 
is limited to a selection of stakeholders (Hopkins 2004). But following 
Urminsky’s definition noted earlier, the SA8000 Standard can be classified as a 
code of conduct, and thus the term of ‘codes’ will be used when referring to the 
variety of voluntary labour initiatives present in global supply chains whenever 
possible.
4.4 International Framework Agreements
It has been argued that the advent of codes involving business, trade unions and 
NGOs has been an important stage in the development of other agreements 
between companies and unions, such as International Framework Agreements 
(IFAs) (Riisgaard 2004, Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). IF As secure the
commitment of TNCs to respect the fundamental rights of workers and as such 
provide another route towards better conditions for labour (Riisgaard 2004).
They are agreements on minimum labour standards negotiated between TNCs and 
GUFs (and national and local union bodies) and normally include recognition of 
the ILO core labour standards (Riisgaard 2005, Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). 
IFAs are negotiated at the international level, but require participation of the 
relevant regional, national and local unions (Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). At a 
minimum, IFAs include the principles of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, but some include further provisions, such as a commitment to decent 
wages and the provision for safe and hygienic working conditions (Riisgaard 
2005, Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). IFAs often develop from codes of conduct, 
but in many respects IFAs are viewed as a ‘step’ beyond these codes (Fairbrother 
and Hammer 2005, Frundt 2005). IFAs set minimum labour standards and 
obligations, and although these are not legally enforceable, TNCs are obliged to 
accept some responsibility for ensuring labour rights are maintained along the 
supply chain (Riisgaard 2004, Hammer 2005). In addition, some of these 
agreements are not restricted to the signatory company, as there are often 
stipulations made that suppliers will also be persuaded to abide by the agreement 
(Fairbrother and Hammer 2005). Furthermore, IFAs are structured to give 
unions’ formalised representation at a senior level within the corporate 
organisation, which makes it possible to override local union-management 
hostility (Riisgaard 2005). This, together with the opportunity provided to unions 
to monitor compliance of the agreement on the ground, fundamentally 
distinguishes IFAs from any other voluntary initiative (Riisgaard 2005, 
Fairbrother and Hammer 2005).
There are two such agreements in the global food sector, one o f which is the IFA 
signed in June 2001 by Chiquita International with the International Union of 
Foodworkers (IUF) and the Central American trade union COLSIBA 
(Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros) (Were 2003, Riisgaard 
2004). At the time, the framework agreement was described as ‘a groundbreaking 
partnership’ for labour rights, on the basis that it included freedom of association, 
and minimum labour and employment standards for workers in Chiquita’s Latin 
American banana operations (Chiquita 2001b). In the agreement, Chiquita 
reaffirmed its commitment to the ILO core conventions numbers 29, 87, 98, 100,
-96-
105, 111, 135, 138 and 182 (Chiquita 2001b). (Details of these conventions are 
noted in Appendix E.)
According to Riisgaard (2005), IFAs are a step forward in terms of labour 
regulation because they provide a review function for worker representatives and 
company managers to meet, and oversee the application of the agreement. 
However, according to Hammer (2005), IFAs are not better codes with trade 
union involvement -  they are qualitatively different and offer a different platform 
for industrial relations, and it could be argued governance. The indication being 
that with such agreements global unions have the potential to gain substantive 
recognition for labour rights with international employers (Fairbrother and 
Hammer 2005). IFAs also have the strategic value of the possibility of advancing 
voluntary labour standards and multi-lateral legislation (in the ILO) approaches to 
labour rights sequentially (Block et al. 2001, Hammer 2005). In this regard, 
Brecher and others (2006) suggest that IFAs offer the potential of a power shift in 
relationship terms between the various actors involved in global supply chains.
4.5 Conclusion
The argument presented in this chapter demonstrates that there has been a shift in 
the forms of labour regulation implemented in global supply chains from 
mandatory national (state) and international (supranational institutions) to a 
situation whereby corporations have adopted voluntary initiatives, such as codes 
of conduct and certifiable standards. These initiatives serve business interests 
because they demonstrate efforts to improve the labour conditions of workers, and 
hence help corporations defend their social responsibility credentials. However, 
the implication of this change, is that governance is structured by the policies of 
specific actors (chiefly corporations), which coordinate and control the chain. 
This transition has created a new regime of labour regulation in global supply 
chains, one that is marked by the adoption of private global regulation, that is 
through the adoption of voluntary labour initiatives such as codes of conduct and 
certifiable standards. Indeed, as noted by Urminsky (2001) there may be 
instances whereby governments encourage such voluntary initiatives as a 
substitute for more formal regulation of business. Hence, there is a sense of de­
regulation becoming re-regulation in the form prescribed by business. The role of
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unions, NGOs, civil society groups and indeed, workers themselves becomes less 
clear in this form of labour regulation. In this context, calls for governance of 
global supply chains bring the relationship between capital and labour to the 
centre stage.
The debates on what form governance should take and the increasing adoption of 
voluntary initiatives, some of which lead to private regulation in global supply 
chains, presents a puzzle -  one that leads to the focus o f the fieldwork study and 
the key research questions that are addressed:
1. Does the adoption of codes of conduct improve labour conditions on 
banana plantations?
2. In whose best interest is it to adopt codes and other voluntary 
initiatives, such as International Framework Agreements (IFAs)
3. What do workers think about codes and IFAs?
4. Are IFAs a decisive step towards re-regulation?
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Chapter Five 
Methodological Reflections
Introduction
The aim of the chapter is to describe the methodology adopted in this research 
study. The overall approach is qualitative and the chapter is divided into separate 
sections that discuss some of the more interesting methodological issues 
encountered in conducting qualitative research where capital and labour 
intertwine. In the thesis, I explore the areas of corporate social responsibility and 
the ‘positioning’ of labour codes of conduct in a global banana supply chain. I 
achieve this by observing, interviewing and conducting conversations with many 
of the social actor groups directly engaged in the chain and those that have stated 
an interest in the way the chain is organised and controlled. I use interpretive 
sociology that begins with the actor’s perspective; I listen to what comments are 
made and then categorise and re-interpret these accounts from an analyst’s 
perspective based on the analytical framework that informs the study. Thus the 
statements made in the thesis are often contextualised by the information garnered 
and the insights developed. However, the knowledge gained during this process 
is also undoubtedly influenced by my own perspective on the issues of ethical 
trade in food retailing and my personal history in the retailing sector.
I reflect on the qualitative methodology, but I also discuss the reasoning behind 
this approach. The overall intent of the chapter is to describe some of the more 
interesting issues and challenges I encountered when conducting the research. 
Thus the chapter begins with a brief background to qualitative inquiry and the 
journey taken towards answering the key research questions. Thus I introduce the 
methodological approach taken in this particular study and reflect on the 
processes of negotiating access, data collection, data analysis and reflexivity. The 
chapter is therefore structured under a number o f broad sections: Methods of 
Inquiry, Research Journey, Fieldwork, Analytical Criteria, Research Ethics, and 
Conclusion.
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5.1 Methods of Inquiry: the Procedural Pursuit
The overall approach of the research is qualitative and multi-method; reflective, 
narrative, and sometimes experimental. Qualitative research can help to make 
sense of the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of everyday activity, by identifying the context 
of such events within a social arena (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). As noted by 
Becker (1992) the qualitative approach aids the process of studying people doing 
things in the places where things are done. It is a method of inquiry which takes a 
‘naturalistic approach’, consisting of a ‘set of interpretive, material practices’ that 
can locate the observer in the world and transform it into ‘a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, and memos to the self (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 3).
Four main types of research activity focus this study, including: (i) participation 
in an international conference organised and attended by key stakeholders in the 
banana industry, (ii) semi-structured interviews with key decision makers at the 
retail end of the banana supply chain, (iii) a period of fieldwork in a banana 
producer-country, during which I conducted semi-structured interviews and focus 
groups involving an array of social actors, and (iv) a series of interviews with 
other interested parties in the chain based in Europe, including trade unions and 
NGOs. I also attended a more general conference on ethical trade and CSR, a 
presentation of the research findings by the ETI Impact Assessment team, 
conducted a detailed literature review and undertook documentary analysis.
I conducted the fieldwork in one country, adopting a ‘case study’ approach. The 
term case study is used to identify a specific form of inquiry, with ‘a range of 
dimensions’, one o f the more important dimensions being ‘the number o f  cases 
investigated’ followed by ‘the amount o f  detailed information that the researcher 
collects about each case studied’ (Hammersley and Gomm 2000: 2, italics added). 
The case study affords the opportunity to gather and analyse information about a 
large number of features of each case, the emphasis being on the qualitative 
nature of the data rather than the quantification of data (Hammersley and Gomm 
2000). As such, the case study approach leads to a more narrative approach.
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5.2 The Research Journey: Where to Begin?
The research journey began with my experience in the industry. This study was 
facilitated by contacting a network of former colleagues in numerous supermarket 
retailers in the UK. The supermarket ‘buying fraternity’ is somewhat incestuous 
and typically, with careers moving between supermarket groups, there is virtually 
always someone who has a contact in the ‘opposite camp’ or ‘someone who 
knows someone’ and as such referrals across competitive boundaries were not 
unusual. Thus I was transferred from one individual to the next in a number of 
supermarket retailers in my endeavours to construct a research plan. It was 
suggested to me by one of these informants that the best course of action would 
be to make contact with the three major banana TNC producers. This was to be 
the start o f a journey that would eventually lead me to the banana plantations of 
Costa Rica, where I would observe the production process o f a fruit destined for 
foreign markets.
The first requirement was to approach the producers, but I knew from personal 
experience I needed some form of introduction or at the very least some contact 
names in the companies I was about to approach; cold calling would not be my 
best option. Cold calling is a typical phrase used in the sales and marketing 
environment, whereby no previous contact or introduction has been made, it has 
the literal sense of knocking on doors unannounced. I contacted a former retail 
colleague who had previously had some involvement with the banana sector and 
asked for advice; from which I was given my first producer contact name and 
telephone number: a representative in Chiquita, who as my colleague noted “will 
be amenable to your study and will probably be happy to meet and talk to you, 
also he won’t mind me giving you his telephone number” (Conversation Retail 
Colleague, December 2004). I arranged to meet the representative at the Ethical 
Corporation conference held in London on the 22nd of February 2005.
The conference was a two-day event entitled ‘Business/NGO Partnerships and 
Engagement’, and a number of case studies were presented to show the structure 
and progress of such collaboration. Several of the presentations caught my
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attention, including one by the ETI and Marks and Spencer PLC regarding the 
implementation of the ETI Base Code in the company’s food supply chain, and 
another by Chiquita International. One of the statements made in the presentation 
by the representative from Chiquita stood out, he said ‘Companies are citizens of 
the wider world, they are not only concerned with self-interest, but have a duty to 
society’ (Conference presentation, February 2005). The comment may have been 
constructed for the conference audience, but it made me think a little more about 
the lens through which I could view my own research and how I could explore the 
relationship between business and society.
As agreed, I met with the representative from Chiquita and we had the 
opportunity to talk at length. We discussed the banana industry, the production 
process, labour codes of conduct, the position of UK supermarkets on issues of 
environmental and social conditions on banana plantations and tentatively 
explored the opportunity of me visiting a banana plantation owned by Chiquita 
(Conversation George Jaksch, CSR Director: Chiquita, February 2005). While 
the location of the field study trip had not been finalised, indications from 
previous discussions with my retail network were that Costa Rica would be the 
ideal place. The reasoning for this choice was Costa Rica was one of the biggest 
banana exporters in the world and the country was considered a more stable and 
safer environment compared to its Central American neighbours. Having 
discovered that Chiquita had a large number of banana farms there, I was 
disposed to study the industry there. However, other considerations needed to be 
taken into account, such as which other banana TNC producers operated in Costa 
Rica, and how best could I make contact with them. Jaksch (Chiquita) informed 
me of a major event in the banana industry calendar, which was due to take place 
in a couple of months, the Second International Banana Conference (IBCII). I 
was not aware of this event and as all the major actors in the global banana supply 
chain -  producers, retailers, government officials, trade unions and NGOs -  
would gather to discuss the issues and challenges facing the industry, it seemed 
opportune for me to attend. As noted by Jaksch, it appeared to be perfect timing
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for my study and “a chance to meet everyone who is important in the world of 
bananas” (Conversation George Jaksch, CSR Director: Chiquita, February 2005).
5.2.1 The Second International Banana Conference
By attending the Second International Banana Conference (IBCII) in Brussels, I 
was able to make contacts and engage with many stakeholders in the global 
banana chain from corporate entities to trade unions, and from government 
representatives to civil society groups. The key objective o f the conference was 
to ‘secure commitments by governments and banana companies to respect/enforce 
labour and trade union rights and standards for workers in all producing 
countries’ (IBCII 2004: 2). The whole conference agenda was structured around 
what the organisers deemed the most pressing question in the banana industry 
‘How to Reverse the Race to the Bottom’ -  a question o f tackling the major issues 
o f fair prices, living wages and labour rights. The main argument was that 
producers, driven by the major supermarket groups, were seeking ever lower 
production costs in order to supply cheaper and cheaper bananas and this was 
crippling the industry and its workers (IBCII 2004).
Following the First International Banana Conference (IBCI) in 1998, it appeared 
that the majority o f banana producers and trading companies accepted the 
diagnosis o f the dire conditions in the banana industry and were intent on 
rectifying the situation (Farquhar and Smith 2005). Yet, in spite o f this 
understanding and the proliferation o f voluntary labour initiatives and codes of 
conduct being introduced, achievements on the ground seemed limited (Farquhar 
and Smith 2005, Chambron 2005). According to Chambron (2005) conditions in
socio-economic terms actually appeared to worsen during the years following the
12first conference. One o f the reasons commonly cited for this, was the power of
12 During the IBCII event the terms ‘power’ and ‘buying power’ were often used to describe the 
level o f control supermarket groups have over the banana producers, both the TNCs and the 
independent growers (IBCII Observations, April 2005).
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the major supermarkets, who by ‘flexing their muscles’ in terms o f their buying 
power over the last number o f years, had extracted cost reductions from producers 
in order to cut the price o f bananas for the consumer. This had resulted in both a 
number of ‘price wars on the high street’ and ‘a degrading o f the conditions on 
banana farms’ (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). The large supermarket 
groups were accused o f taking advantage o f a structural oversupply in the 
industry, and it was suggested that the pressure for cheaper and cheaper prices 
was to the detriment o f improvements to labour conditions (IBCII Forum 
Discussion, April 2005). The importance of the role of the supermarkets as 
regards maintaining environmental and social standards in the banana supply 
chain was becoming increasingly apparent.
I attended two o f the breakaway workshops, the first called ‘Reversing the erosion 
o f labour rights’ and the second ‘Living wages and fair prices: whose 
responsibility?’ I hoped this would give me further understanding o f the factors 
influencing the success o f voluntary initiatives and codes o f conduct in the global 
banana chain. And, as events unfolded during the three day conference, it became 
more evident that there were a number o f factors influencing the effectiveness of 
codes implemented in the production process o f the global supply chain for 
bananas. The key factors that emerged included:
• The corporate strategy, organisational structure and culture o f the producer 
company
■ The corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles o f the supermarket 
retailer
The company philosophy, infrastructure and values needed to be considered when 
evaluating the function and effectiveness o f labour codes o f conduct. Based on 
the presentations, discussions and my observations at the conference, it appeared 
that codes were applied differently and had varied significance, dependent on the 
philosophy o f the organisation (corporate strategy) and the type o f organisation 
(the corporate structure). This consideration played a key role in determining the
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fieldwork location, the plantations to visit and the banana companies/producers I 
would need to engage with.
5.2.2 A Round o f  Retail Interviews
Prior to and following the IBCII event in April 2005 ,1 conducted a series o f semi­
structured interviews with representatives from all the major UK supermarket 
groups. I spoke with buyers, CSR representatives, supply chain executives and 
technical managers. This both helped me to prepare my thoughts before going to 
Brussels and enabled me to ask some searching questions following what I had 
heard at the conference. In general, the retail representatives were happy to speak 
o f their policies on social responsibility, their commitments to labour codes o f 
conduct and listen to what I had observed at the conference. However, it soon 
became evident that they were aggrieved at being held responsible for the poor 
conditions in the banana production chain, and some suggested that the major 
producers were accountable for such matters. Clearly each actor has their own 
perspective on the issue o f equitable labour conditions in global supply chains, 
but the challenge for me would be to interpret the statements of my retail 
informants while remaining objective. I needed to suspend my understanding of 
retail buying and knowledge of supply chains, so that I would continue to 
scrutinise what I was being told and not be coerced into condoning the position of 
any one social actor in the banana supply chain.
5.2.3 The Case Study Location
Careful consideration was given to the suitability and the feasibility o f carrying 
out the research in my chosen location (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). But 
my decision was undoubtedly influenced by personal circumstances and contacts 
(Pollard 1985). The fieldwork location was selected on the advice o f retail 
contacts, their suggested selection criteria being: (i) the country needed to be a 
major banana exporter to the UK, (ii) there would be fairly good access for 
potential respondents, and (iii) the location would be relatively safe on a personal 
level. Thus Ecuador and Columbia, Latin American countries that met conditions
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(i) and (ii), but not the last consideration, were excluded in favour of Costa Rica, 
which met all three conditions for a trusted fieldwork location.
Figure 5.1 Map of the Republic of Costa Rica
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Source: EIU, Economist Intelligence Unit 2005.
Costa Rica proved to be the correct decision for a number of reasons; first it is an 
appropriate location to conduct this form of study, second it is the third biggest 
exporter to the European market and all the major banana producers operate there, 
and third, it is considered relatively safe for a lone female researcher to conduct 
this kind of research. However, there was still the need to consider language and 
the fact that Spanish was the native tongue in Central America, which would 
require the use of translators and a requirement to acquire basic communication 
skills in another language and culture. For eighteen months prior to embarking on 
my field study trip I attended weekly Spanish classes and during my time in Costa 
Rica I sought out a personal tutor to help develop my language skills. This was 
critical, not only so I could live day-to-day in a location where little of my own 
native language was spoken, but more importantly so that I could connect and 
communicate with possible respondents both formally and informally. This was 
one of the trials and tribulations I had to face in choosing to conduct research in
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another country and culture. One o f the more physical tribulations was the 
climate, the constant humidity on the plantation and the accompanying animal life 
that such conditions bring, such as spiders and snakes on the plantations, and red- 
biting ants and cockroaches in my living quarters.
5.3 Fieldwork - An Expedition
The Second International Banana Conference was a ‘jumping off platform’ 
theoretically and heavily influenced the structure o f my study and fieldwork. The 
conference took place in the early stages o f my research project and provided a 
great opportunity for me to ‘pick up’ contacts and ‘negotiate’ access to the field. 
The design o f a research project is intended to help situate the researcher in the 
empirical world by building the connections with specific locations, groups of 
individuals, institutions, and other bodies of relevant material (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000). In many ways, the conference fulfilled these requirements. 
Whilst, I was still in the midst o f drawing on my own retail experience to develop 
my ideas and contemplate the approach o f the research study, I was compelled to 
consider the problems and concerns raised in this forum. The conference in many 
ways acted like a catalyst; it brought clarity to those questions I had asked myself 
regarding the ‘ethical’ supply chain. The issues and challenges being faced in the 
global banana chain resonated with my previous experience o f retailing. As a 
retail buyer involved in the product sourcing process o f fresh foods for a major 
supermarket group I was constantly mindful of trying to reach a fair agreement 
for all parties engaged in the supply chain. However, there were always market 
pressures: o f being competitively priced, maintaining market share, and meeting 
sales targets and profit margins; the bottom line, which seemed to defy all best 
intentions. My experience as a retail consultant in a number o f other major 
supermarket groups also confirmed the fact that there were many individuals 
trying to ‘do the right thing’, that is attempting to be equitable in their business 
practices. But somehow it seemed as if  their efforts were often thwarted. It was 
with this experience in mind and the insights gained through the attendance at the 
IBCII event that I was spurred on to more fully explore the dynamics o f the 
ethical trade dilemma.
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Documents can be defined as social productions and important when an area o f 
research is o f immediate interest (May 2001). Being able to examine the CSR 
policy statements o f the supermarkets and the producers, and their intended 
recipients was also an important first step in the research process. Documentary 
analysis both prepared the groundwork for my field study and supplemented the 
data I collected during my field trip. Prior to travelling to Costa Rica, I obtained 
company financial reports, government policy materials, social auditing criteria, 
union agreements and research studies conducted by a variety o f actors interested 
in the implementation and monitoring o f codes. The process o f analysing these 
documents helped me develop my approach to the study and formulate a number 
of questions for the different groups o f social actors engaged in the banana chain.
5.3.1 The Nature o f  Fieldwork
Bailey (1996: 1) states briefly that ‘field research is the systematic study of 
ordinary events and activities in the settings in which they occur’. To gain an 
understanding o f  an event, data needs to be collected; interacting and observing 
people can achieve this during the course o f their daily lives, usually in self- 
contained settings such as workplaces (Maanen 1988). As noted by Maanen 
(1988) fieldwork usually means living with those who are studied over a lengthy 
period. My approach was somewhat different, mainly because I had not planned 
to conduct an ethnographic study. However, I needed to visit the location where 
the topic o f interest -  the banana production chain and the labour conditions 
therein -  occurred, and this required me to spend two months conducting 
fieldwork. This gave an ethnographic dimension to my study. The term 
ethnography is often contested, but according to Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995) ethnography may have several features which include a strong emphasis 
on exploring the nature o f particular social phenomena rather than setting out to 
test hypotheses about them and the analysis of data involving explicit 
interpretation o f the meanings and functions o f human actions.
I visited Costa Rica from the 10th February to the 9th April 2006. For practical 
reasons, I was based in Heredia -  a town in the central province o f Costa Rica -
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that was close to the National University as opposed to a banana town in the 
province o f Limon. A few months prior to my trip to Costa Rica, a colleague of 
mine who is a native o f Columbia suggested it may be best for me to have some 
sort o f ‘safety net’ in a country where I knew no-one. Indeed, I was totally reliant 
on commitments made by company executives based in Europe and the US to 
guide me through the maze o f contacts I would need to make on the ground. My 
colleague suggested writing to a number o f academic institutions in Costa Rica to 
ask for their support in terms o f providing the infrastructure o f a desk, access to 
the internet for email and a phone from which I could contact my potential 
gatekeepers in the county. In exchange, I would offer to discuss my planned 
fieldwork and where possible share some of my research experience. After 
searching the world-wide-web, a number o f academic institutions appeared to be 
a good match in terms o f research interest. Thus with the help o f my colleague, 
who helped me construct a letter of introduction in Spanish, I contacted the 
Director or Head o f Research in a number of these institutions. I received an 
immediate response from the El Centro Intemacional de Politica Economica para 
el Desarrollo Sostenible (CINPE), the International Centre for Economic Policy 
for Sustainable Development o f the National University based in Heredia, near 
the capital San Jose.
I had originally thought o f creating a base for myself in the province o f Limon, 
the main banana-producing locale, but I had been advised against it by my retail 
contacts. The majority o f towns in the district are banana towns with few 
potential places for me to stay or work when not involved in farm visits and 
conducting interviews. Also there was the possibility o f feeling more like an 
exile, or as Maanen (1988: 9) describes it a ‘self-initiated exile’ in the towns. The 
feeling o f stepping into a culturally alien community did indeed concern me. 
Costa Rica is a well known holiday destination, famous for its rainforests and 
beautiful beaches, and considered a wonderful place to visit. But for me 
personally, not knowing anyone in the country made me feel quite isolated from 
the moment I arrived. I felt like an alien surrounding by strangers, watching my 
every move, attentive to those around me and ready to react to any strange
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episodes or misfortune that may be bestowed upon me. As suggested by Maanen 
(1988) there is a strange sense o f both excitement and fear when conducting 
fieldwork, and this is very much my experience.
However, I still spent periods in the banana locale. The distance from Heredia to 
Limon was such that I needed to stay over each time I visited the plantations. I 
made the journey to the Limon province five times in all, staying for two to three 
days on each occasion. During these periods, I was able to immerse myself in the 
social setting o f a banana town and observe behaviour. I kept detailed fieldnotes 
and took a great number o f photographs o f the locale I was situated in and o f the 
production activities I observed on the farms. I also kept a personal diary during 
my stay in Costa Rica, little ‘memos to the se lf to record my experiences and 
emotions (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 3). I often refer to this when reviewing my 
data or contemplating what I observed whilst staying in the banana towns.
5.3.2 Securing Access in the Field
There is always a balance to be stuck between the ease o f access and potential 
difficulties when being directly sponsored by a gatekeeper (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995). Certainly, this was a matter I needed to consider in light o f my 
connections to the supermarket buying fraternity and knowledge o f the retail 
supplier base. In some ways, this could pose a problem, in that 
workers/respondents may not see me as independent o f the companies: 
supermarkets and producers, and the social audit organisations. Yet, I felt a 
strong moral obligation to tell the workers’ story. My field study was conducted 
in cooperation with two o f the US-banana TNC producers, a wholesaler, and a 
small number o f independent producers -  all o f whom supplied the major UK 
supermarket groups. I was unable to arrive unannounced on plantations, thus the 
farms visited were expectant o f my visit and the purpose o f my research. I had to 
provide in advance an abstract of my research interest, a summary of the 
questions I was likely to ask and written assurances that my research was purely 
for academic purposes only. All my correspondences with the farm were 
channelled through a local CSR or Compliance Manager and were written in both
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English and Spanish. Fortunately, I had been made aware of these requirements 
before arriving in Costa Rica, and I was able to prepare most o f these 
correspondences in advance. This proved to be very beneficial, as it allowed me 
to check and verify my translation with my Spanish-speaking colleague from 
Columbia.
5.3.3 iH able espanol? : Do you speak Spanish?
Prior to my field study trip, I undertook a programme of Spanish language 
courses, but I was not fluent in the language and required the assistance o f 
translators to conduct my interviews. I accepted that this may create difficulties 
in terms o f the barrier that this may create between me and the informant, and the 
way their testimony would be re-laid to me. The potential for a translator to re­
interpret what was said was also troublesome because o f the requirements for the 
delicate analysis o f ‘talk’ which is not necessarily based on what is said or the 
interactive conversation (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). The need to work 
closely with a translator, the social interaction, the requirement to make sure 
informants understood the differing roles o f the researcher and the translator were 
all aspects o f the research study that needed to be managed. However, the critical 
point for me was whose voice I would hear, that of the translator or the informant 
-  who would be my respondent. Fortunately, I could follow and understand much 
of the conversation and was able to interject and clarify when I felt the translation 
was unclear or sketchy. Although I had completed an intense course of Spanish 
learning and continued with personal tutors during my stay in Costa Rica, the 
reality o f living in another language and culture was very different to what I had 
expected. In order to reflect on the circumstances I found m yself in, I also kept a 
personal diary during my visit to record my experiences, thoughts and emotions.
5.3.4 Interviewing
In order to secure respondents on the farms visited, all interviews with workers 
were conducted whenever possible in privacy and they were guaranteed 
anonymity. I employed a semi-structured interview approach following a list of 
questions I had prepared in both English and Spanish before leaving the UK (a
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copy in English is provided in Appendix F). Some o f these questions were 
amended during the interview process as experience o f a few interviews taught 
me, especially communicating through translators, that the questions could be 
more precise. In addition, there were occasions when time with a worker was 
limited due to the work they were engaged in and I adopted a more open-question 
explorative approach to the interview. This method is considered effective in 
capturing work-experience (Cassell and Symon 1994). I chose semi-structured 
interviews to collect data because, as noted by others, this is a technique that 
allows for greater depth and expansion o f the interview -  the opportunity to probe 
an interviewee’s response (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, Denzin and Lincoln 
2000). I used funnel questions -  open ended to more directed questions -  which 
enabled me to work towards and more fully explore the key research questions 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). However, as noted by Becker (1998) there 
can be inherent dangers with this process including the problem of respondents 
trying to second guess the researcher’s agenda and subsequently, presenting 
themselves as they want to be perceived.
Implicit in negotiating access to respondents is deciding on the type of 
methodology to use in the sampling process. The sampling process is often 
neglected in qualitative research, being seen as a ‘positivistic worry’ on the one 
hand, or a non-value added activity, due to the use o f ‘non-probability methods’ 
on the other (Gobo 2004: 435). However, Gobo also concedes that qualitative 
research does not need to sample or consider serious sampling issues based on the 
fact that most theoretically significant and important studies in field research are 
based on ‘opportunistic samples’. The process o f selecting respondents to 
interview on the farms I visited is best described as creating a purposive sample. 
On each farm, I sought to interview a representative number o f field workers and 
packhouse operators, at least one permanent committee member (workers’ 
representative) and at least two representatives of management (supervisor and/or 
farm administrator). I also attempted to balance the number o f male and female 
workers I spoke to, but this was somewhat influenced by the gender split on the 
farm -  men work mostly in the field and women in the packhouse. I also
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attempted to interview workers that were union members, but this proved 
virtually impossible as I was constantly told on each farm I visited that there were 
no such workers. However, I did on occasions through casually chatting to 
workers find there were individuals who in the past had been members of the 
local union. This provided me with an opportunity to explore the reasons why 
that worker was no longer affiliated to a union.
5.3.5 Focus Groups
In addition to interviewing respondents in the workplace, I conducted three focus 
groups away from the plantation. Audit groups to assess workplace practices use 
focus groups (SAI 2005) and it seemed an appropriate method for me to employ 
to collect data. The method is different from group interviewing as focus groups 
depend on interaction between the participants within the group. O f course, there 
is the danger o f the situation being contrived and artificial, and in my case, there 
was the problem o f stopping the discussion intermittently to allow for translation. 
However, there are also benefits associated with this method:
1) The opportunity to gain several perspectives on the same topic
2) The possibility o f observing people’s shared understanding o f a situation
3) The way individuals are influenced by others in a group situation
However, there is the wider concern o f whether the viewpoints garnered in this 
sort o f situation are more a reflection o f group dynamics, than the reality on the 
ground. The focus groups were organised in collaboration with a local union 
representative, who invited banana workers to come and discuss their working 
conditions in meeting rooms in the local union office and community centre. In 
many cases it proved difficult to ascertain which farms the participants came 
from, as some displayed a degree of anxiety when asked to name the farms they 
worked on or who their employer was. This was unfortunate, but more so was the 
imbalance o f gender (mostly male workers attended) and the fact that most of the 
participants were harvest workers. Compared to the interviewing process the 
ratio between field workers and packhouse operators was therefore not so 
balanced. However, the selection process o f respondents in this instance was
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outside o f my control, albeit I had directed the union representative in terms of the 
required numbers and experience o f potential participants.
5.3.6 Oth er Social A dors
Whilst in Costa Rica, I also conducted interviews with other social actors 
involved in the banana chain. I met with a number of CSR, technical and regional 
managers o f the major TNC producers, a regional union coordinator (COLSIBA), 
a local union official (SITRAP), a representative from a local NGO 
(ASPEROLA), social accounting auditors (Rainforest Alliance) and officials from 
the country’s National Banana Corporation (CORBANA). These other interviews 
provided new voices and perspectives to the debate on labour conditions on 
banana plantations. I was able to arrange some of these interviews prior to my 
visit following the discussions I had and the contacts made during the IBCII event 
in April 2005. Indeed, union officials from COLSIBA who I met at the 
conference were particularly keen for me to contact them when I was due to 
complete my field study. They seemed concerned that I would “see the real 
thing”, stating that I “must visit independent plantations [because] the companies 
all say one thing, but it is very different on the ground, the only way is to see it” 
(Conversation COLSIBA Representatives, April 2005). Other contacts, however, 
were made one-by-one through recommendations and referrals when in the 
country. There was an element o f luck to meeting these informants because I was 
attempting to ‘connect the dots’ in a somewhat complex and sometimes not very 
open network (Freidberg 2004).
5.3.7 Final Phase o f  Data Collection
On my return to the UK, I had a mass o f interview and focus group transcripts, a 
number o f taped conversations and a variety o f documents to analyse. One of the 
first tasks was to try and synthesise what I had learned o f the banana commodity 
chain and the labour conditions therein. During this process I revisited my earlier 
interview transcripts with retailers and found myself speaking again to a number 
o f retail colleagues. I also discussed with some o f the producer companies the 
data I had collected and my experience in Costa Rica. This was a way for me to
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reflect on what I had observed and to clarify some of the details. During this 
period I also met with other social actors, including a representative o f the Ethical 
Trade Initiative, a campaign director from Banana Link and a representative of 
the IUF.
In Costa Rica I had seen the bananas shipped out o f Port Limon, but I had yet to 
see them arrive in their appointed destination. My final overseas visit was to 
Antwerp, the biggest banana port in the world, to see the ripening process and 
observe how this delicate fruit survived its journey. Antwerp is the first European 
destination for the majority o f bananas, from where they are quality checked, 
ripened and transported either by road or sea to their final market. I had managed 
to trace every link in a global banana supply, apart that is from taking a passage 
on board a banana boat, spoken to a variety of social actors involved in the 
process, and was beginning to understand the issues surrounding voluntary labour 
initiatives in the sector.
5.4 Analytical Criteria
One o f the early challenges when embarking upon a research study is to 
determine the analytical framework in which to evaluate the findings o f an 
investigation. As noted in Chapter Four, there are a number o f approaches which 
are helpful in evaluating inter-firm relations and the different roles o f social actors 
in global supply chains. However, following the lead o f many other researchers 
in similar circumstances (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Murray and Raynolds 2000, 
Hale and Opondo 2005), I decided to draw on Gereffi’s (1994, 1999) GCC model, 
and Gereffi and his colleagues’ (2005) GVC framework. This is largely because 
other theoretical concepts would distract from the acute level o f control exercised 
by UK supermarket buyers in global supply chains and thus prove less 
appropriate to the research interest. Control, which is evidenced by the constant 
downward pressure on producers to reduce their selling costs to enable the on­
going price reduction o f bananas in the supermarket (Field notes, Feb-April 
2006). The GCC model and GVC framework are ideal for conceptualising 
patterns of control in the banana chain, which is highly characteristic of a buyer-
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driven chain, but which also has producer-driven characteristics. This approach 
allows for an exploration o f the power dynamics between the two ends o f the 
global banana supply chain. In this way it is hoped, a better understanding will be 
developed o f the impact ‘buyers’ have on the labour conditions o f workers, whilst 
recognising the dominant role o f the TNC producers in the chain.
My analysis draws on interview data, on-site observations, published reports, and 
has been ongoing throughout my research, which loosely lends itself to the model 
of Grounded Theory. This is a general methodology for developing theory that is 
grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
The approach refers to theory, then data and back to theory, which in a cyclical 
way produces inductive research that incorporates deductive reasoning to regulate 
the theoretical perspective (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In terms o f making sense 
o f the data collected and the events witnessed, distinguishing between the data 
and their meaning, I developed a number o f themes and grouped the data 
accordingly. Through the process of coding, fragments o f data have been brought 
together in relation to the particular themes. At first, I coded the data manually 
but then used the qualitative software NVivo. The coding process represents the 
decisive link between the original raw data: interview and focus group transcripts 
and the theoretical concepts employed in the research (Seidel and Kelle 1995). 
Exploring the linkages between the data categories and the theoretical ideas in 
this way, helps clarify what the data is saying (Coffey and Atkinson 1996) and 
provides the opportunity to interpret and reflect on the information (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). The concepts considered during the process o f coding in this 
instance are: the driven-ness o f the chain and the types o f relationship between 
worker and the various actors in the global banana supply chain. The very notion 
that such relationships have a bearing on the working conditions for labour in the 
chain was a key consideration during the review o f academic literature 
appertaining to labour governance and the subsequent development of research 
questions for this study.
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The issue o f sampling emerges at different points in the research process. It is 
connected to the decision o f who to interview, the interview data that is to be 
transcribed and interpreted (material sampling), and finally it is connected to the 
selection o f text used to illustrate findings (presentational sampling) (Flick 1998). 
Following Flick’s exemplar o f doing good qualitative research I transcribed all 
interviews, categorised the data according to the themes identified and presented 
the most pertinent extracts. In this way, I have attempted to describe, analyse and 
explain the social phenomena I observed.
5.4.1 Validity
I visited twelve farms in total during my fieldwork study and conducted a number 
of interviews with workers (72), supervisors (11) and farm administrators (5). 
This is a small proportion o f respondents compared to the number employed in 
the banana sector, and thus the study cannot be considered representative o f the 
situation o f banana farming in Costa Rica. However, based on the analysis 
conducted I believe it is possible to ascertain the way in which codes o f conduct 
are generally considered by workers. Also, the testimony from other respondents 
during this phase (producer technical managers, union officials, NGO 
representatives, social auditors, and government officials), together with that 
previously collected (supermarket representatives and producer representatives), 
and subsequently (global union representative, producer representative and code 
authority representative) does help to show the accumulative effect of codes in 
terms o f influencing labour conditions on banana plantations.
5.4.2 Independence and Objectivity -  the Reflexive Self
I was employed in the retail sector one way or another, for nearly twenty years, 
and I have a degree o f insight and understanding of the food retailing industry. 
However, I also have a great deal o f ‘baggage’, bias or whatever one uses to 
describe a situation where one has a long history of being in one camp or part of a 
particular group o f ‘actors’ in the social world. I began my retailing career as a 
graduate trainee following a temporary Christmas job on the sales floor, stacking 
shelves. I had become enamoured with the pace and buzz o f the retail operation,
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it was truly dynamic from the supply logistics that provided the store with product 
through to the brand marketing and sales activity. I spent six years o f my early 
career in the retail operations part o f the business being promoted through the 
management ranks, until I completed a company sponsored masters in business 
administration and was promoted to take a position in the company head office. I 
moved into the commercial division o f the company, and undertook a number of 
buying and marketing roles. As a buyer, I was responsible for developing new 
products as well as sourcing existing products in a category range, which meant a 
large proportion o f time was spent engaging and developing relationships with 
suppliers and producers. It was at this point in my career that I fully appreciated 
the commercial challenges o f ethical sourcing. The difficulty that a supermarket 
buyer has to face, managing to buy at a price that meets the product criteria: 
guaranteed quality and supply, with the financial criteria: target margin based on 
competitive market price, whilst at the same time paying an equitable price to the 
supplier/producer.
Followed a considerable time in ‘front-line’ retailing, I became a consultant 
advising both retailers and suppliers how to build trading partnerships, how to 
work together, and how to be socially responsible in their global supply chains. 
As a consultant, I was experienced at observing the impact o f multinational 
corporations on societal conditions and I was able to advise how the more 
negative impacts could be averted. However, due to my commercial 
understanding o f the situation, I was always cognisant o f the ‘bottom line’. This 
was problematic for me, because it implied there would always be a natural 
business limit to which companies would go regardless o f how appalling the 
conditions were in the supply chain or how exploited workers may be. The 
dilemma facing companies o f how to be socially responsible while trying to 
maximise shareholder profits intrigued me. I wondered if  it was possible to 
maintain equitable conditions for workers through self-regulation in a market. 
And, whether the chief proponents o f the market could achieve this: supermarkets 
and suppliers/producers. Or, was the only way forward some form o f inter­
governmental regulation? This was where my interest to examine the labour
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conditions in global supply chains originated. Thus, prior to commencing the 
research study, I had some ideas o f what the main themes o f the thesis would be 
and the sort o f questions I felt needed to be answered. In many respects, my retail 
experience helped to contextualise my research.
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) describe the construction o f different ‘selves’ 
when conducting research and the dilemma o f a double identity -  the insider and 
the researcher. I had the self-assurance that came from knowledge o f the retailing 
industry and a technical understanding o f supply chains to embark upon the 
research journey. Nevertheless, I had to acknowledge that my biggest challenge 
would be impartiality, the ability to suspend my own understanding -  an insider’s 
knowledge -  that may lead to an acceptance o f certain conditions. This would be 
critical if  I was to ensure equal commitment to gaining the views and perspectives 
o f all social actors engaged in the chain. However, the fact that I had a 
conceptual understanding o f the subject did enable greater access to those 
respondents willing to discuss the issues, and support my research study. During 
the DBCII event in particular, there was a snowballing effect -  the referral from 
one potential respondent to the next. The fact that I had a buying background was 
actually seen as an advantage by some union officials and NGO representatives I 
met. They considered I would be able to quickly recognise the problems in the 
chain and be under no illusion as to the role of the supermarket groups in this 
regard.
However, there is also the ‘se lf  in the field, an element o f ‘se lf  presentation 
which is personal and emotional (Coffey 1999). On the suggestion of industry 
colleagues experienced in visiting banana plantations, I made the decision to wear 
a wedding ring and present m yself in the field as a Senora, a married woman. I 
was advised that this action would ensure the respect o f male workers and 
acceptance by female workers. On my first farm visit, I discovered that no other 
jewellery apart from a wedding band was permitted to be worn (due to health and 
safety procedures). Thus, without the need for verbal confirmation all the people 
I encountered automatically referred to me as Senora. I felt a degree o f
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discomfort presenting myself in this way and questioned my own integrity in 
doing so. Yet I was assured this course o f action was for my own wellbeing, as I 
was stepping into a somewhat chauvinistic and differently constructed society 
from that which I was used to -  my Northern European experience. This was the 
first indication that I would be required to adapt my personal as opposed to my 
professional behaviour in order to conduct fieldwork in another cultural setting 
(Devereux and Hoddinott 1992).
5.5 Ethics
There are three main issues which are frequently raised in relation to ‘ethics’ in 
research; informed consent, confidentiality and trust (Ryen 2004). Ethical 
guidelines concerning anonymity, confidentiality and privacy endorsed by the 
British Sociological Association have been adhered to in this research. However, 
as noted by Burgess (1984: 193) ethical statements ‘do not come to terms with the 
relations between researcher and researched’ and there are often hurdles which 
are not covered within ethical guidelines. In this regard, the process o f ethical 
consideration necessitates awareness on the part o f the researcher, which extends 
beyond knowledge o f and adherence to the statements o f ethical practice (Burgess 
1984). The ethical considerations associated with this research relate primarily to 
securing the anonymity o f the participants and ensuring confidentiality. 
Anonymity and confidentiality are very important when interviewing respondents 
whose answers and beliefs may have an impact on their identity and threaten their 
livelihood. In addition, anonymity is held to pose particular problems for analysis 
o f qualitative data in the context o f interviewing particular groups o f social actors 
in a community that is limited and closely knit.
This is problematic in the banana exporting chain, as there are a limited number 
of actors at both ends o f the chain, both the supermarket and producer 
organisations are described as operating in oligopolistic markets. Problems exist 
for all potential respondents; a buyer in a supermarket will not necessarily wish to 
be identified by particular statements, and banana workers may feel vulnerable if 
they are recognised by their testimony or their views have been shared with their
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supervisor. Protecting informant’s identity and honouring commitments not to 
attribute their comments or express their views to their employer was important to 
me; it was a matter o f trust. As noted by Lefkowitz (2003), trust lies at the heart 
o f research, and all engagement in the procedural pursuit is reliant upon it.
One o f the key ethical concerns that has arisen from this research study has been 
the securing o f anonymity for respondents and participants. There has also been 
an issue regarding the naming o f the farms where workers are employed. Thus, 
for referencing purposes I have employed a coding system, whereby a series o f 
letters and numbers identifies the worker, the job activity the worker is assigned 
to, and the farm where the worker is employed. Only the author knows the basis 
o f this system, however a summary o f the coding principles are included in 
Appendix G. This approach has also been used for other respondents and 
participants involved in the research study, who requested complete anonymity 
and confidentially. Some respondents agreed that their testimony could be 
attributed and where their comments have been used in the thesis, they are 
acknowledged.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have described the qualitative methodological approach 
undertaken in the research study. The data and respondents’ testimony presented 
in Chapter Seven to Chapter Nine, reflects this approach. The chapter also makes 
explicit the role o f the researcher and the adoption of certain personas during the 
research process. A gradual development from an insider position to that of the 
researcher -  an external position -  and hopefully one less subjective, took place. 
However, there are huge advantages to knowing a research area before hand, in- 
depth knowledge o f a situation can actually help the research process 
(engagement with potential respondents and conducting interviews).
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the research is multi-method and the 
methodology employed for collecting data has largely depended on semi­
structured interviews, focus groups and observation. The observations and 
reflections made during the IBCII event in April 2005 helped me prepare for the
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experience o f conducting fieldwork in Costa Rica. However, there were also 
times when I visited a banana farm when I could simply observe and reflect what 
was going on around me. Decisions made about what to present as empirical 
material were made in both the collection and interpretation stages o f the 
methodological process. There were times, during these stages, when I had a 
sense o f what was the best data to include. There were also moments when I 
began to group similar type comments/testimony/issues from the various sources 
of data. The data was then analysed and framed through a sociological 
perspective.
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Chapter Six
The Republic of Costa Rica
Introduction
There are a number o f dimensions to the story o f the banana and its emergence as 
one of the world’s key staple products. Costa Rica has played a significant part in 
this development and continues to play a major role in the global banana trade 
today. After Ecuador and Columbia, Costa Rica is the third largest producer of 
bananas for the export market (FAOSTAT 2006). The country depends on this 
production, both to generate foreign currencies and employment. Thus, the state 
has an important part to play in maintaining the competitiveness o f its banana 
industry and as the history o f the country shows, its support o f both the coffee and 
banana elites has been continuous and substantial. The argument presented in this 
chapter is that the state’s development o f agrarian policy and engagement with 
commercial enterprise has helped shape the banana industry and to some extent 
has impacted on the way the US-banana TNC producers conduct their business 
today.
Costa Rica is a small country measuring 51,100 square kilometres. It lies 
between Nicaragua to the North and Panama to the South, and borders the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (CIA 2007). The population was an 
estimated 4,133,884 in July 2007 (World Bank 2007). The country has fertile 
soil, adequate rain pattern, and a mild sub-tropical climate, which makes the 
country well suited to agriculture (Mesa-Lago 2000). Costa Rican society 
appears to be culturally and linguistically homogenous with Spanish as the only 
spoken language (Mesa-Lago 2000). The main ethnic group is white (including 
mestizos) at 94 percent (CIA 2007). However, the country’s orderly and stable 
political nature and comprehensive social security programme have long attracted 
poorer neighbours and immigration from nearby countries in turmoil (Wilson 
1998, Mahoney 2001). Costa Rica is one o f the few countries in the region that 
has experienced a pluralistic democracy, free elections, a peaceful transition of 
power between presidents and parties with divergent ideologies, and a reasonable
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degree o f political stability, if  the brief interlude o f the 1948 uprising is set in 
context (Booth 1998, Seligson 2002, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Costa Ricans, Ticos 
as they are known, cherish their heritage by proclaiming their historical tradition 
as a stable society, with a high rate o f literacy and democratic institutions (Bell 
1971). As noted by Ameringer (1982) the Ticos’ faith in education and distrust of 
militarism is essential to the country’s democracy, as the nation was founded on 
the principle that the people were sovereign and the chief purpose o f government 
was to educate the populace to enable them to participate in the affairs o f state. 
Indeed, the self-described Switzerland of the Americas is an example o f how 
Costa Rica affirms its democratic principles and political neutrality, whilst 
alluding to its mountainous geography (Booth 1998).
Modem Costa R ica’s stable economy depends on tourism, and the export of 
agricultural commodities (chiefly coffee, bananas and pineapples), electronic 
products and medical equipment (CIA 2007). Poverty has been substantially 
reduced over the past 15 years, and a strong system of social welfare is in place 
(Sandbrook et al. 2007). Costa R ica’s political stability and high education levels 
attract foreign investors, and the country’s emphasis on tourism and export 
markets continues to bring in foreign exchange (Sandbrook et a l  2007). In 2006, 
its key export partners included the US (29.1 percent), the Netherlands (13 
percent), China (12.5 percent) and the UK (6.6 percent) (CIA 2007). Costa Rica 
has a long history of state involvement in economic and social development, and 
its democratic rule is in stark contrast to the political instability and economic 
strife of the surrounding region (Booth 1998, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). The 
country’s chosen route o f socio-economic reform has also resulted in much higher 
social indicators than in many other countries in the developing world and 
highlights Costa Rica’s distinctiveness (Wilson 1998). The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) now includes Costa Rica (ranked forty- 
seventh worldwide) amongst those countries with ‘high human development’. In 
2003, the country’s adult literacy rate was 95.8 percent, and life expectancy at 
birth was 78.2 years compared with that o f 77.4 years in the United States (UNDP 
2005).
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6.1 The Birth of a Republic
Christopher Columbus landed on the east coast o f Costa Rica in 1502, known 
today as Puerto Limon (Booth 1998). However, Costa Rica was a ‘backwater’ in 
Spain’s American Colonial Empire and attracted only a small number o f Spanish 
settlers, who were mainly o f minor and untitled nobility (Booth 1998, Sandbrook 
et al. 2007). Because o f the isolation of the country, in-migration was slow 
(Booth 1998), and by the beginning o f the seventeenth century it was ‘a poor, 
empty, isolated and marginal colony’ (Molina and Palmer 1998: 27). The 
Spanish optimistically named the country Costa Rica, the Rich Coast, but on 
finding little gold and few precious metals the Spanish turned to agriculture 
(Booth 1998). The country adopted a form o f agrarian democracy, with families 
living an isolated life working their own land (Bell 1971). The difficult process 
o f clearing the country’s extensive forests and the small dispersed indigenous 
population were factors that initially saved the country from the Spanish 
encomienda (land allocation) and the exploitative hacienda system (land 
tenancy). By the latter half o f the seventeenth century, colonists with a 
considerable degree o f personal wealth arrived in the country and were granted 
the right by the Spanish Crown to parcel up the land and establish a system of 
bonded labour in an effort to encourage the cultivation o f cacao and tobacco 
(Booth 1998, Wilson 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). Thus, the commercial success of 
agricultural production was made possible by the exploitation o f the surviving 
indigenous people13 and an imported black slave labour force from nearby islands 
in the Caribbean (Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 1998).
However, unlike the US, slaves had opportunities to purchase their liberty and the 
early part o f the eighteenth century was a period o f increased racial mixture made 
up o f mestizos (mixed race) and white descendents o f impoverished colonialists 
(Molina and Palmer 1998). The elites in Costa Rica -  the principle families who 
could trace their lineage to the conquistadors -  controlled the cattle ranches in the 
North and the cacao growing areas o f the Central Meseta, monopolising 
wholesale and retail trade, and dominating civil, military and ecclesiastical posts 
(Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 1998). The isolation o f the country gave this
13 The indigenous population, not large to begin with, were much reduced by European diseases in 
the early days o f colonialism (Sandbrook et al. 2007).
- 125 -
elite group the opportunity o f self government and the country’s low levels o f 
economic differentiation (compared to neighbouring Spanish colonies) helped 
contribute to the development o f a social-democratic ideology in Costa Rica 
(Booth 1998, Cruz 2005, Sandbrook et al. 2007). After a short period of rule by 
the Central American Federation, which was formed in 1821 following the 
demise o f Spanish colonial authority, the country declared its sovereignty in 1838 
(Bell 1971, Booth 1998). Upon its independence, Costa Rica was faced with the 
challenge o f creating an appropriate political system for an emerging freethinking 
society and a developing export market. Costa Rica was less o f a country and 
more o f a territory ruled by four affiliated, but rival municipal governments 
located in the Central Meseta (plateau) o f the country (Molina and Palmer 1998). 
After independence there was much jostling for power, but ultimately San Jose, 
the centre o f agrarian capitalism, emerged as the city o f political pre-eminence to 
become the capital o f the newly formed Republic in 1848 (Bell 1971, Molina and 
Palmer 1998). Quite importantly, the sporadic battles between rival towns had 
not resulted in the development o f a professionalized army and the country 
managed to avoid the lengthy and prolonged wars o f other Latin American 
countries following independence (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, Booth 1998). The 
leadership o f the capital helped to determine Costa Rica’s future, its urban culture 
together with the disposition o f the coffee elite, and the influence o f immigrants 
from Europe helped the country’s merchants and professionals embrace 
Enlightenment and Liberalism, albeit more in the capitalist than socialist version 
(Molina and Palmer 1998, Mahoney 2001).
For nineteenth century Liberals, progress meant material advancement and a 
market economy -  the political elites in Costa Rica put their faith in a vigorous 
export economy (Langley and Schoonover 1995, Mahoney 2001). The country’s 
transition to capitalism was chiefly through the expansion o f the coffee export 
market and the privatisation o f land for growing it. A decree passed in 1831 
granted ownership o f state lands to anyone who had cultivated coffee on those 
lands for a period o f five years (Seligson 1977, Mahoney 2001). From the initial 
privatisation o f common lands, a preference was given to farmers who already 
occupied a particular plot, and the government encouraged small growers to 
develop the land as opposed to privileging large estates, which helped minimise
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the influence o f a reactionary landlord class. The expansion in coffee cultivation 
created a coffee region that spread across the principal urban populated centres 
and created a national system o f agrarian relations in which small farms 
predominated (Mahoney 2001, Sandbrook et al. 2007). As coffee became the 
major export crop, the coffee elite became a dominant political force (Mesa-Lago 
2000, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). The coffee oligarchy constituted an ‘elite’ due to 
their control over the commercial aspects of coffee production, such as financing, 
processing and marketing (Mahoney 2001). In post-colonial Costa Rica there was 
relatively widespread access to land, so the coffee elite depended less on land 
ownership for superior status than on other intermediary activities in the coffee 
commodity chain14 (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Coffee, the golden bean as it became 
known, experienced a dramatic expansion during the mid-nineteenth century and 
helped to consolidate the country’s foreign exchange. Between 1850 and 1890, 
coffee accounted for nearly 90 percent of the value o f the country’s exports 
(Bulmer-Thomas 1987, Molina and Palmer 1998). The golden bean made Costa 
Rica the wealthiest country in the region, but its pre-eminence as the most 
important contributor to exports was soon challenged by bananas. Ironically, the 
beginning o f banana cultivation in Costa Rica was an indirect outgrowth of the 
coffee economy (Enloe 1989, Wilson 1998).
During the 1870s, the Costa Rican government commissioned the building of a 
railroad from the port o f Limon on the Atlantic coast to the coffee-growing 
regions in the Central Meseta, near the capital of San Jose (Wilson 1998). Coffee, 
as a highland crop, could not be grown in the damp coastal lowlands where access 
to shipping was easier, but the government hoped the railway would reduce both 
the cost and time taken to transport the crop to its principal markets in Europe 
(Wilson 1998). Initially, attempts to raise the necessary funds through British 
financial institutions proved difficult, but railroad fever was high and with loans 
secured from London, the government pushed ahead (Seligson 1977). However, 
problems in the construction process caused a delay and in 1883, the government 
approached Minor Cooper Keith, an American entrepreneur, to finish the railroad 
(Wilson 1998, Chapman 2007). Keith renegotiated the English debt and
14 Even though some members o f the coffee elite owned large farms, most o f their wealth came 
from the processing and exporting o f the crop (Sandbrook et al. 2007).
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completed the project in exchange for a ninety-nine year lease on the railway and 
port facilities, and ownership o f 800,000 acres o f land (nearly 7 percent of the 
national territory) along the route o f the railroad (Molina and Palmer 1998, 
Wilson 1998). The land was used to cultivate bananas, both as a means of 
feeding workers employed to build the new railroad and to offset the costs of 
running it (Enloe 1989, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Keith realised that the survival of 
the railroad depended on a continuous supply of cargo, which the seasonal crop of 
coffee could not provide. Keith’s operation, which became part o f the United 
Fruit Company, proved to be the mainstay o f a foreign-owned banana monopoly 
in Costa Rica until the mid-1950s (Seligson 1977, Chapman 2007).
The government’s role in financing and commissioning the infrastructure to 
support coffee exports was an early sign of the government’s interest in the 
commercial affairs o f the country (Seligson 1977, Wilson 1998). Banana farming 
combined with coffee production transformed the country into a capitalist 
economy (Seligson 1977, Molina and Palmer 1998). Unlike its neighbours, Costa 
Rica did not have the entrenched landed elite, which a semi-feudal peasantry 
locked into servile labour might revolt against, but the introduction of the 
plantation system in both coffee and bananas increased the levels o f waged-labour 
and helped foster inequality in the country (Seligson 1977, Wilson 1998, 
Mahoney 2001). This was particularly pronounced in the Limon province, where 
thousands o f migrants from Jamaica, the work force imported to build the 
railway, were subsequently employed on banana plantations (Seligson 1977).
6.2 The Beginnings of a Democracy
During the early-nineteenth century, a number of successive governments 
professed a ‘laissez-faire ideology’, a free market regime, and did not intervene 
too much in economic and social affairs (Mesa-Lago 2000). However, this policy 
changed during the later period o f the century, when a more Europhile elite class 
sought to construct a modem state in Costa Rica. This new elite was made up of 
coffee processors, bankers, successful professionals, and individuals with 
commercial interests linked to foreign capital (Bell 1971, Sandbrook et al. 2007). 
Unlike other countries in the region, there was a gradual shift towards the liberal 
reformist tradition that would ultimately enhance the role o f the state in Costa
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Rica. The changes in the economic and social structure o f the country are best 
described in terms o f three key reform movements -  in 1885-9, 1940-44 and 
1948-9 (Bell 1971, Bulmer-Thomas 1987, Mesa-Lago 2000, Mahoney 2001).
6.2.1 First Movement o f Economic and Social Reform
The first wave o f economic and social change came during the years 1885-9, with 
a series o f reforms introduced by a self-declared liberal government (Mesa-Lago 
2000). The aim o f the government was to represent the nation as racially white, 
despite the presence o f mixed-origin people (Sandbrook et al. 2007). The 
country’s small population made it a net importer o f labour since the advent of 
export agriculture in the 1840s and immigration became a focus o f elite anxieties 
concerning the degeneration o f the ‘white’ Costa Rican race (Wiley 1995). Such 
anxiety acted as a catalyst for laws limiting ‘undesirable’ immigration and a 
strong state commitment to education and public health. Together, it was hoped 
these laws would increase the supply o f ‘white’ migrant labour and negate the 
need for Chinese and West Indian immigrants (Sandbrook et al. 2007). A series 
o f educational reforms were introduced, including universal primary schooling 
(for both boys and girls), the introduction of secondary schools and the payment 
o f teachers out o f the fiscal budget (Wilson 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). Education 
had always been the preserve o f the rich, but the professional class, recognising 
the benefits o f their own experience, helped establish a universal education that 
would make Costa Rica an ‘exemplary nation in Latin America’ (Bell 1971: 7). 
These educational reforms contributed to the consolidating notions of a nation, 
citizenship, entitlement and rights (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Also there were the 
first signs o f demilitarisation, as reductions in the military budget were introduced 
during the period (Mesa-Lago 2000).
6.2.2 Second Movement o f Economic and Social Reform
The second period o f economic and social reform was more significant, because it 
signalled a break away from the more conservative elites in the country. The 
standard bases o f conservative support -  the church, colonial institutions and 
traditional landed gentry -  had been conspicuously absent in Costa Rica, making 
way for the coffee barons (los cafetaleros as they were known) to defend the 
conservative cause (Stone 1971, Mahoney 2001). Costa Rican society had been
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marked by the inclusion of most social groups, which was unusual for Latin 
America (Bulmer-Thomas 1987). Nevertheless, by 1920, a new elite group 
emerged, based on the ‘accumulation o f capital’ and this heralded an era of 
greater inequality in the country (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Costa Rica was an agrarian country -  a primary goods 
producer for the international economy -  but still a country almost exclusively 
dependent on coffee and banana exports, as both accounted for more than 85 
percent o f export earnings (Wilson 1998). The vast majority of these exports 
were destined for just two markets, 42 percent to the UK and 50 percent to the 
United States (Bulmer-Thomas 1987). By the time o f the Great Depression in the 
1930s, both employment and government revenues (which largely came from 
export taxes) were affected by a plunge in the world prices o f Costa Rica’s 
agricultural exports (Mesa-Lago 2000). For the most part, workers in agricultural 
production were not well organised, but with rising unemployment and the 
deterioration o f economic and social conditions, labour unrest followed (Mesa- 
Lago 2000).
The banana industry’s high labour requirement in a largely uninhabited area had 
encouraged the development o f a separate labour market on the Atlantic coast, 
consisting mainly o f English speaking Jamaicans. Banana workers were non­
peasant agricultural workers, mainly non-white and concentrated in one location 
working for a single employer, which created further alienation (Wilson 1998). 
These characteristics, together with the decline in production during the 1930s, 
led to the organisation o f labour in the banana sector and a number of 
confrontations erupted between farm workers and the US-owned banana 
companies (Wilson 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). By this time, other US financed 
producers, including the Standard Fruit Company had joined the United Fruit 
Company (Roche 1998, Myers 2004). Up until now, political parties, an integral 
part o f any functioning democracy, were chiefly personalised electoral vehicles 
designed to promote contending leaders from the coffee elite15 as the President of 
the country, as opposed to ideologically based organisations. There were two 
exceptions, the Reform Party (Partido Reformista) founded in 1921, and the
13 There were a number o f intra-class divisions within the coffee elite, with opposing factions 
routinely ignoring electoral rules and fighting each other for control o f the government (Mahoney 
2001).
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Communist Workers and Peasants Block (Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos) 
founded in 1931 (Wilson 1998, Cruz 2005). In response to the poor working 
conditions on banana plantations and the deteriorating economic situation caused 
by the 1930s Depression, the newly founded Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos set 
about organising banana workers on the Atlantic coast. In 1934, the unions’ 
10,000 banana workers called a strike against the United Fruit Company (UFC), 
one of the biggest strikes ever seen in Latin America against a US company 
(Seligson 1980, Wilson 1998, Cruz 2005). After several weeks, the government 
was forced to intervene and the strikers won ‘significant concessions’ (Seligson 
1980: 68).
The election o f Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia to the presidency in 1940, led to a 
break with the new liberal elite. Calderon had developed ‘sensitivity’ to the 
‘social question’ during his medical training at Catholic universities in Belgium 
(Wilson 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). He believed that Christian-inspired social 
reform was the “only formula to harmonise the conflicting interests of capital and 
labor” (Calderon, quoted in Rosenberg 1981: 279). In 1941, Calderon introduced 
far-reaching reforms including a wide ranging social security system 
(unemployment, health, accident and pension benefits), an eight hour workday, 
workers’ freedom to organise, mandatory collective bargaining, a government 
regulated minimum wage, land distribution, and the creation of the public Costa 
Rica National University (Wilson 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). In 1942, Calderon 
amended the 1871 Constitution to include these reforms as Social Guarantees, 
which together with the enactment o f the Labour Code in the following year, 
substantially expanded the role o f the state (Bell 1971, Mesa-Lago 2000). The 
1943 Labour Code provided for a Labour Ministry to oversee the rights of labour, 
which included collective bargaining, protection against arbitrary dismissal and 
the right to organise and strike (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). The right to organise 
included both the provision for trade unions and ‘permanent worker committees’. 
However, the right to strike came with some stringent conditions, requiring 60 
percent o f workers to sign a petition, register their names with a labour judge, and 
then agree to forty-five days o f mediation before taking any action (Frundt 1998).
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The reforms were achieved with the aid of the new archbishop o f San Jose, 
Monsignor Victor Manuel Sanabria Martinez, a noted labour and social reformer, 
and the Communist Popular Vanguard Party (Partido Vanguardia Popular: PVP), 
which changed its name from the Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos in 1943 (Bell 
1971, Wilson 1998, Cruz 2005). It was commonly agreed that the pressure for 
political, social and economic change was identified with the communists and not 
Calderon’s National Republican Party (Partido Republicano Nacional: PRN) 
(Wilson 1998). Calderon therefore needed to develop an unusually broad 
coalition, including the more conservative coffee elite (the landowning growers), 
to ensure his programme of reform was implemented. Despite the agreed 
consensus, the programme quickly came under attack (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). 
But according to Wilson (1998), the legislation did in some ways influence the 
growth o f syndicalism (unionism), because workers became more aware o f their 
rights. In 1943, the Communist PVP with the help o f Monsignor Sanabria formed 
the Costa Rican Confederation o f Workers (Confederation Costarricense de 
Trabajadores Rerum Novarum: CCTRN) (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). Wilson 
(1998) suggests the church became involved in organising labour in this way to 
help limit communist influence. The political elites feared fascism in the world 
and communism at home, which was considered threatening to the moderate and 
peaceful nature o f the country and their privileges (Cruz 2005).
Calderon’s antifascist stance and by extension, his declaration o f war on 
Germany, proved problematic since coffee exporters traded heavily with 
Germany and were dependent on German nationals for export financing (Cruz
2005). The country’s trading position was also exacerbated by the 
commandeering o f banana boats during the Second World War for the shipment 
o f essential provisions and military supplies to Europe (Roche 1998). The 
country experienced an economic crisis and the government faced mounting 
criticism from a number of diverse groups (Booth 1998). Opposition manifested 
itself in two groups: the Centre for the Study of National Problems (Centro para el 
Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales: CEPN, also known as El Centro) and 
Democratic Action (Action Democrata: AD) (Wilson 1998). Following the 
fraudulent election o f Teodoro Picado Michalski (the calderonista-Catholic- 
Communist alliance backed candidate) as president in 1944, El Centro joined
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forces with Accion Democrata (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). A coffee grower and 
leading figure in Accion Democrata, Jose Figueres Ferrer had originally 
supported the introduction o f progressive social policies, but became concerned 
with the growth o f the radical left. With a number o f other so-called social 
democrats, Figueres planned an armed insurrection (Wilson 1998, Sandbrook et 
al. 2007). Opposition to Calderon and Picado operated on a broad front, it 
comprised the National Union Party (Partido Union Nacional: PUN) who wished 
to protect smallholding coffee producers, the new elite who wanted to eliminate 
the Social Guarantees, and the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social 
Democrata: PSD) who wanted greater social reform (Bell 1971, Ameringer 1982, 
Wilson 1998). Somewhat ironically, the most ardent supporters o f the 
Calderonista government were the pro-communist banana workers from the 
remote lowland coastal regions (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Figueres began planning 
with other dissenters to use military power to replace the National Republican 
Party with a Second Republic (Wilson 1998). In 1948, Otilio Ulate Blanco the 
PUN presidential candidate and a member of the coffee elite, defeated Calderon’s 
bid to return to the presidency, but the calderonista-controlled congress refused to 
certify the results. The disputed electoral result prompted Figueres into a 
victorious revolt and the government was overthrown (Bell 1971, Booth 1998).
6.2.3 Third Movement o f Economic and Social Reform
The third movement o f economic and social change began with an armed uprising 
in 1948 and continued with a stream of political reform over the following decade 
(Bell 1971, Mesa-Lago 2000). The revolt of 1948 resulted in a forty-day conflict 
and an ‘extended search for a viable government in a nation whose society had 
grown beyond its traditional institutional structure’ (Bell 1971: 4). The tradition 
o f a democratic and peaceful transfer of power in Costa Rica was broken. After a 
short but violent encounter, a negotiated settlement was reached through the 
signing of the Mexican Embassy Pact in April 1948 (Booth 1998, Wilson 1998). 
Figueres and Otilio Ulate (who arguably had the greatest claim to the presidency) 
agreed on an interim government (a Junta) for a period o f eighteen months, during 
which time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to enact a new constitution 
and ratify Ulate as the first President o f the Second Republic. In reality, the 
Second Republic was founded in name only, as the draft o f the new constitution
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was discarded and the Constitution o f 1871 was modified (Bell 1971, Mesa-Lago 
2000). Still much o f the labour legislation introduced previously was retained 
including the minimum wage, the length of the working week, and the rights of 
workers and employers to organise freely. The social security system ensuring 
health care, old age, disability and maternity benefits was also mandated (Bell 
1971, Wilson 1998). Calderon’s social reform programme was strengthened and 
within a few years became part of the country’s accepted heritage (Wilson 1998).
The after effects o f the 1948 revolt, the political and economic consequences, 
were far reaching. The most famous decree of the triumphant Junta was the 
abolition o f the army, deemed a symbolic act but one that closed off the potential 
for future militarisation (Wilson 1998). A further significant ruling was the 
nationalisation o f the country’s banks, which eliminated the control o f credit by 
the coffee elite and helped promote economic diversification (Molina and Palmer 
1998). Other key measures included the imposition of a 10 percent wealth tax 
and a 15 percent tax on the profits o f the US-owned banana company United 
Fruit, which had up until this point paid limited taxes and exported its profits 
alongside its bananas to the US (Wilson 1998, Sandbrook et al. 2007). There was 
also a wave of repression instigated against the communists, calderonistas and 
left-wing labour unions, which had been on the losing side (Molina and Palmer 
1998). The Communist PVP was declared illegal, and its previously powerful 
affiliated labour unions banned (Bell 1971, Sandbrook et al. 2007). A new 
political class emerged from the 1948 uprising and in the following decade the 
members o f El Centro -  the ‘Generation of Forty-eight’ -  espoused more 
audacious programmes o f modernisation. Power was dispersed among different 
branches o f government and new political institutions were granted policy­
making powers (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). In addition, a new form of worker 
representation was created, known as Solidarismo, which is based on the concept 
o f solidarity sponsored by the social doctrine o f the church (Movimento 
Solidarista 2006). Political parties and interest groups including the Catholic 
Church and civil groups, moved into the centre stage o f Costa Rican politics. 
Parties became more social issue-based in the battle to win electoral votes and 
form a government -  the pursuit o f further social reform was made with ‘one eye 
on the next election’ (Wilson 1998: 5).
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6.3 The Emergence of a Modern Nation
The next fifty years or so of political, economic and social development in Costa 
Rica became known as the era of social democracy (Wilson 1998, Cruz 2005, 
Sandbrook et al. 2007). Costa Rica is often presented as a social-democratic 
success in Latin America, based on the country’s ongoing support o f the free 
market by its political elites and the tempering effect o f the peoples’ attachment to 
the benefits o f welfare-state institutions (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, Cruz 2005, 
Sandbrook et a l  2007). However, some o f the country’s historical circumstances 
and developments during this period also indicate characteristics o f corporatism. 
Schmitter (1974: 93-4) defines corporatism as:
‘A system o f interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection o f leaders and articulation o f demands and supports’.
Corporatism or ‘welfare state capitalism’ as Gilpin (2001: 169) describes it, can 
be used to characterise a political system in which capital, organised labour, and 
government cooperate in the management of the economy. Certainly, these 
conditions may be observed when examining the role o f the state in Costa Rica 
following the 1948 uprising. But as noted by Harrod and O ’Brien (2002), there 
are different forms o f corporatism as a political system which may be used to 
unite and create harmony between conflicting power hierarchies in a capitalist 
model, although Harrod (2002) does suggest corporatism is based upon an ‘extant 
recognition’ that one o f its major purposes is the control o f organised labour. He 
states that ‘corporatist theory accepts that there is fundamental conflict between 
labour and management (as representative o f capital), that management will 
accumulate to the detriment o f labour and labour will organise against 
management’ (2002: 57). Harrod (2002: 57) goes on to identify the solution to 
this conflict as ‘the involvement o f the state as the arbiter and enforcer of 
compromise between the conflicting parties’. By comparison, social democracy 
is equated with the political notions of peace, agreement, pact or co-existence 
(Vasconi 1990). However, the question of whether corporatism is a better
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reflection o f the political structure that evolved in Costa Rica during the period of 
reconstruction is beyond the scope o f this research study. Hence, the terms used 
to describe this period o f state development are consistent with others (Booth 
1998, Wilson 1998, Bulmer-Thomas 2003, Cruz 2005, Sandbrook et al. 2007) 
who comment on the political, economic and social history o f Costa Rica. 
Following this line o f thought, the four phases that distinguish the next period of 
economic and social development in Costa Rica, from the enactment of the New 
Constitution to the current day, are categorised in the terms commonly used.
The New Constitution o f 1949 introduced a legal framework for greater state 
involvement in the country’s economic and social affairs and by doing so, ushered 
in the beginning o f the modem Costa Rica state (Wilson 1998). One important 
requirement that emerged from the 1948 conflict was to design an institutional 
framework that would break ‘the momentum of popular mobilizations’ in Costa 
Rica (Molina and Palmer 1998: 107). The start o f this process was to devolve 
political power into four separate branches of government: the Presidency, the 
Executive, the Legislative Assembly, and the Judiciary (Ameringer 1982). A 
further consequence o f the commitment to deal with popular discontent through 
legal and peaceful means was the introduction o f a diverse range of semi­
independent government agencies (Molina and Palmer 1998). These agencies 
were created for specific tasks, but they were also designed to enable technical 
experts to fulfil the new constitutional mandate whilst protecting ‘the welfare 
function o f the state from retrenchment of un-friendly governments’ (Wilson 
1998: 56). One such agency, virtually unique in Latin America, is the Social 
Security administration (Caja Costarricense de Seguros Sociales: CCSS) (Bulmer- 
Thomas 1987, Mesa-Lago 2000). The CCSS was established in 1941 and had 
several key features, including a) an almost complete coverage for the entire 
population, at least on health care, b) it had both social insurance (contributory) 
and social welfare (non-contributory) incorporated, and c) it had standardised 
entitlement conditions. In addition, it was mandatory that all salaried workers 
were covered by CCSS, and that the self-employed and employers could join 
voluntarily if  they so wished (Mesa-Lago 2000).
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The creation o f the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones: 
TSE) was one o f the more important changes to electoral politics in Costa Rica 
during this period. The TSE is a non-partisan body, whose key tasks include 
interpreting electoral laws, maintaining the voter registration list, and supervising 
and announcing elections (Wilson 1998). The 1949 Constitution extended the 
voting franchise by granting suffrage to women and reducing the voting age to 
twenty (in 1971, this was reduced further to eighteen). The Constitution also gave 
civil status to the English speaking Jamaican population on the Atlantic coast, 
effectively enfranchising them (Bell 1971, Wilson 1998). Previously, those that 
had migrated from the Caribbean to the banana producing lowlands were 
prevented from travelling outside the region and excluded from the voting process 
(Harpelle 1993, Lehoucq 1996). In 1959, the TSE recommended a constitutional 
amendment to make voting mandatory, which the Legislative Assembly accepted 
(Wilson 1998). As noted previously, political parties in the past were 
personalised electoral machines representing elite interests, but with a new 
constitution in place the opportunity arose for ‘m odem ’ parties (Booth 1998, 
Wilson 1998). One o f the first parties to emerge was the National Liberation 
Party (Partido Liberacion Nacional: PLN), an anti-communist leftist party which 
evolved from the PSD (Partido Social Democrata) in 1951 (Bell 1971, Wilson 
1998). Developed by Figueres, the PLN began as a multi-class party, primarily 
addressing middle- and lower-class concerns, emphasising redistributive policies, 
and pointing to the state as the facilitator o f economic growth (Wilson 1998).
Because o f the widely devolved political decision-making initiated in the 1949 
Constitution, opportunities arose for interest groups to influence political parties 
(Booth 1998, Wilson 1998). Interest groups are viewed as active social actors 
that affect the policy-making process in Costa Rica (Ameringer 1982). The 
number of access points for interest groups also grew and they exploited new 
tactics to move beyond personal contacts, financial contributions and strikes. 
Some interest groups used the newest branch of the Legislative, Sala Cuarta (the 
fourth court) to stop legislation that they had failed to prevent during the 
policymaking process (Wilson 1998). In 1992, the country’s human rights were 
further buttressed when the official ombudsman (Defensoria de los Habitantes) 
was created (Molina and Palmer 1998, Wilson 1998). Some o f the more
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successful interest groups in Costa Rica today are the business associations. 
Examples o f these include, the National Association for Economic Growth 
(Asociacion National de Fomento Economico: ANFE), which promotes liberal 
economic ideas such as free trade, and the national chambers which act for coffee 
and banana producers (Wilson 1998). In the case of bananas, this is the National 
Banana Corporation (Corporacion Bananera Nacional: CORBANA).
The social improvement in Costa Rica following the Second World War was in 
part aided by the spectacular growth in the economy. The traditional pattern of 
agri-exports generated extraordinary profits: banana exports rose from 3.5 million 
to 18 million crates annually between 1944 to 1952 and coffee prices rose by over 
600 percent between 1940 and 1956 (Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 1998). 
Increased productivity was being achieved on coffee and banana plantations due 
to the use o f agro-chemicals and the cultivation o f disease-resistant crops (Molina 
and Palmer 1998, Roche 1998). The state in a bid to stimulate competition, 
sanctioned the operations o f new foreign-owned banana companies between 1956 
and 1965, and the national chamber assisted local banana entrepreneurs who 
produced fruit under contract for the US-owned banana companies (Booth 1998, 
Molina and Palmer 1998). Until the 1950s, most efforts at diversifying the 
economy had been in the agricultural sector, but with the implementation of 
industrialisation laws in the late-1950s and membership to the Central American 
Common Market in 1963, the economy really took off. A new public sector 
borne out of the creation and development of government agencies nurtured this 
economic growth (Molina and Palmer 1998, Wilson 1998).
However, the economic and social stability of the 1960s was shaken by the 
sudden increase in the price o f oil in 1973 and the Central American Common 
Market exhausting its capacity for growth (Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 
1998). There was a short reprieve from the impending crisis during 1976 and 
1977 when coffee prices rose internationally because o f frost damage to the 
Brazilian crop. For the most part, this was a time for expanding markets in the 
country’s key exports -  coffee and bananas (Molina and Palmer 1998, Sandbrook 
et al. 2007). In addition, during this period the government borrowed monies to 
support the industrial sector, the intention being to create an Entrepreneurial State
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(Sandbrook et al. 2007). The so named ‘Entrepreneur State’ programme was 
devised by President Daniel Oduber Quiros (1974-8) and involved huge sums of 
public investment in business creation (Molina and Palmer 1998). The most 
symbolic gesture o f the programme was the formation o f the Costa Rican 
Development Corporation (Corporacion Costarricense de Desarrollo: CODES A), 
a public sector holding company which included subsidiaries, amongst others, in 
transportation and fruit packing. CODESA significantly increased the role of the 
state in the production o f goods and services (Wilson 1998, Sandbrook et al. 
2007). But, the shock of a second increase in oil prices in 1979 and a sharp 
decline in international coffee prices, led to a collapse in the Costa Rican 
economy -  the country was virtually bankrupt (Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 
1998). By November 1981, the country’s external debt had risen to $2.6 billion 
and it was in danger o f defaulting on the interest payments (Ameringer 1982). 
The country also had a $670 million balance o f payments deficit, which reflected 
the doubling o f oil prices (imported petroleum represented 50 percent o f the 
country’s energy needs) (Ameringer 1982, Molina and Palmer 1998). In 1981-2, 
salaries dropped by 40 percent, unemployment rose to 10 percent, and inflation 
ran between 80 and 100 percent -  the country was experiencing the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Booth 1998, Molina and 
Palmer 1998).
The social impact o f the crisis was also severe, with high levels of unemployment 
and the sudden impoverishment o f both professionals and labourers (Sandbrook et 
al. 2007). Adding to the crisis were widespread troubles in the region, the 
uprising against Nicaragua’s Somoza dictatorship and the revolutionary 
offensives in El Salvador and Guatemala, which devastated regional economic 
trade (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, Molina and Palmer 1998). The subsequent growing 
influx of refugees and illegal immigrants also placed a considerable strain on the 
country’s social security structure (Molina and Palmer 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). 
The country sought help from international institutions and the government o f 
Rodrigo Carazo Odio (1978-82) signed two agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), but broke each in swift succession. The government failed 
to meet the IM F’s routinely recommended measures o f privatising state 
enterprises, reducing public sector employment and social spending (Ameringer
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1982, Molina and Palmer 1998). At the nadir o f the crisis came a shift in 
economic policy, a series o f sweeping neoliberal reforms, which underlined the 
influence o f competing interest groups and factions in the country (Booth 1998, 
Wilson 1998).
6.4 The Neoliberal State
The economic crisis o f the 1970s and the early-1980s marked a major turning 
point in the role o f the state in economic and social development (Wilson 1998). 
Following his election in 1982, the PLN candidate, Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez 
challenged the US government that if  capitalism and democracy were to live in 
harmony in Central America, Washington should offer more meaningful help 
(Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 1998). The US government response was to 
dispatch the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
Costa Rica. The USAID transferred nearly $530 million to Costa Rica between 
1982 and 1984, building strong alliances in both business and politics (Molina 
and Palmer 1998). State enterprises were privatised and trade was diversified, 
with non-traditional exports encouraged (Booth 1998). The value o f coffee and 
banana exports as a percentage o f total exports dropped from a combined 87.3 
percent in 1955 to 54.3 percent in 1985 (Wilkie et al. 1995). There was a de­
emphasis on the role o f state and a new reliance placed on market mechanisms to 
determine prices and the allocation o f resources. The fact that the National 
Liberation Party (PLN) should be the party behind this transformation, rather than 
the more conservative Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) came as a surprise to 
the country’s social interest groups and labour movement (Wilson 1998, Cruz
2005). The PUSC formalised as a party in 1983, evolving from the PUN (Partido 
Union Nacional) and drawing on Calderon’s reformist ideas and free enterprise, 
as advocated by traditional exporters (coffee and bananas) and importers whose 
economic interests were affected by the PLN’s policies (Wilson 1998). 
Essentially the PUSC advocated cutting back on state-led economic development 
and promoted policies that depended more on market mechanisms to determine 
economic decisions (Wilson 1998).
However, the economic problems exacerbated social conditions and there was a 
breakout o f strikes on banana plantations in the Pacific lowlands, culminating in a
- 140-
major strike in 1984. The United Fruit Company responded by closing their 
operations and moving to Panama (Booth 1998, Molina and Palmer 1998). A 
large number o f banana workers were left stranded, and with few other 
employment opportunities, the region was devastated. The experience proved 
that the state was powerless to stop the US-owned TNC producers moving their 
operations elsewhere (Wilson 1998, Chapman 2007). The government’s position 
was weakened and its commitment to state-led socio-economic development was 
gradually replaced with a neoliberal economic programme co-sponsored by the 
US government (Wilson 1998, Cruz 2005). The US saw Costa Rica as a stable 
ally and as part o f the evolving relationship between the two countries, the Ronald 
Reagan administration planned to make Costa Rica the southern front in its 
counter-revolutionary war on Sandinista Nicaragua16. The US embassy 
sponsored Nicaraguan exiles to help seize control over Costa Rica’s security 
forces, reorienting them in a paramilitary direction (Molina and Palmer 1998, 
Wilson 1998). The US administration had strong allies in the more conservative 
political circles and local media in Costa Rica, and routinely calls were being 
made for the state to confront the menace o f Sandinismo (Booth 1998, Molina 
and Palmer 1998). However, the Costa Rican government complied with all of 
Washington’s demands apart from this one, refusing to allow the US to establish 
military bases in the country. President Monge ‘invoked the symbolic weight of 
Costa Rican history’ and declared the country’s neutrality (Molina and Palmer 
1998: 122). A diplomatic solution to the Central American conflict was required 
and in 1986 the newly elected President Oscar Arias Sanchez, promoted a peace 
plan signed by all five leaders o f the Isthmus, for which he was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 (Booth 1998).
Costa Rica’s prolonged financial difficulties led to dynamic changes in the 
country’s economic and social circumstances during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
Structural Adjustment Programs (PAEs) instigated under the direction o f the IMF 
began to falter during the late-1980s (Molina and Palmer 1998). The response of 
shock therapy introduced by Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier during his 
presidency (1990-94) resulted in deep cuts in public spending, including
16 The Costa Rican government and people gave material and moral support to Nicaragua in its 
fight to become a socialist country, the outcome was a Sandinista victory in 1979 (Molina and 
Palmer 1998).
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education and health. Fournier, the son of Calderon Guardia -  the former 
president responsible for the bulk of social reform in the 1940s -  although 
mindful o f his father’s heritage, argued for drastic action (Molina and Palmer 
1998, Wilson 1998). However, the erosion o f real incomes due to sales and 
income taxes made the professional classes poorer, and pushed the poor into the 
so-called informal sector (Molina and Palmer 1998). The following presidency of 
Jose Maria Figueres Olsen, the son o f former president Figueres Ferrer, proved to 
be even more painful for Costa Ricans. Figueres Olsen signed an agreement with 
his predecessor Calderon Fournier committing both the PLN and the PUSC 
parties to a series of reforms that would roll back the Welfare State developed 
between 1940 and 1978 by both their fathers (Molina and Palmer 1998).
The responsibility for the dismantling o f Costa Rica’s social development 
programme was laid at the door o f neoliberalism -  that is the Latin American 
version o f extreme free market theory (Molina and Palmer 1998, Sandbrook et al. 
2007). The accusation was that the state had abdicated responsibility for the 
people to the market, at the cost of great social and cultural change in the country 
(Molina and Palmer 1998, Mesa-Lago 2000, Cruz 2005). However, Mesa-Lago 
(2000) suggests there were two changes in the lives o f the populace which were 
positive during this period, firstly the rapid growth o f evangelical Protestantism 
and secondly, the rise o f Solidarismo. The form of labour organisation associated 
with the Solidarismo movement was originally based on the concept o f solidarity 
espoused by the social doctrine o f the Catholic Church (Molina and Palmer 1998, 
Movimento Solidarista 2006). The Spanish words Solidarismo and solidarista are 
derived from the word solidaridad, which translated into English means solidarity 
(Bendell 2001). The movement, first promoted in 1947 by Alberto Marten -  an 
associate o f President Figueres Ferrer -  was viewed as a solution to the employer- 
employee problems that emerged from the promulgation o f the 1949 Labor Code 
(Molina and Palmer 1998, Movimento Solidarista 2006). The key objective of 
the labour organisation was for employers and employees to ‘work in harmony’, 
invoking ‘a spirit o f solidarity’ which would increase production and equality, 
‘within the standards o f economic efficiency and social justice’ (Movimento 
Solidarista 2006:1). In 1953, when the PLN won control o f the government, it 
fostered the development o f solidarity unions. Solidarity unions did not subscribe
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to the class-based confrontational tactics typical of more traditional unions and 
rejected the use o f strikes as a bargaining tool -  they acted more like ‘company 
unions’ (Wilson 1998: 69).
Today, solidarity unions or solidarista associations as they are more often called 
are defined as ‘social organisations managed by the workers themselves in a 
totally autonomous w ay’ (Movimento Solidarista 2006: 1). They are created and 
funded by individual workers and company owners, and have developed in 
various industry sectors including banana production. Solidarista associations 
offer workers certain benefits and securities, such as sickness pay and low interest 
loans, and companies are spared the negotiating power o f the unions (Molina and 
Palmer 1998, Movimento Solidarista 2006). In 1980, such organisations made up 
only 7 percent o f worker-management agreements, but by 1986, this had risen to 
51 percent (Molina and Palmer 1998). The introduction o f the Solidarity Law 
(Ley de Asociaciones Solidaristas) in 1984, which granted even more economic 
benefits to workers who are members, led to a rapid growth in solidarista 
associations over the following years (Wilson 1998). By 1994, there were 1,694 
solidarista associations in Costa Rica, compared to 600 trade unions (Molina and 
Palmer 1998). Wilson (1998) suggests this was partly because the influx of new 
TNCs investing in Costa Rica preferred this form of association and system of 
representation for employees in the workplace.
However, there were a series o f other events which helped the demise o f trade 
unions in Costa Rica. The process started with the Junta’s ban o f the Communist 
PVP and its affiliate, the CCTRN -  the largest confederation in the country -  that 
silenced the political left for years to come (Wilson 1998, Bell 1971). The ban 
emasculated organized labour and the number o f unions in Costa Rica dropped by 
almost 80 percent (Aguilar-Hemandez 1989). This was followed by the actions 
of the PLN government of 1953, which both encouraged the growth of 
Solidarismo and introduced a nationwide collective bargaining mechanism: 
national wage boards established wages and remuneration, and there was no real 
role for the unions in the process (Wilson 1998). There were also a series of legal 
measures making it difficult for unions to call strikes and leaving union leaders 
vulnerable to dismissal, which helped weaken the labour movement (Wilson
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1998, Mesa-Lago 2000). Nevertheless, the left did maintain its influence amongst 
banana workers, considered the ‘most combative sector o f labor’, between 1950 
and 1970 (Molina and Palmer 1998: 106). When the government introduced a 
banana rehabilitation and expansion programme (Ley de Fomento Bananero) in 
the early-1990s, amongst the benefits o f tax reductions, favourable exchange 
rates, and the opportunity to develop new lands, the US-banana TNCs were also 
granted the freedom to choose solidarista associations to represent workers above 
trade unions (Chambron 1999, FAO 2003). The impact o f the banana wars 
between the US and Europe in the 1990s had begun to affect the country’s export 
incomes, and in order to appease the US-owned banana TNCs and prevent their 
flight to lower-cost producing countries, the state had been compelled to respond 
(FAO 2003). However, the Ley de Fomento Bananero was widely viewed as yet 
another measure to subjugate labour during difficult trading times (Chambron
1999, Myers 2004). This was to have a real impact for trade unionism on 
plantations in the future, because the concentration of banana production for 
export in Costa Rica is quite high. In 2001, 50 percent o f the country’s 
production was owned by the top three TNCs (FAO 2003). Besides this 
production, the TNCs also have long-term contracts with independent producers, 
and therefore control a higher share than this figure suggests. The FAO estimated 
the figure closer to 84 percent o f national exports for 2001 (FAO 2003).
The decline o f trade unions at the end o f the twentieth century coincided with 
other economic change in the country -  for the first time in 150 years the value of 
coffee and banana exports were overtaken by non-traditional exports (Molina and 
Palmer 1998). The new crop o f exports included textiles (assembled in foreign 
owned plants: maquiladoras), pineapple production (controlled by one o f the 
major banana TNCs, Del Monte), ornamental plants and seafood, and these 
helped protect the country against the continual price swings of coffee and 
bananas (Roche 1998, Cruz 2005, Sandbrook et al. 2007). In addition, there were 
other shifts in the state regulation o f labour markets in Costa Rica during the 
period. There was a broader process of informalisation in labour markets and the 
emergence o f a large immigrant underclass, taking on the menial jobs that most 
Costa Ricans had become reluctant to do (Sandbrook et al. 2007). There had 
always been a constant flow o f migrants from neighbouring Central American
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countries, particularly from Nicaragua, but in the late-1990s migration grew 
exponentially (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, Sandbrook et al. 2007). By 1999, 
Nicaraguans represented approximately 15 percent o f the population of Costa 
Rica. The increase o f migrants was chiefly due to the 1998 civil war in 
Nicaragua, but the devastating effect of Hurricane Mitch on the country’s banana 
plantations also drove many Nicaraguans south to the banana lowlands on the 
Atlantic coast (Trejos 2000). These migrants were not, however, always welcome 
and there was a growing tension between the Ticos and the Nicas (as Nicaraguans 
are called) (Trejos 2000). Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations have always been a 
little strained, due to border conflicts17 and political rivalries (Furlong 1987), but 
following this new explosion o f migration, the way o f life in Costa Rica changed 
(Trejos 2000). Nicas were held responsible for the increase of crime in the 
country and Ticos responded by building gates and fences around their homes and 
businesses, leading to a separation o f the two communities (Bail 2007).
However, Sandbrook and his colleagues (2007) argue that this period of 
neoliberal doctrine actually served to solidify welfare gains introduced during the 
previous three decades. They claim that reforms of pensions, education and 
health relied on a mix o f market, quasi-market, and state-directed modalities. The 
changes introduced maintained the social security provision for the entire 
population with the costs subsidised by the state, which would suggest a more 
complicated interrelationship between state and market, as opposed to the 
substitution o f one by the other (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Currently, Costa Rica is 
embarking on a hybrid model of development, which includes the opening up of 
markets, a minimal degree o f privatisation and the reform o f its large state 
apparatus (Cruz 2005, Sandbrook et al. 2007).
6.5 Conclusion
The purpose o f this chapter has been to describe chronologically the events that 
have shaped the political, economic and social character o f Costa Rica. In this 
way, the characteristics o f the country where the fieldwork study was completed
1 The ill-defined border between the two countries has caused problems since the early 1800s and 
Nicaragua has made several invasions o f Costa Rica territory, most recently during the Sandinista 
regime in 1982-86 (Furlong 1987). The dispute over navigation rights along the San Juan River 
boundary line in the northeast continues today, which is exacerbated by the fact that this is one of 
the main entry points for migrants into Costa Rica (Bail 2007).
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can be better understood. Certain historical events have been highlighted in order 
to illustrate the types o f relationship that were formed between the state, its 
citizens and the corporate sector. What is demonstrated is that Costa Rica 
emerged from an agrarian society almost exclusively dependent on the export 
crops o f coffee and bananas to become a broader based industrial society. The 
country’s early involvement in world markets and low defence expenditures 
created a favourable environment for the state to promote social development and 
improve social conditions. However, following the difficult trading conditions of 
the country’s key export markets (coffee and bananas) during the Second World 
War, economic crisis turned into political crisis in the form o f an uprising in 
1948, and highlighted the willingness o f the country’s elites to abandon 
democratic processes when it was against their own interests.
However, following this short period of political instability, successive 
administrations introduced economic and social development programmes that 
largely survived the economic crisis of 1980-1982 and the neoliberal reform of 
the 1990s, and continue today. The nation was the earliest Central American 
country to pass a Labour Code to offset labour conflict and successive political 
administrations have maintained a reputation for equitable labour relations 
(Frundt 1998, Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Recently, the state has undertaken less of a 
development role in Costa Rica, but it is still active in creating opportunities for 
business and providing a series o f social security benefits, such as national 
insurance, health care, and pension entitlements (Cruz 2005, Sandbrook et al. 
2007). The country has strong economic growth and one of the lowest 
unemployment rates in the region (World Bank 2007). The social-democratic 
model developed in Costa Rica, with its comprehensive labour law and social 
welfare programme, creates the backdrop to considering how voluntary labour 
initiatives (codes o f conduct) operate in the banana production chain. It also 
provides the context to explore how forms of voluntary regulation in the chain 
complement a national structure o f labour regulation in the pursuit o f furthering 
the rights o f workers.
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Chapter Seven 
Plantation Production
Introduction
The aim o f the chapter is to provide a greater understanding o f the working 
conditions in the production chain o f exported bananas. To achieve this, a 
detailed description is given of the operational tasks involved in the production 
process together with the testimony o f workers regarding these activities. The 
overriding intention o f the chapter is to indicate the key activities performed on 
banana plantations and explain how they affect the working conditions o f labour. 
In this way, it is hoped to foreground the issues and experiences of a labour force 
employed to perform demanding work in difficult circumstances and to help 
explain the current drive towards the implementation o f labour codes of conduct 
in global supply chains. The chapter will therefore trace the process of growing 
and preparing the fruit for market, from the field to the packhouse.
For over a century, bananas have been cultivated in a plantation system, which 
depends on cheap land, cheap labour and foreign markets (Gregor 1965, Roche 
1998). The chapter therefore begins with a brief explanation of this form of 
agricultural system, followed by a detailed description o f the tasks performed by 
workers and a summary o f the employment and social conditions that labour 
experiences on banana farms. The banana sector, like many global industries, is 
in perpetual motion and faces challenges of an oversupplied market, changes to 
market structure (the EU tariff regime), shifts of ownership in production 
(subcontracting) and an increasingly diverse labour force (growing levels of 
migrant labour).
The details presented in the chapter -  the structure of the industry, the jobs and 
work activities within the production chain, and the employment conditions on 
banana farms are all drawn from the commentary o f workers, trade unions and 
company management. Other details pertinent to the main interest of the thesis 
are incorporated into the discussion and referenced appropriately. The main part 
o f the chapter is based on the empirical data collected during field research on
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banana farms in the lowland province o f Limon, which is situated on the Atlantic 
Coast o f Costa Rica.
7.1 Plantation Agriculture
Plantation agriculture began in the sixteenth century, through the initiative of 
European colonialists in tropical climes and a supply of slave labour (Gregor 
1965, Courtenay 1980). The term ‘plantation’ in the original sense referred not 
just to a landed estate, but also to the whole process o f migration and occupation 
(Thompson 1935). The history of plantation agriculture provides a somewhat 
‘imperialistic’ view o f the plantation, describing it as a weapon for one country to 
exploit ruthlessly the natural resources and populace o f another (Gregor 1965). 
The United Fruit Company in particular, has been described as the prototype of 
plantation imperialism (Langley and Schoonover 1995, Chapman 2007). 
Plantation agriculture became an established system for farming a variety o f crops 
including sugar cane, tea, coffee, tobacco, bananas and rubber across the world -  
in Central and South America, the equatorial regions o f Africa, and the Far East 
(Thompson 1935, Courtenay 1980, FAO 2003). This form of agriculture was 
more than mere colonisation; it was a system organised and controlled based on 
making a profit (Thompson 1935). Today, the plantation system is a large scale, 
capital intensive, highly specialised farming export-orientated enterprise, which 
employs waged-labour and tends to be foreign-owned. Such characteristics make 
the modem day plantation more akin to its industrial counterpart, the factory 
(Gregor 1965, Young 1970).
In Latin America, banana plantations cover hundreds o f square miles o f flat and 
fertile land, and are supported by irrigation, transport and refrigeration systems, 
and an organised workforce (FAO 1986). These larger corporate plantations are 
between 4000 and 6000 hectares in size and are chiefly organised to supply the 
export market. A hectare (ha) is 10,000 square metres or 247,109 acres (FAO 
1986). The plantations are divided into a number o f farms to form managerial 
units, but the majority o f land is still utilised for growing bananas. However, each 
farm has a dedicated central area, which houses office buildings, a workers’ 
canteen and rest area, chemicals storage, medical facilities and a packhouse. 
Some farms in close proximity may share office and storage facilities (for
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equipment and chemicals), but each farm has its own packing station. The 
cultivation and production area of a farm is generally 2000 to 2500 ha and will 
employ between 150 and 250 workers. Where a farm administrator manages 
adjacent farms, workers may work on more than one farm, dependent on the daily 
labour requirement.
Because o f the different production systems, costs vary widely and are calculated 
to be about 2-3 times higher in the traditional form of production practised in the 
Windward Islands, compared to the more industrialised process prevalent in Latin 
America (Kasteele 1998). Small independent growers and cooperative farms 
grow bananas in the more hilly climes o f the Windward Islands (Grossman 1998). 
The cost difference between the two systems of production is mostly due to 
variations in labour costs, mainly salaries, and higher yields, through production 
efficiencies and the process o f applying agro-chemicals, which have supported 
substantial increases in production yields since the mid-1980s (Grossman 1998, 
Kasteele 1998, FAO 2003). Growing bananas is a very labour intensive process, 
taking between 220-365 worker days per ha each year (Fyffes 2004). The labour 
requirement coupled with the limited life o f the banana, a mere twenty-one days 
from the time o f picking to an inedible mush, places a heavy burden on producers 
to maintain a well-organised and highly integrated supply chain (Read 1983, 
Chapman 2007).
As discussed earlier, the banana industry is highly concentrated, with three 
leading TNCs: Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte, which together accounted for an 
estimated 58 percent o f the world’s banana exports in 2002 (FAO 2003). In Costa 
Rica, bananas are mostly grown for export and in 2002, over 80 percent of the 
country’s banana exports were grown or sub-contracted by Chiquita, Dole and 
Del Monte (FAO 2003). The TNC producers both own and manage plantations, 
but increasingly subcontract production to independent growers or source bananas 
from secondary supplies. Bananas sourced from associated growers and the 
occasional third party grower provide up to 60 percent o f the export demand 
placed on the TNCs by their customers (supermarkets, smaller retail groups and 
wholesalers). The TNCs depend on a sophisticated and well-managed supply 
chain to serve the export market, which means either owning or renting
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plantations, owning or leasing shipping and transportation facilities, and owning 
ripening and distribution networks in consuming markets. At each stage of the 
banana supply chain, there is a high degree o f coordination between plantations 
and the offices o f their customers, particularly concerning demand requirements. 
The daily harvest on each farm is meticulously planned to pack enough cases for 
full containers (a shipping unit), the number o f which depends on the consolidated 
orders received from customers.
However, the banana industry does not just rely on a well-organised and highly 
integrated supply chain to maintain high yields o f quality fruit. A number o f 
changes in agricultural technologies and practices have contributed to the 
production o f the perfectly shaped and blemish free banana (Soluri 2003, Jansen 
2004). In particular, these included the introduction of pesticide management and 
the extended use o f agro-chemicals on plantations (Jansen 2004). There are a 
number o f chemicals applied throughout the production process, including 
fungicides, insecticides and herbicides, which are intended to protect the fruit 
against insects and disease (Wilson and Otsuki 2002, Jansen 2004). By their very 
nature, the chemicals used are toxic and can cause human hazards through 
exposure or direct intake (Wilson and Otsuki 2002). Thus, the work environment 
can be especially dangerous for farm workers who face a high risk o f toxicity due 
to the continual exposure during the cultivation process (Wilson and Otsuki 2002, 
Harari 2005a).
However, the types o f agro-chemicals used and methods o f application employed 
on banana farms are constantly under review, both from a health and safety point 
o f view and in terms o f environmental damage (Wilson and Otsuki 2002, Jansen 
2004). Pest control is a major cost factor in banana production and considerable 
effort has been made by producers to reduce and rationalise the use o f pesticides, 
which represent approximately 30 percent o f the final cost o f exported bananas 
(Interviews: Producer CSR Manager RC@P2, February 2006; Producer 
Compliance Manager MCM@P6, March 2006; Producer Technical Manager 
RT@P1, March 2006). Improvements have been made which include storage of 
chemicals, new spraying equipment, protective wear, the construction of separate 
showers, laundry facilities for clothing to be washed on site and not at home, and
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the introduction o f training programmes for workers regarding the safe handling 
of chemicals (Interviews: Producer CSR Manager RC@P2, February 2006; 
Producer Compliance Manager MCM@P5, March 2006; Producer Technical 
Manager RT@P1, March 2006). Nevertheless, the use of pesticides in banana 
cultivation continues to be questioned by both environmental and social 
movements (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). This is partly because the 
changes in cultivation practices that could help reduce the high levels o f agro­
chemicals used in the production process have proved difficult to achieve (Wilson 
and Otsuki 2002, Jansen 2004). Hence, work on banana farms continues to be 
demanding and dangerous, and an area o f concern for all those involved in the 
industry (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005).
7.2 Work on Banana Farms
In Costa Rica farms or fincas as they are called, are named after the town or area 
where they are situated. The farm is closely identified with its community and 
underpins much o f the economic activity within the locality. The impact of the 
US/EU trade dispute over the last five years has taken its toll on banana producers 
and resulted in many farms being closed or abandoned in the Limon province. 
The crumbling infrastructure o f once thriving packing stations and fields 
overgrown by weeds blot the agricultural landscape o f the district. Like ghost 
towns, such sightings hint at the on-going struggle which producers are faced with 
in this highly competitive sector and the number of jobs that are lost or transposed 
elsewhere. There was a sense o f collective mourning on the part o f workers when 
discussions turned to these dilapidated farms, as one retired banana worker stated:
“They [the deserted farms] are a reminder always o f the better days... 
the time when we all had jobs... now the companies have gone to 
other places, but the sadness... it hangs over the whole community 
here, everyone depends on the farm, every trader in the town... stores 
close and we are left with nothing” (Focus Group IOH@FG3, March
2006).
Other workers, older and mostly retired, echoed these sentiments by displaying 
feelings o f hopelessness and desolation during the discussion, yet strangely, 
younger workers seemed to accept these weakened employment conditions, as if 
they were resigned to the continuing state o f flux in the banana sector. There was
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a distinct difference in the way older workers described the industry that had 
consumed their working lives. The banana plantation was more than the 
traditional workplace where each would follow their fathers before them; it was a 
way o f life. Banana producers had once developed little enclaves in the province 
by providing workers with housing and building the local infrastructure, the 
school, the football pitch and often the town hall and meetinghouse. It was this 
sense o f community that now seemed to be missing for many o f the older 
workers. For these workers, the plantation had become an industrialised unit 
where the big banana companies cared only about the amount o f fruit that could 
be produced in the shortest possible time and at the lowest cost.
Accordingly, the production operation has experienced changes during the last 
twenty years or so. However, in spite o f new cultivation practices including the 
streamlining o f production activities and a greater use o f agro-chemicals being 
introduced over recent years, banana production remains a manual process. Every 
farm follows the same basic principle; a banana stem is cultivated, harvested, 
selected and packed, and then transported to the port where the fruit awaits the 
next vessel to be shipped to market. There are a number of work tasks to be 
performed during the production cycle and each activity involves a discrete group 
of workers with different skills and experience.
Diagram 7.1 Work Activities in Banana Production
Packing
Selection
(trimming)
Cultivation ReceivingHarvesting
Selection
(assortment)
«----------------------------------  Field   »«----------------------------------------------  Packhouse  ----------------------------------------------------
Source: Fieldnotes, Feb-April 2006
During the cultivation stage, work activities include planting, cropping, weeding, 
pesticide application and maintaining the irrigation system. At the harvesting
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stage, activities such as cutting, carrying, and transportation o f the fruit to the 
processing area are performed. When the fruit arrives at the packing station, it 
needs to be prepared for the export market, and this final stage of the production 
cycle includes the work activities o f trimming and sorting bunches of bananas, 
labelling, packing, and loading the fruit into a container ready to be transported to 
the port. On each farm, the production process is split by location, there is the 
fie ld  where the bananas are cultivated and harvested, and the packhouse where the 
bananas are selected, sorted and packed.
Each o f these locations represents a group of work activities and workers that 
have a high degree of separation from each other, the one key meeting point being 
the receiving area, a ‘hand o ff  -  where the fruit transfers from one to the other. 
Within these two distinct areas of work on banana farms; ‘planting and picking’ 
and ‘selecting and packing’, there are a number o f additional activities, which 
further subdivide the labour process, and the types o f workers employed to 
complete the work. There also tends to be a gender split, with men mostly 
working in the field cultivating and harvesting, while women are mostly occupied 
in the trimming and sorting o f the fruit.
7.2.1 In the Field
The agricultural side o f a banana farm is more commonly described as the field 
and the most regularly performed tasks in the field are related to planting, 
cultivation (bagging, cropping, and the application o f agro-chemicals), and 
harvesting the fruit. The work is intense and fast moving in the field, and those 
operating here need a certain agility to work around the dead plants, fallen and 
cropped leaves, and the web o f blue twine that stretches from one plant to 
another, which helps to support the banana plant. To the uninitiated, the field is 
an obstacle course that requires a great deal of concentration. Bananas thrive on 
deep, loose, well-drained soils in humid climates and grow most successfully in 
tropical conditions (Roche 1998). The sub-tropical climate in Costa Rica means it 
can be particularly hot and humid in the field, and workers have to cope with 
temperatures o f up to 38 degrees centigrade with alternating bursts of torrential 
rain. Thus, the duties performed by banana workers require great physical and
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mental effort. This is demanding work, as one of the harvest team who has 
worked in the field for four years, explained:
“Cutting o f the harvest is the hardest job on the farm ... we start early, 
at maybe 5 or 5.30, when it is cooler, but by early morning it is so 
hot... it is exhausting, there is nowhere to shelter here [in the field]” 
(Interview COHP@F26, March 2006).
The working environment is very challenging and there is nowhere to take refuge 
from the sun or the frequent showers of rain (two key requirements for banana 
cultivation). Many workers commented on the unbearably hot and humid 
conditions in the field, as one worker confirmed:
“I tie my boots to stop the water, it gets very wet and in the rainy 
season it will rain everyday for nearly six months, but in the dry 
season also it rains, maybe a day and a night a week... it is very wet 
and very hot here” (Interview AOC@F25, March 2006).
The field is tough and demanding, but nevertheless when talking to workers faced 
with this situation every day, for every negative comment made there was a 
positive one regarding these conditions, as is evidenced by the comments below:
“There used to be a problem with the rain when I worked out in the 
fields, but it doesn’t affect me now, it’s healthy and it refreshes me, I 
like working here [in the field]” (Interview ROC@F26, March 2006).
“I always work here [in the field], I like it, because I have the freedom 
to do my work, no one watches over me... so the rain does not bother 
me, it is just nature, the fruit needs lots of water so the rain is good, it 
helps make a lot o f fruit to harvest” (Interview EOH@F32, March
2006).
The environment in the field is such that workers appear to adapt, seeming to 
accept that the variable temperatures and conditions in the field are part o f the 
process o f farming bananas, and in this regard, the situation they face each day is 
outside their control, and attributable to the biology o f the banana plant. The 
banana is a fruit, which although commonly thought o f as being produced on a 
tree, does in fact grow and develop as a plant.
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The banana plant is really a giant herb related to the orchid, lily and palm family 
(Roche 1998). It grows from a fleshy bulb called a ‘rhizome’ and after the leafy 
stalk has matured -  it takes nine months from initial planting to producing its first 
crop -  a spike emerges from the top of the plant and bends downwards in the 
shape of a large bud. To help protect the bud and growing banana stem from 
pests, the bud is covered with a blue polythene bag impregnated with the 
insecticide chlorpyrifos. Chlorpyrifos is one of the most commonly used 
pesticides in worldwide banana production and is categorised as a Class II 
pesticide by the World Health Organisation (WHO), which indicates a moderately 
high level of toxicity. The WHO has classified pesticides into four categories (I, 
II, III and IV) with the lower numbers indicating higher levels of toxicity (Wilson 
and Otsuki 2002). The bag also shields the growing fruit from potentially 
damaging climatic conditions, such as torrential rain and wind, and helps reduce 
blemishes on the fruit. The bagging process and the on-going care of the banana 
stem are activities, which are normally performed by a worker known as a 
bagger. The bagger clambers up a wooden or light metal ladder to reach and 
carefully position the blue bag around the emerging bud of the fruit, but the 
banana plant and its crop are not overly robust and great care has to be taken 
when performing this task.
Plate 7.1 A worker positioning a blue bag around the bud of a banana plant
Source: Photograph taken during fieldwork, Feb-April 2006
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Once the bag is in position, a coloured ribbon is tied to the top o f the stem, a 
different colour for each week of the 12-week growing cycle. The colour o f the 
tape will indicate the maturity of the fruit and act as a guide to the harvest team. 
Most producers have a strict control system for monitoring the age o f the stem, as 
this ensures uniformity in the fruit when it reaches its market destination. At the 
same time, the bagger will tie blue twine from this plant to a neighbouring one in 
a criss-cross fashion, to create a support structure for the plant and the banana 
stem, which, as it grows heavier each week, becomes more vulnerable to being 
blown or falling over.
As each leaf o f the rhizome bud unfolds, the banana stem develops and rows of 
small flowers appear which will become individual bananas, called ‘fingers’. 
Each row has 15-35 fingers that make up a ‘hand’ or bunch of bananas and each 
stem develops between 7-10 hands. To achieve the greatest yield of quality fruit, 
the bagger removes some o f the flowers. This helps ensure that the plant 
develops a bumper crop and meets the exacting standards o f the export market. 
Typically, farms in Costa Rica produce a stem of bananas of 8 or 9 hands with 
between 150 and 200 fingers. During the early stages o f the banana stem’s 
growth, the bagger regularly rolls back the bag to check the growing fruit and 
remove poor or damaged fingers. However, one single banana is left at the 
bottom, which draws the nutrients o f the plant down the stem and ensures that the 
low'er clusters of fruit are o f equal quality to those at the top. Many of the tasks 
the bagger has to perform require careful handling o f the polythene bag, because 
it is coated with the potentially harmful chemical chlorpyrifos, which can over­
stimulate the nervous system causing nausea, lung congestion, chest pain and 
dizziness and at high exposure levels can cause respiratory paralysis and death 
(Wilson and Otsuki 2002). In most instances, the producer (the company) 
provides the bagger with safety equipment, including a facemask and gloves, thus 
providing a degree o f protection, although this does not guarantee that workers 
are able to acquire such equipment on a regular basis, as one worker highlighted:
“There are always issues with masks, some days there are none 
available... also gloves... there are none in the warehouse... so we have 
to work without them” (Interview ROB@F22, February 2006).
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However, when this problem was later mentioned to a member o f the quality 
control team on the farm, I was immediately taken and shown the safety 
equipment sitting neatly on the shelves o f a storeroom near the packhouse. The 
equipment is free o f charge to those handling or working with chemicals in the 
production process and it seems that it is readily available for collection every 
day. The quality control assistant suggested that it was quite usual for the 
workers in the field not to use their safety equipment, her view being:
“They [the baggers] don’t want to use a mask, they didn’t have to 
before and many take off their masks, its very hot and not comfortable 
to use... and the gloves are open market... sometimes the protective 
equipment is not used because it is sold to other workers in the field, 
where gloves are not really needed so they are not issued, like the 
harvest team... gloves cost $3, and they [the baggers] make up their 
money this way” (Interview LOQ@F22, February 2006).
The companies do not issue other harvest workers with gloves and masks because 
by the time the fruit is harvested the chemicals inside the bag have dissipated. 
Certainly, the impression I had was that many o f the baggers found the wearing of 
protective equipment uncomfortable, and it interfered with the duties they were 
expected to perform. Baggers were not keen on using the equipment, even when 
it was easily obtainable and when I quizzed further on the subject o f protective 
wear, there was a mixed response, with comments including:
“We are given gloves and masks, and clean uniforms... we always 
have the equipment we need” (Interview HOB@F21, February 2006).
“I wear a mask always, but today I don’t have one... it broke 
yesterday” (Interview AOB@F22, February 2006).
“I’m very proud o f the job I do, but I don’t like wearing the protective 
equipment, wearing a mask is uncomfortable... but I always pass my 
blood test” (Interview EOB@F22, February 2006).
“Protection is worn, there are no problems, everything is provided” 
(Interview EOH@F26, March 2006).
“When my supervisor is here [in the field], then he tells me I have to 
use it [the mask], but I don’t like to use it, it gets hot and then it is not 
so easy to breathe” (Interview GOH@F41, April 2006).
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In some respects, the different responses are explained by the different ownership 
of the farms, with each producer and grower appearing to place varying levels of 
importance on compliance with the use o f safety equipment. It is noticeable in 
the photograph o f a bagger earlier, that neither a mask nor gloves were being 
used, yet the worker had both in his possession. Some producers insist upon 
workers signing their training records to show that they have been told about the 
dangers of handling chemicals and have agreed to wear the equipment provided. 
From this point onwards, it appears to be up to the worker to comply with the 
health and safety requirement. Others closely monitor the situation, particularly 
as non-compliance would be a clear breach o f the voluntary codes and standards 
introduced on the farm and would count against the producer on a farm audit. 
The requirement to provide and ensure the use o f protective wear for workers 
handling chemicals is included in the health and safety principles o f both the ETI 
Base Code and the SA8000 Standard.
Over time, the chemicals inside the bag dissipate, but the continual handling of a 
bag coated with chemicals is still o f concern to those engaged in the activity. One 
bagger who had been working in the field for sixteen year$ commented on the 
risks involved in this process:
“Every 3 months they take a blood sample to see what the levels of 
chemicals are in my body... I never fail, but I am careful... I know 
how to do my job so that I am ok” (Interview AOB@F22, February 
2006).
This same worker did not have his mask on, because it had broken the day before. 
It is not clear how failing to wear the recommended equipment qualifies for being 
careful in this kind o f work, but there was a sense that these sorts o f safety 
requirements are somehow not critical to those who have spent a long time 
working in the field. The corporate social responsibility manager who reviews all 
operating procedures on company-owned or managed farms seemed to view the 
situation somewhat differently and asserted the need for such precautions and the 
importance o f regular blood tests. He explained that the reason for three-monthly 
blood tests for all workers in the field, was to check the levels o f chemicals in the 
worker’s nervous system, and he added:
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if  the test shows a fail then the worker [bagger] is relocated to 
another area in the field... maybe the harvest or the packhouse, but 
most o f the baggers don’t want to work there, so this helps with 
compliance... after the first test failure, the worker is tested again in 
another month, and if  he [the worker] fails one more test the following 
month, then he is permanently moved away from bagging and given 
another job on the farm” (Interview RC@P2, February 2006).
However, this presupposes that all that workers need to do to ensure protection
from any harmful effects o f the chemicals they work with, is to wear the correct
18safety equipment. Over the years, there have been a number of campaigns 
against the use o f the chemically impregnated polythene bags, which claim that 
workers can still inhale chemicals even when using a mask, and that the situation 
gets more dangerous when the insecticide begins to evaporate in the heat. The 
on-going use o f chemicals in this way remains a contentious issue and 
campaigners have engaged with the scientific community to provide more 
qualified evidence o f the dangers facing banana workers (Interview Gilberth 
Bemudez Umana, Union Regional Coordinator: COLSIBA, February 2006; 
Harari 2005a).
Part o f the solution to reduce the levels of chemicals used during the cultivation 
process has been the introduction o f defoliation; trimming the leaves o f the plant. 
The tending o f the plant itself, rather than the banana stem is the job of the 
cropper. The cropper identifies plants that have been affected by insects or 
disease, and manually cuts away part o f the infected or dead leaves, which helps 
to protect the growing plant and prevent any further spread of disease. The 
banana plant also needs frequent pruning to remove surplus growth in the clump 
and the removal o f grass and weeds close by, which may rob the plant of the 
soil’s nutrients. Maintaining the healthy condition o f the plant is the cropper’s 
responsibility and like those workers involved in the bagging process, the job 
performed by the cropper has an impact on the quality o f the fruit and the yield of 
the crop. There are many croppers working on any one farm, but the work is 
structured so that each cropper is responsible for a given area, which is between 
250 and 300 ha at any one time.
18 Chiefly trade unions and NGOs, including COLSIBA, Banana Link and Emaus Forum have led 
these campaigns.
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During the growing process, one o f the major diseases that producers are faced 
with is a leaf disease called Black Sigatoka. The disease manifests itself as spots 
on the leaves o f the plant and can easily spread and sabotage the whole crop. The 
main export banana since the early 1960s, the Cavendish variety, is very 
susceptible to this disease, so it is critical to control and eliminate the disease. 
The two key activities performed to try to tackle this problem in the field are the 
removal o f the infected leaves by the cropper and the treatment of the plant with 
fungicides. The intention is to kill the fungus Mycosphaerella Fijiensis that 
causes Black Sigatoka, but unfortunately the fungus has developed a resistance to 
systemic fungicides (Jansen 2004). In addition, the application of these 
fungicides is problematic as they are highly toxic and require careful handling and 
application. However, there are other chemicals classified as highly toxic and 
hazardous handled on plantations, such as Nematicides, used to control nematode 
worm infestations (Wilson and Otsuki 2002). Both fungicides and nematicides 
are applied by aerial spraying, which takes place virtually every week on a 
plantation, with fungicides being applied up to 40 times a year and nematicides up 
to 4 times a year (W ilson and Otsuki 2002, Jansen 2004).
Undoubtedly, agro-chemicals help control pests and maintain the availability of 
low cost and high quality fruit, but there are clearly health risks attached to their 
use. Major risks include on-farm ingestion by workers, the diffusion o f chemicals 
across the plantation and surrounding area caused by wind drifts, and the danger 
to consumers from potential pesticide residues in the fruit (Wilson and Otsuki 
2002). Both the types o f chemicals used and the method o f application are highly 
controversial issues for banana producers (Jansen 2004, IBCII 2005b). One of the 
major challenges facing producers is how to organise frequent aerial applications 
without drenching workers on adjacent farms or endangering the local community 
(Wilson and Otsuki 2002, Jansen 2004). To overcome some o f these difficulties 
some producers spray on a Sunday or in the evening, when the farm has ceased 
production. Others divide the plantation into a number o f sections and spray the 
area where no work activity is scheduled. However, claims have been made by 
workers, unions and some external observers that workers are exposed to
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chemicals being sprayed on the farms while working (Emaus Forum19 2000, 
COLSIBA 2005, Banana Link 2005). Workers were keen to talk about this issue 
and there was a regularity and consistency in their response, as indicated by some 
of the comments noted below:
“The supervisor tells us when the planes will spray, so we know not to 
go in that area... but some workers go there, [in that area]... but 
sometimes there is a problem with the wind, it isn’t always safe” 
(Interview MOC@F21, February 2006).
“But, sometimes they don’t make the warning that the plane is 
overhead, so banana workers active in the fields they get sprayed” 
(Focus Group POC@FG2, March 2006).
“A cloud o f chemicals hangs over us... we carry on working -  that’s 
how it is in the field” (Interview WOH@F26, March 2006).
“Farms do this [aerial spraying] all the time, workers have to move to 
one side o f the field, but chemicals spread in the air -  it is a problem 
always” (Interview COHP@F26, March 2006).
“Every week they fly over with the pesticides, by law no one should 
be in the field harvesting, not when applying them [the pesticides].
We must be completely on the other side, but we see it in the air and 
then it floats by” (Interview NOH@F32, March 2006).
The college Escuela de Agricultura de la Region Tropical Humeda (EARTH)20, 
the Agricultural College o f the Humid Tropical Region in Costa Rica estimates 
that 15 percent o f aerial sprayed fungicide is lost to wind drift and falls outside 
the plantation (quoted in Chambron 1999). However, workers are necessarily 
resigned to the problems associated with aerial spraying, as if  it was all part of the 
job. It was something they just ‘had to get used to’ and ‘live w ith’ and there was 
often a shrug o f the shoulders; an acknowledgement that nothing would change. 
The operation is viewed as a necessary part of ensuring a good yield of quality
19 Emaus Forum founded in 1992, is a solidarity network for human rights and the environment in 
Costa Rica’s region o f  banana production (Emaus Forum 1999).
20 EARTH is located in Limon, Costa Rica and is a private, international, non-profit university, 
which focuses on agricultural sciences; the aim of the university is to contribute to sustainable 
development in the tropics by seeking a balance between agricultural production and 
environmental preservation (EARTH 2006).
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fruit and as quality is a key determinant of a workers’ salary, it becomes 
acceptable.
Producers have helped to ensure greater protection for workers by better planning 
of spraying schedules and by increasing the precision o f spraying by the use of 
helicopters, as confirmed by a supervisor working on a company owned farm:
“A helicopter sprays overhead, [we] have to spray the field every 8 
days, it is always in the afternoon when the workers have gone home, 
other farms do it in the morning, which is a danger to the workers... 
but not here. There is a schedule on the notice board [in the 
packhouse] for everyone to see, but we also tell the workers in the 
morning, so they know not to harvest there. Also, I have to check 
there are no workers there, before the spraying starts. Sometimes we 
tell the workers and they still go into that part o f the field... maybe 
they have forgotten or maybe there is more fruit closer together ready 
for cutting and it is easier for them. But we always tell them not to” 
(Interview MS@F26, March 2006).
However, the responsibility o f the companies as regards aerial spraying emerged 
as a very emotive topic o f discussion in a focus group conducted in the 
community hall, o f what is essentially a banana town in the province o f Limon. 
One o f the focus group participants, a harvest worker, described the problems 
associated with this activity:
“The manager says that when the plane is spraying, everyone should 
be out o f the area, but this is not done... the records show this is being 
done right, this is w hat’s presented... even when the spraying is a very 
dangerous chemical” (Focus Group RH@FG3, March 2006).
There was definitely a difference in the way producers explained the process of 
aerial spraying and the experiences recounted by workers; a possible case of 
procedure failing to work in practice. This is one of the most controversial issues 
regarding the working conditions o f workers in banana production and it tends to 
be an area that receives a great deal o f attention from all actors engaged in the 
global banana supply chain.
Some o f the participants in this focus group are still involved in cases pending in 
US courts, cases regarding the use o f the nematicide, Dibro-mochloropropane 
(DBCP). DBCP was developed by Shell Oil and Occidental Chemical in the
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1940s and proved so effective for a number of crops that it was widely used in the 
US during the 1950s. However, it is a highly toxic chemical, which allegedly was 
still being applied on banana plantations in the mid-1980s; even though the 
manufacturers Shell Oil and Dow Chemical knew the potential dangers of the 
product in the late-1950s (Rosenthal 2004, Werther and Chandler 2006). Both 
corporations’ medical researchers conducted tests on rats and detected high 
toxicity o f DBCP through inhalation and skin absorption, and recommended 
limited use and impermeable protective clothing if  skin contact was likely 
(Rosenthal 2004). DBCP has proven to be a virulent and carcinogenic pesticide 
and can cause the most harmful effects, including birth defects, damage to liver 
and kidneys, and sterility in male workers (Chambron 1999). The first lawsuit 
relating to the use o f DBCP was made in late 2002 by 3,000 Central American 
plantation workers and was heard in a US court by a federal judge in New Orleans 
(Werther and Chandler 2006). The workers sued Shell Oil, Dow Chemical, 
Occidental Chemical, Chiquita International, Dole Food and Fresh Del Monte 
Produce over the continued use o f the pesticide on banana plantations in Central 
America, the Caribbean, Africa and the Philippines (Werther and Chandler 2006). 
By 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US banned DBCP 
for most uses, but banned pesticides can still be legally manufactured in and 
exported from the US (Rosenthal 2004). This is in spite o f the fact that exposure 
to DBCP could result in sterility and cancer, and there is a real possibility of birth 
defects in the children o f those exposed to the chemical (Werther and Chandler 
2006). The EPA does not review health and environmental impacts of pesticides 
destined for the export market, but it is required to notify foreign governments if a 
pesticide is restricted or cancelled; the effectiveness o f this process has been 
somewhat questioned in this case (Rosenthal 2004).
The chief complaint against the banana producers was that until as late as 1985, 
the nematicide continued to be used on plantations without proper education or 
proper protection for the workers, even though the producers were aware o f the 
danger to those workers exposed to the chemical. The companies involved have 
fought hard to avoid these cases being heard in US courts, but in 2005 further 
legal action was taken by countries in Central America, including Costa Rica 
(Werther and Chandler 2006). There are many cases still pending and some of
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those involved in lawsuits against their former employers found this topic very 
hard to discuss in the focus group. One of the workers who became very upset 
during the discussion claimed:
we would be working in the field and they [the company] would 
be spraying, it didn’t matter that we were there... now I will never 
have children, that is how I was affected by the company, by the 
chemicals” (Focus Group AH@FG3, March 2006).
All workers in the field are potentially vulnerable to the application o f chemicals, 
which are seen as necessary to maximise the production yield of the crop. There 
seems to be an acceptance o f frequent application o f pesticides as a sort of 
‘natural necessity’ on the basis that large-scale monocultures can never produce 
high yields without such action (Jansen 2004: 159). A farm administrator 
responsible for two farms owned by one of the TNC producers explained the 
importance o f spraying, whilst adding that this operation only took place when 
workers were not in the field:
“We don’t want to use them all the time, chemicals are the most 
expensive things, but everyone has to spray, it is the only way. 
Sigatoka only affects the leaves, a yellow stain appears, then in a few 
days the whole leaf will go black, we need 10 leaves at least [on the 
plant] or there w on’t be enough protection to the fruit and the bunch 
will be no good... we could lose a whole farm in two months” 
(Interview CA@F32, March 2006).
Unfortunately, the situation is not helped by the rate at which Sigatoka spreads 
and few other means o f managing this most infectious disease seem to be 
available. Cropping the plant and trimming the leaves still allows the fungus to 
remain in the air, which appears to be the basis o f the argument for the 
continuation o f aerial spraying. This is the mindset that prevails in the industry 
and it seems as if an alternative to aerial spraying is illusory, even if producers are 
heavily recruiting agronomists and are investing in collaborative research with 
universities like EARTH, to develop better pest management systems. However, 
with the constant pressure to produce the high yielding blemish-free fruit that 
ripens uniformly, the lack o f an alterative solution may not be so surprising.
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The next stage in the production process is the harvesting o f the fruit. At 12 
weeks, the banana stem can weigh up to 100 pounds (45 kilograms) and is ready 
to be cut from the plant. The chief harvest worker, a cutter, is responsible for 
determining which bunch is ready for harvesting. In order to reach the fruit the 
cutter will first nick the banana stalk with a long pole that has a sharp curved 
knife at the tip. The plant droops over and the pole is used to support the 
overhanging plant and its heavy crop. The cutter then cuts the whole stem away 
with a large machete and a second harvest team member, called a carrier, waits 
for the stem to drop onto his shoulder. After the banana stem is harvested, the 
mother plant is cut down and left to rot on the ground. This allows the daughter 
plant that has been developing alongside to blossom; the banana plant is a 
perennial that will grow repeatedly from the same root system.
Plate 7.2 A harvest team preparing to cut the fruit
Source: Photograph taken during fieldwork, Feb-April 2006
This is very dangerous work due to the use o f very sharp knives and there can be 
problems, as one worker in the field noted:
“Accidents do tend to happen in harvesting and pruning” (Interview 
AOB@F22, February 2006).
As another worker acknowledged:
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“Sometimes there are accidents with knives, but there is a first aid 
person in every area; the field, the packhouse and the office” 
(Interview MOS@F25, March 2006).
A supervisor also commented on the use of sharp knives in the field and the 
potential this gave for accidents:
“ ...the hardest and most dangerous work is cutting the bananas and the 
weeds, the workers have to take care, most o f the accidents we have 
here, is with knives in the field” (Interview MS@F26, March 2006).
It was generally acknowledged on all the farms visited that the work in the field 
was the most demanding and uncomfortable, because o f not only the constant 
humidity and tropical showers, but because of the physicality o f the work. The 
carrier has a padded shield to support the banana stem as it drops onto his 
shoulder, but this is a very heavy load to transport across difficult and uneven 
terrain. The weight o f  a good commercial stem of bananas is between 88 and 110 
pounds (40-50 kilograms), and it has to be carried to the nearest wire-cable 
conveyor system, which is often a distance away (the harvest team work up to 500 
meters either side o f a cable-route). The carriers run with their load for maybe 
five minutes or more, weaving and wending their way through the web of blue 
twine stretched between the plants, whilst avoiding fallen dead plants and holes 
sunk in the ground.
The banana stem is transported around the plantation through a system of 
cableways and pathways. The system facilitates the movement of the crop 
without having to lay the stem down, which helps prevent bruising and damage to 
the banana clusters. When twenty-five stems in total have been cut and placed on 
the cable, the carrier will take the train of bananas to the packhouse. This work is 
physically very demanding, as the carrier transports the fruit by attaching a rope 
from the trolley to a belt around his waist, and pulls the train along a downward 
sloping pathway towards the packhouse. The distance travelled will vary, but 
usually it is less than a kilometre. The carrier will make the trip four or five times 
every day, however when asked how tiring the work was, one carrier in particular 
stated:
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“My job makes me very fit, I play for the football team here and we 
always win” (Interview JOH@F23, March 2006).
Many farms have their own football teams and matches are organised within the 
district. There is a great deal of competition between the different teams and it 
seems that carriers are always in great demand to play because of their great 
fitness. There is also some rivalry between the different companies, who 
encourage and support their teams through the provision of equipment, clothing 
and prize winning cups for football matches.
Plate 7 3  A carrier pulling a train of bananas to the packhouse
Source: Photograph taken during fieldwork, Feb-April 2006
There are three workers in every harvest team; one cutter and two carriers. One 
carrier will always be on his way to or from the packhouse while the second 
carrier is helping with the harvesting of another crop. The carriers have an 
opportunity to rest at the packhouse between their arduous runs. There are a 
number of harvest teams on a farm and there will be a constant stream of fruit 
trains arriving at the hand-off station at the front of the packhouse. At this point, 
the crop is passed to another team of workers, who are responsible for preparing 
the fruit ready for market.
7.2.2 In the Packhouse
Bananas are harvested green, but as soon as the banana stem is cut from the plant, 
ripening starts, thus the fruit needs to be processed immediately. The processing 
side o f banana farming occurs in the packhouse, which in a somewhat industrial 
way is often referred to as the production area. There are a number o f work 
activities that take place in the packhouse including quality checks, selection and 
trimming, selection and assortment, packing and storage. When the train of 25 
banana stems reaches the weighing station at the receiving area of the packhouse, 
the crop becomes the responsibility o f those workers operating in the packing 
section o f the farm.
The first key activity in the hand-off o f fruit from the field to the packhouse is 
quality inspection. The bananas are weighed, examined and checked against a set 
o f strict criteria, which is driven by the export market. In particular, European 
supermarkets specify standards regarding the size and appearance of the fruit. 
Thus, product uniformity is critical for the producer and there are a series of 
quality checks conducted throughout the packhouse operation. At the receiving 
point, a target sample o f the fruit will be taken and a number o f measurements 
will be made, such as the finger grade21, finger diameter, finger length22, and 
finger curvature, and the uniformity o f the hands o f bananas. In addition, similar 
sized bunches are preferred by supermarkets and further checks are made in 
respect o f the presentation o f the fruit. UK supermarket groups cite the 
appearance and uniformity of bananas as important drivers in the consumer 
purchasing decision-making process (Lawrence 2004, Blythman 2004). 
Therefore, the banana stem is also judged by the number of bruises and 
blemishes, which forms another part o f the quality control process, as one 
supervisor highlighted:
“We want fingers [bananas] that are good or they can’t be for export...
the supermarkets just won’t take them” (Interview FOS@F24, March
2006).
21 Bananas destined for the European market are normally graded as Class 1 or Class 2.
“  European supermarkets specify the minimum requirements o f finger length in their respective 
markets, the minimum length acceptable for premium fruit in the UK is normally 200mm.
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The importance o f ‘getting it right’ for the supermarkets was certainly not 
underestimated by the quality control teams, as one of the quality inspectors 
clearly indicated in the following statement:
“The quality o f our bananas in the market is very important, it affects 
the company here, the benefits of the worker, they [the Supermarkets] 
maintain our salaries” (Interview LOQ@F23, March 2006).
After these various quality checks are completed, the train o f banana stems passes 
through to a holding space, which feeds the next process in the production cycle. 
In turn, each crop o f 25 banana stems is pulled into the first cutting operation in 
the packhouse, where the fruit is separated from the stem into more manageable 
clusters. The fruit is cut into four or five clusters o f bananas, with between 25 to 
35 fingers on each and tossed into a large bath o f running water, which helps 
remove dirt and insects. The gently propelling water also pushes the large 
clusters to the first selection activity in the process, where workers known as 
selectors will lift out a cluster, cut and trim it and create smaller bunches of 
bananas with 6 to 9 fingers. At the same time, the selector will identify and 
discard bruised or smaller fingers, which fail to meet the required specifications.
Bananas that are misshapen, have peel blemishes caused by disease or have under 
or over grade fingers are rejected and set to one side; they are later sold in the 
local market. Groups o f selectors, almost exclusively women, stand on the 
production line, knife in hand ready to scrutinise the crop and create the ‘perfect’ 
bunch o f bananas for the waiting consumer.
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Plate 7.4 A group of selectors trimming bunches of bananas
Source: Photograph taken during fieldwork, Feb-April 2006
This activity could be viewed as quite dangerous work as the knives used have to 
be kept very sharp to ensure quick and decisive cutting of the bunch. The 
companies provide safety equipment for this work, including boots, aprons and 
gloves, but these only repel the water, and offer limited protection against the slip 
of a knife. However, when discussing their work, the women workers claimed 
few accidents occurred, declaring they were good at their work because they were 
very clever with their hands. This work requires great dexterity and as if to prove 
the point, one of the female selectors took off her gloves and proudly stated:
“Look I have no cuts and there are no scars on my hands... 30 years in 
banana packing, I started at 13 years old, mostly on selection... it is 
very skilled, women are best at this work” (Interview COS@F21, 
February 2006).
The perfectly trimmed bunches of bananas are gently dropped into another large 
tank of running water and for approximately 15 minutes will journey towards the 
packing area. During this time, the latex -  a sap that bleeds from the top of the 
bunch after cutting -  will cease to run and hopefully the crown of the bunch seals. 
Stopping the flow of latex is critical, as the sap causes blemishes on the fruit, 
leading to more waste. The farms visited claimed to use only running water for 
this activity, however other research suggests that an astringent, such as
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aluminium sulphate is added to the water to help stop the flow o f the latex, and 
this often causes skin complaints and health difficulties for workers (Harari 
2005a; IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005).
At the end o f the washing cycle, bunches o f bananas are scooped out of the water 
and placed on black flat trays with the crown, the top o f the bunch, facing 
upwards. This is the second stage o f selection, known as the assortment o f the 
fruit. Bunches o f bananas are selected and placed on the tray in a configuration 
required for packing. The weight and number o f fingers on each bunch, as well as 
the number o f bunches placed on each tray are important considerations, as 
sorting the fruit in this way eases the packing operation, with one tray equalling 
one box. This also helps to reduce the number of times the fruit is handled, which 
in turn helps reduce waste, because the delicate nature o f the fruit means that the 
more times it is touched the more blemishes it will have. The crown of the bunch 
is then brushed with an insecticide to help fend off insects and prevent disease 
(crown rot) developing in the fruit during its transit to market. This post-harvest 
chemical treatment is another area o f concern for workers’ wellbeing, and some 
producers have introduced closed spraying chambers for the operation.
Following this activity, a number o f company labels are placed on the bunch, to 
help build brand awareness with consumers. More recently, these labels have 
been developed to communicate producers’ ethical and environmental credentials. 
Each full tray o f bananas is required to more or less equate to a full box, but 
whilst the weight o f the tray is checked, adjustments have to be made to guarantee 
at least 40 lbs o f fruit in each box. One o f the workers described this activity:
“All day I check the weight, when the chamber is a little slow or too 
fast it is sometimes difficult, but each box must weight between 41.7 
and 421bs, so I add or take away spare bananas” (Interview 
ZOP@F31, March 2006).
The trays move along a small conveyor belt to the packing area where the fruit is 
packed in a cardboard box with a plastic liner.
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Plate 7.5 A packer placing bunches of bananas in a box ready for shipping
Source: Photograph taken during fieldwork, Feb-April 2006
Given the speed of the packing process, bunches are positioned as carefully as 
possible to help avoid bruising of the fruit. But the pace o f the packing operation 
is very quick, as one o f the workers engaged in the activity highlighted:
“This is a hard job, we move quickly so there is no delay on the line, 
we must keep up... but I like to keep busy” (Interview JOP@F31, 
March 2006).
The packed boxes pass over yet another weighing scale, a final check before the 
plastic inner sleeve is gathered at the neck, the air sucked out and the top sealed 
with a rubber band to create a vacuum pack. Boxes are then placed on pallets and 
stored in a refrigerated container. A pallet holds 48 boxes and it takes 20 pallets 
to fill a container, thus each container will take up to 960 boxes. The average 
daily production for a banana farm of 2300 ha is two full containers, but the 
quantity of bananas harvested will be greater than this, as the production plan has 
a built-in allowance for quality rejection and waste o f 10-15 percent. Loading the 
stock is also very demanding work, as noted by one of the packers:
“We work very hard, we have to pack and load all that is picked each 
day... we can’t go home until it is all done” (Interview ROL@F24, 
March 2006).
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The container will be transported to the port the following day -  the production 
schedule o f the farm is aligned with the arrival time o f the next boat at the port. 
As the ripening process begins the moment bananas are picked, the prime 
consideration after packing the fruit is to keep it under controlled temperature and 
transport it to its final destination as soon as possible. By the time this delicate 
fruit reaches its destination -  the market -  it will have been handled a dozen times 
by dozens o f local workers employed on large-scale plantations, in typically very 
difficult conditions.
7.3 The Employment Relation
Bananas are the largest single export in Costa Rica and the banana industry 
employs an estimated 34,000 workers directly on farms and a further 60,000 
indirectly, for instance at ports and as service providers (Interview Jorge Sauma, 
Director: CORBANA23, April 2006). Costa Rica has one o f the highest banana 
yields o f producer countries, but it is also a relatively high-cost producer, with 
wage costs being amongst the highest in Latin America (Interview Jorge Sauma, 
Director: CORBANA, April 2006). High wage bills, together with the influence 
of the three key TNCs in terms o f how employment is structured in the sector, has 
led to a degree o f instability for some workers in the country. One o f the reasons 
given for this, is the continual fall in prices paid to producers by the big 
supermarket groups, which has a direct impact on the livelihood and security of 
those employed in the banana sector (Interview Jorge Sauma, Director: 
CORBANA, April 2006).
7.3.1 The Work Contract
Many banana workers experience a lack o f employment stability (Farquhar and 
Smith 2005, Frundt 2005). It seems that work contracts are dependent on a 
number of differing criteria on banana farms in Costa Rica, including the type of 
work and the plantation ownership model; TNC producer or independent grower. 
In addition, the Labour Law in Costa Rica stipulates that there should be a 
probation period o f three months before a worker is entitled to holidays, social
23 CORBANA (Corporacion Bananera Nacional) is the National Banana Corporation set up in 
1971, to promote the banana trade and act as a regulatory body o f Costa Rica’s banana industry 
(CORBANA 2007).
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security benefits and other traditional benefits associated with a work contract. 
Only when this three-month testing period has been successfully passed, can a 
worker be assured o f a work contract. There has been much campaigning by 
trade unions and other activist groups condemning the industry for initiating 
periods o f employment that fall under the ninety days and the perpetual probation 
status it creates for workers (Emaus Forum 2000, COLSIBA 2005, IBCII 2006). 
The so-called rolling three-month contract emerged as an issue in one of the focus 
group discussions, as the following comments highlight:
“It is always three months contracts... short term contracts here” 
(Focus Group LH@FG3, March 2006).
“ [3 months] it’s a trial and probation period for workers... they [the 
companies] do this so there is no permanent job” (Focus Group 
EB@FG3, March 2006).
“The way it is done, live for three months, dismissed, out for one 
month, live again for three months... this means either the worker can 
not join the union or has no permanent state... if  there is more labour 
stability or a record [of employment] the worker can then join a 
union” (Focus Group RH@FG3, March 2006).
However, there were some positive comments from workers on this issue too, as 
one worker explained:
“I am under a permanent contract now, but for only 6 months. I 
worked here for 4 years, but I am happy because the supervisor is a 
really good boss, which is rare” (Interview COHP@F26, March 
2006).
In addition, there was a sense of pride displayed by those workers that were able 
to declare they had a permanent contract, as indicated by the comments o f two 
field workers on one independent farm:
“I get paid by the area covered, but it is a permanent contract” 
(Interview DOC@F23, March 2006, emphasis as stated).
“I signed a contract when I started working, a permanent contract” 
(Interview JOH@F23, March 2006, emphasis as stated).
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However, there has been a tendency for producers to circumnavigate the 
country’s Labour Law, by extending the working day and subcontracting certain 
work activities on plantations (Emaus Forum 2000, COLSIBA 2005, IBCII 2006).
7.3.2 The Working Day
Workers often commented on the working day and would refer to the Labour Law 
of the country, quoting details o f the legislation. Workers would stipulate that the 
law clearly stated that the working day was eight hours long and that this was the 
time usually worked. As one o f the workers in the packing section explained:
“We used to work 10 hours or more, but more regulated hours now... 
they [the auditors] recommended an eight hour day and now it is the 
law” (Interview EOP@F32, March 2006).
An eight-hour working day was part o f the criteria recommended in the SA8000 
Standard, and eight hours was adopted and made the legal guideline for the 
working day in Costa Rica in 2003. Consequently, any time worked over eight 
hours should be classified as overtime. However, some workers suggested that 
hours were extended past the eight-hour threshold and they had little option but to 
comply with the demand to continue working. Such comments were most 
frequently made in the packhouse, where the workers could only go home when 
all the fruit picked that day was boxed, loaded and ready for shipment. As noted 
by a worker involved in the packing operation:
“I start at 6.30am, finish at 5.30pm, for 6 days... we have to pack and 
load all that is picked each day... we can’t go home until it is all 
done... I think it depends on the demand” (Interview ROL@F24, 
March 2006).
A scenario that was confirmed by one of the supervisors working for an 
independent producer:
“On the farm we work very late and have to be at the farm until the 
end o f the process” (Interview LOS@F26, March 2006).
When discussing extended working hours with a representative from one o f the 
TNC producers, his assertion was that all hours in excess o f the normal eight-hour
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working day are agreed, with additional time worked counted and paid as 
overtime:
“If the job takes more than 8 hours, the legislated working day, then 
the rate is different by law... overtime is a special rate... Sundays or 
holidays also, this is double rate” (Interview RC@P6, March 2006).
As was the case in many o f the discussions held with workers and supervisors, 
there would be a distinct difference in the views held by one group of informants 
compared to another.
7.3.3 Subcontracted Labour
There are many tasks in the banana industry that are deemed suitable for being 
outsourced or subcontracted, such as cleaning duties in the packhouse and the 
collection and recycling o f waste (blue polythene bags stripped from the banana 
stem in the packhouse and rejected fruit are just two examples of waste that needs 
to be managed on a plantation). However, as a harvest worker suggested:
“Harvesting is never subcontracted in any farm -  it is the most 
sensitive part o f the operation [banana production]” (Interview 
COHP@F26, March 2006).
Nevertheless, subcontracting does suit some producers as it offers flexibility in 
the production process. It can provide the extra labour needed for producers to 
respond to changing demand or increased supply requirements from customers. 
However, the critics o f producers using ‘contractors’ to carry out numerous duties 
on the plantation, claim that this is yet another way for companies to avoid paying 
minimum wages for workers and the social security contributions to the state. 
Some workers commented on this issue and how the subcontracting process had 
affected them in terms o f their wages being reduced, one worker claimed:
“They [the companies] hire under the minimum wage, subcontract 
and sometimes they don’t pay the social structure [social security 
benefits]” (Focus Group AH@FG3, March 2006).
Other comments included:
“There is no pressure on subcontractors to pay the minimum wage” 
(Focus Group BC@FG3, March 2006).
- 176-
“Subcontractors became a legal entity and then act in their own way” 
(Focus Group RH@FG3, March 2006).
It has been claimed that subcontracting on plantations has caused the deregulation 
o f labour legislation and undermines the system of protection workers are entitled 
to in Costa Rica (Emaus Forum 2000). In these circumstances, labour is 
dependent on lone contractors and a series o f temporary jobs, which can make 
workers more vulnerable in the event of an illness or an accident in their work 
(Emaus Forum 2000). Employment agencies for banana workers are not 
prominent in Costa Rica, but if  there were such agencies workers may be better 
protected, because like other employers, these agencies would be expected to pay 
state contributions towards a worker’s social security benefits. The experience of 
banana workers in Costa Rica is like that o f many other agricultural production 
chains, whereby workers are employed on a casual basis over a long period of 
time (Friedland 2003, Frundt 2005).
7.3.4 Social Conditions on Farms
When talking to the workers about their daily activities, it becomes evident that 
there is a sense o f belonging and dependence on other workers, regardless of 
which section in the production process they operate in. Each group of workers 
appears to be defined by the job they perform and workers identify themselves in 
terms o f the group or team they are part of. However, there is also a sense of 
isolation with the outside world, particularly for those workers who work and live 
on the plantations. As one worker explained, there is a feeling o f being cut off 
from the rest o f society:
“We are out here living away from everyone else, we have one day 
off a week, a Sunday, we could go into the town, go to a park, a bar, 
anywhere, but it is too far to go into town, there is no bus, no 
transport, it is too far to cycle and taxis are too expensive. We have no 
social life, we just sit here [on the farm] with nothing to do” 
(Interview APP@F36, March 2006).
As concluded by Frank (2005a: 87), ‘work on the banana plantations is usually 
poorly paid, insecure and monotonous’. Other commentators suggest that the 
social consequences o f this scenario are manifold; alcoholism, disintegrated
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families, sexual harassment o f women and violence (Emaus Forum 2000). Some 
companies try to create a social atmosphere and organise different events, such as 
football tournaments. However, many young workers living on the plantation, 
with little or no family nearby, still spoke o f a feeling o f isolation and o f being 
locked into the world o f banana farming.
7.4 Conclusion
The production process on plantations can be a classified as having a high degree 
o f work intensification, which is characterised by a high work pace, long and 
flexible hours, with overtime often called at short notice, and significant health 
and safety risks (Nichols 1997, Waddington 1999). The work activities on 
banana plantations are driven by the production process, which results in hard and 
unremitting work for labour. The production operation runs from dawn to dusk, 6 
days a week. However, this does not mean that all workers are expected to work 
long hours. Over the last twenty-five years there has been a number of changes in 
agricultural technologies and practices on banana plantations that have impacted 
the type of work done and the relationship between employer and employee. 
Technological innovation has led to producers introducing cultivation practices 
involving the application o f agro-chemicals, which affect the health and safety of 
workers on plantations. The constant pressure to produce a high yield o f fruit and 
the perfect banana o f uniform size and colour without blemishes, has resulted in 
production practices that can have serious consequences for workers. In this 
regard, the work is dangerous and raises difficult questions about safety, which 
codes of conduct are meant to reconcile.
However, the experience o f talking to workers regarding the application process 
of ago-chemicals on the farm tends to indicate that the use o f pesticides is viewed 
as an accepted part o f the job. The main responsibility for safety appears to be on 
the employee. They either use the equipment or stay out o f the field where they 
are endangered, in the ways described. The situation is somewhat different in the 
packhouse where health and safety requirements appear to be more strictly 
adhered to. The explanation for this could be the fact that supervisors have more 
of a presence compared to the field, where workers claimed they were expected to
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get on with their work and rarely saw a supervisor, or because most chemicals are 
applied during the cultivation process.
In addition, the continual demand for cheaper and cheaper bananas in key markets 
in Europe has placed cost constraints on producers, which they have passed down 
the chain to workers. This has manifested itself in the form of an increase in 
temporary contracts, job instability and in some instances, the avoidance o f social 
welfare payments by producers. The legal loophole o f ‘permanent temporary’ 
contracts (three month rolling) makes these workers vulnerable. Their situation is 
also more precarious than permanent workers because they do not have the same 
guarantees and are unable to affiliate to a union. The employment contract 
underwrites vulnerability and uncertainty -  three month contracts, uncertain 
hours, and difficult social lives -  this is what it is like at the bottom of the chain.
A number o f issues have emerged from the discussion in this chapter, all o f which 
relate to the working conditions faced by labour on banana farms. They can be 
categorised as (i) health and safety (danger and risk o f using agro-chemicals), and 
(ii) job insecurity (variable contracts -  temporary, permanent and subcontracted 
work). These issues will be explored in relation to the role and position of 
voluntary labour codes and standards on plantations in the following chapter.
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Chapter Eight
Labour Codes of Conduct: The Policy and the Practice 
Introduction
As noted in the preceding chapter, there are some key issues faced by workers on 
banana plantations, the most critical being the danger o f handling agro-chemicals 
and the employment instability that comes from working in a globalised industry. 
The chapter explores these issues within the context o f the relevant principles of 
the ETI Base Code and the SA8000 Standard, and inferences are made regarding 
the labour conditions on banana farms in light of these voluntary initiatives. The 
chapter explores the reality o f employment in the banana sector relative to the 
principles noted in both codes, focusing on health and safety, job security, a living 
wage, discrimination, and freedom of association. The chapter also reviews a 
more recently established form of governance in the banana production chain, 
International Framework Agreements (IFAs). The issues associated with working 
on banana farms are complex and the introduction of labour codes o f conduct in 
the sector has been variable (Frundt 2004, Kasteele and Stichele 2005). In an 
agricultural sector like banana farming, the capitalist model o f production 
dominates (Raynolds 1994). The process of capital accumulation continually 
reshapes the industrial landscape; it changes and creates new ways o f doing things 
(Nichols 1997). This is certainly evident in the banana industry where companies 
have sought competitive advantage. Traditionally, this has meant improving 
production yields and cutting costs, usually labour costs. But more recently, it 
has included the development of social responsibility credentials (Nicholls 2005).
The theories o f comparative advantage, drawn from the doctrines o f Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, highlight the need for countries to develop an export trade 
where they have an advantage in the production process (Krugman and Obstfeld 
1997). Banana farming in Latin America largely relies on production economies 
of scale and low labour costs to maintain its comparative advantage in the export
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trade (Myers 2004). For the major banana companies to maintain this competitive 
position with their key customers (chiefly the supermarkets) they must continue to 
keep prices low, which invariably means cutting the cost o f production and 
labour. This raises the question o f whether social responsibility policies, which 
include codes o f conduct, are the most effective means of ensuring acceptable 
labour conditions in global supply chains and/or a realistic form of protection for 
workers’ rights. A number o f questions are prompted by this query, such as: (i) 
where do codes fit in the production process for bananas, (ii) are they a response 
to the needs o f workers, (iii) are workers aware o f the various codes, (iv) does the 
success o f these voluntary initiatives depend on workers’ awareness and 
acceptance, and finally (v) are such voluntary measures valued by workers, in that 
they actually make a difference to the labour conditions on banana plantations. 
One o f the main aims o f the chapter is to wrestle with these questions and attempt 
to determine the permeability and uncertainty that surround these forms of control 
in global supply chains, and to try and identify how codes benefit workers.
To ensure understanding o f the voluntary labour initiatives which are currently 
operating in the banana chain, a summary is provided o f the codes and standards 
subscribed to by both ends o f the global banana supply chain -  supermarkets and 
producers. This is followed by a detailed analysis o f how these are viewed and 
understood by workers; the intended beneficiaries o f voluntary labour regulation. 
Chiefly, the testimony o f workers is the basis o f the discussion in the chapter and 
these accounts are largely organised to show how the principles o f codes operate 
in practice. The intention here is to review the social responsibility commitments 
and level o f compliance to codes by the varying companies engaged in the global 
banana supply chain and to show the difficulties associated with this form of 
labour regulation. By exploring the policy and practice o f codes in this way, a 
better understanding may be gained o f how the major TNCs and independent 
producers involved in banana farming embrace and respond to other social actors 
exerting control in the chain. Also, by following this approach it may be possible 
to show whether the ways producers adopt codes and other labour agreements,
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makes a difference to workers. In this regard, it is hoped the chapter will 
contribute to the developing theory of self-regulation in the globalised market.
8.1 Codes of Conduct
As highlighted in Chapter Four, codes and other standards introduced in global 
supply chains are aimed at both securing and maintaining certain levels of 
environmental and social conditions in the chain. There are a number of 
standards subscribed to by companies engaged in food production, wholesale and 
retail, some o f which are aimed at ensuring food hygiene standards in order to 
comply with EU directives on health and safety, and the requirements of due 
diligence in the chain, such as EurepGAP. EurepGAP is a partnership 
organisation (retailers and agricultural producers) that has developed an agreed 
set o f food quality and safety standards to certify each step in the production 
chain, providing complete traceability from field to the plate (EurepGAP 2006). 
The EurepGAP organisation has gradually extended its geographical reach and 
changed its name to GLOBALGAP in September 2007 (GLOBALGAP 2007). 
Whilst other initiatives have been developed by individual companies as a means 
of presenting a public statement that shows the company is committed to ensuring
")Athe products it sells are made in reasonable working conditions. Often referred 
to as ‘Company Codes o f Conduct’, these initiatives increasingly cover labour 
standards for overseas suppliers (Hale and Shaw 2001). In the UK food retailing 
sector, examples o f such propriety standards include Tesco’s ‘Nature’s Choice’, 
Sainsbury’s ‘Special Select’ and W aitrose’s ‘Responsible Sourcing Code’ 
(Interviews: Retail Technical Manager ST@T2, April 2005; Retail Buyer 
GB@T1, April 2005; Retail Technical Manager DC@T5, June 2005). However, 
codes examined in this research study are not enshrined in law and the companies
'4 This is a term that is rarely defined and like the term ‘acceptable’, which is often used to 
describe working conditions in debates on social responsibility, it has a different meaning and 
interpretation dependent on which group o f social actors in the global supply chain is consulted 
(Hale and Shaw 2001).
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(supermarkets and producers) involved in the global banana supply chain differ in 
their commitment to the various initiatives that are being promoted in the sector.
8.1.1 Supermarket Retailers
Apart from the many propriety standards in the retail sector, many o f the UK 
supermarket groups have insisted their supplier-base comply with more 
established voluntary labour initiatives applicable to global supply chains. 
Chiefly, these are the ETI Base Code and the SA8000 Standard, both of which 
include standards applicable in the production operation o f the supply chain. The 
growing membership o f the Ethical Trade Initiative during the last few years has 
meant that the ETI Base Code has become one o f the key initiatives that 
producers and suppliers to the UK market are obliged to comply with. Three of 
the top four supermarket retailers in the UK are members o f the ETI and as such, 
have committed to ensuring that the Base Code is implemented in all the supply 
chains that they source product from. A summary o f the voluntary initiatives 
committed to by UK supermarkets is detailed below.
Table 8.1 Voluntary initiatives subscribed to by UK supermarkets (as of 30.06.07)
Retailers Codes and Standards
Tesco ■ ETI Base Code
• SEDEX* -  labour standards governance system
ASDA ■ ETI Base Code
■ SEDEX
Sainsbury’s ■ ETI Base Code
■ SEDEX
Morrison - SEDEX
Waitrose • SEDEX
The Co-operative Group ■ ETI Base Code
■ SEDEX
N o tes: * SED EX is a supplier ethical data exchange web-based system  that enablers producers to 
maintain data on labour standards at their production sites, which is then made available to 
trading partners, i.e. retailers (SED EX 2005). The ch ief aim o f  the system  is to make it easier 
for producers to share information on labour standards with their customers (retailers and 
w holesalers) (SE D E X  2005).
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Source: Supermarket Company Annual Reports 2006, Retailer Interviews 2006, SEDEX 2007 
Largely, the major supermarket groups in the UK have made similar
commitments to voluntary initiatives regarding labour conditions in global supply
chains. The key anomaly is the supermarket group Morrisons, which has shown
little interest in becoming a member of the ETI and which, like Somerfield Stores
Ltd., a member o f the ETI until last year, has stated a preference to abide by in-
house ethical standards (Mathiason 2006; Interview ETI Representative
DD@OG2, June 2006). Somerfield is the fifth-biggest supermarket group in the
UK, and was a founding ETI member, but it made the announcement not to renew
its ETI membership in May 2006. Whilst stating a commitment to incorporate the
accepted codes o f practice across their business, the retailer also stated matters of
ethical trade were best managed in-house (Mathiason 2006). Waitrose, one o f the
smaller supermarket groups and part o f the John Lewis Partnership, has also
displayed misgivings over the introduction of additional external standards o f this
nature. After much deliberation, Waitrose decided not to join the ETI, based on
the reasoning that ‘responsible sourcing’ was an inherent part of the
organisation’s constitution; the ‘ethical philosophy’ which guided the Partnership
(Interview Retail CSR Executive, April 2005). In this respect, the ETI Base Code
was viewed as “simply a duplication o f what is already being done in the
business”, but in recognition o f the advantages of sharing knowledge of labour
standards in the supply chains o f their suppliers/producers, Waitrose became a
founding member o f SEDEX (Interview Retail CSR Executive, April 2005).
8.1.2 Banana Producers
As regards producers, one o f their greatest priorities in the past has been quality 
and due diligence, resulting in the introduction o f EurepGAP and ISO standards 
in their supply chains. Due to the pressure of civil society groups, and possibly 
more influential, the demands o f their customers (supermarkets/wholesalers), 
producers have also embraced labour initiatives such as the ETI Base Code and 
the SA8000 Standard over the last few years (Interviews: Producer CSR Manager 
RC@P2, February 2006; Producer Technical Manager RT@P1, March 2006;
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Producer Area Manager DG@P5, March 2006). A summary o f the voluntary 
initiatives committed to by the major banana producers is detailed overleaf.
Table 8.2 Voluntary initiatives subscribed to by producers (as of 30.06.07)
Producers Codes and Standards
Chiquita ■ SA8000 -  on company owned farms/working towards 
implementation on suppliers farms
■ Rainforest Alliance -  environmental and social standards on 
company owned farms
■ ETI Base Code -  on company owned farms/working towards 
implementation on suppliers farms
■ SEDEX
Dole ■ SA8000 -  on company owned farms/working towards 
implementation on suppliers farms
■ ISO-14001
Del Monte ■ SA8000 -  on company owned farms
■ ISO-14001
■ ETI Base Code -  working towards implementation on 
company owned farms
Fyffes ■ SA8000 -  support suppliers with compliance
■ ETI Base Code -  supports suppliers with compliance
Source: Producer Company Annual Reports 2006, Producer Interviews 2006, ETI 2007
In the case o f Chiquita, the adoption o f the above voluntary initiatives followed 
the company’s own organisational change in relation to its business operations. 
After the announcement o f a major restructuring effort in 2001, Chiquita was 
facing a difficult trading time, but the company remained committed to the policy 
outlined in its first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) report published in 
2000 (Chiquita 2001a). In 2000, the company developed a Code of Conduct 
based on the Core Values o f the organisation and included a commitment to abide 
by the ILO core conventions (Chiquita 2000, Chiquita 2001a). The Core Values 
programme highlights four key values: Integrity, Respect, Opportunity and 
Responsibility (Chiquita 2002). The company code also included the labour 
standards o f SA8000 and commitments to environmental practices, food safety 
standards and ethical compliance (Chiquita 2001a, Chiquita 2002). Chiquita
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became a member o f the ETI in April 2001, and a few months later, signed a 
historical agreement on labour and trade union rights for banana workers 
(Chiquita 2001b). The International Framework Agreement (IFA) was described 
as ‘a groundbreaking partnership’ based on the fact it incorporated freedom of 
association, minimum labour standards and employment standards for workers in 
Chiquita’s Latin American operations (Chiquita 2001b: 2). Further attempts at 
improving working conditions followed in 2002, with the initiation of 
arrangements to achieve SA8000 accreditation on all Chiquita owned and 
managed plantations (Chiquita 2002). There was a distinct shift in Chiquita’s 
position on the issues o f environmental and social responsibility during this time, 
for which a number of reasons have been cited, including the haemorrhaging of 
sales and loss of market prominence during the US-EU banana wars o f the 1990s, 
the narrow miss o f bankruptcy in 2000, and the determination of the organisation 
to demonstrate it had changed both politically and commercially. To a large 
extent the introduction o f a socially responsible programme by Chiquita was part 
of a wider reinvention o f the company (Interview George Jaksch, CSR Director: 
Chiquita, February 2005).
Since 1999, Dole has been represented on the board of Social Accountability 
International (SAI), the body responsible for developing the SA8000 Standard 
(Conversation Sylvain Cuperlier, CSR Director: Dole, April 2005). In 2000, a 
then owned Dole subsidiary production unit in Spain became the world’s first 
agricultural centre to be SA8000 certified, and in 2001 a plantation in the 
Philippines became the first banana division to achieve SA8000 certification. 
One o f the ways in which Dole demonstrates its commitment to social 
responsibility is through its membership and advisory board role at SAI 
(Conversation Sylvain Cuperlier, CSR Director: Dole, April 2005). In 2005, all 
of Dole’s company owned banana farms located in Costa Rica were certified to 
the SA8000 Standard (Dole 2005b).
In order to comply with labour standards in their production operation, Del Monte 
has introduced the SA8000 Standard and its own Code of Conduct and Labour
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Policy, which draws on the human rights detailed in the ILO core conventions. 
As a member o f the ETI, Del Monte also abides by the principles o f the ETI Base 
Code in their operations (Interview Producer Compliance Manager, March 2006). 
The Fyffes Group also has a Code of Best Practice that ensures safe working 
practices and the fair treatment of workers in compliance with internationally 
accepted labour standards, which the wholesaler’s suppliers are required to abide 
by (Fyffes 2006). Like other banana producers Fyffes is a member of the ETI, but 
as the group does not own or manage plantations, it can only guide and assist its 
supply base to comply with the ETI Base Code (Interview Producer Technical 
Manager, March 2006).
There is also a mixture o f labour, environmental and quality standards in the 
global banana supply chain. Some standards, like the Rainforest Alliance (RA) 
certification programme began life as an environmental standard, but at the behest 
of producers has been extended to incorporate labour standards (Interviews: 
Oliver Bach, Audit Manager: RA, March 2006; Producer Technical Manager, 
March 2006). It has been suggested that some standards, such as those developed 
by the ISO, are simply used as a defence of good management practice when 
companies are scrutinised on their ethical credentials (IBCII Forum Discussion, 
April 2005). Certainly, the question o f how producers substantiate their claims of 
social responsibility in their supply chain operations is very much linked with the 
company’s image in the marketplace. One of the marketing tools that has been 
employed to achieve this is the introduction of ethical labels attached to the fruit. 
Over the past few years, these labels have become a means o f assuring consumers 
that the bananas displayed in their local supermarket are produced in a fair and 
equitable manner. There has been a proliferation o f labelling schemes in the 
industry o f late, but the more prominent and well known, are those certified by 
the Rainforest Alliance and Fairtrade Foundation. Both organisations are external 
and independent bodies that manage an approval process, whereby each farm on a 
banana plantation is regularly audited against a comprehensive set o f criteria 
(Interview Oliver Bach, Audit Manager: RA, March 2006). However, there are
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some distinct differences between the certification and approval criteria o f each 
body.
In response to the problems associated with agricultural expansion, such as 
contaminated waterways and soil erosion, a coalition o f independent and non­
profit groups developed the Rainforest Alliance Certification Program (RACP) in 
Latin America in the early 1990s (RA 2006a, SAN 2005). The mission of the 
coalition was to protect the remaining forests in the tropics and help farmers 
develop environmentally sustainable practices (SAN 2005). The key focus of the 
programme was environmental standards; water and ecosystem conversation, 
integrated crop, soil and pest management and wildlife protection, but the social 
standard for fair treatment o f workers was also included (Interview Oliver Bach, 
Audit Manager: RA, March 2006). The certification programme was introduced 
in the banana sector in 1992, when Chiquita approached the Rainforest Alliance 
to ask for help on the company’s environmental programme, the outcome of 
which was the development of an environmental certification scheme called the 
‘Better Banana Project’ (Interview George Jaksch, CSR Director: Chiquita, 
February 2005). As part o f this scheme, the label ECO-OK was developed to be 
displayed on the fruit, but the very name tended to indicate more environmentally 
friendly than ethical bananas (Soluri 2003). Labelling systems introduced more 
recently attempt to present both aspects of responsible banana production. The 
Rainforest Alliance and the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) which 
manage the certification programme, provide independent auditors equipped with 
a set of concrete measures by which the environmental and social conditions on 
farms can be evaluated against the standards (Interview Oliver Bach, Audit 
Manager: RA, March 2006). Those farms that pass the ‘comprehensive 
evaluation’ process are awarded the Rainforest Alliance Certified Seal o f  
Approval (RA 2006a: 1). The seal, according to both producers and the certifying 
body is a highly ‘prestigious badge’ in the marketplace (Interviews: George 
Jaksch, CSR Director: Chiquita, February 2005; Oliver Bach, Audit Manager: 
RA, March 2006).
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In comparison to codes and certification, the Fairtrade approval scheme is more of 
an alternative route for banana producers to market their fruit and there are 
significant differences in the heritage and ethos of the label. The term ‘fairtrade’ 
became the known name for the partnership between mainly small producers in 
developing countries and buyers (in the North), who were committed to a 
sustainable development process and helping small growers gain market access 
(Barratt Brown 1993, Beek 1998a). The Fairtrade Foundation Mark in the UK 
and its priority o f a stable and just price for producers can be traced back to the 
origins o f the Max Havelaar label -  the fairtrade movement’s first trademark 
created in 1988 by Solidaridad, a Dutch church-linked organisation (Barratt 
Brown 1993, Beek 1998b). The Max Havelaar fairtrade label was introduced to 
the mainstream consumer market, starting with coffee, followed by cocoa, tea, 
honey and bananas (Beek 1998b). The Fairtrade Foundation (FF) seeks to 
organise small farmers into cooperatives in order to agree guaranteed minimum 
prices for a fixed period o f time (FF 2005a). The FF label is designed to give 
assurances to consumers that smaller growers, who are often viewed as 
disadvantaged by the market exchange process, fluctuating prices and the buying 
power o f the supermarket groups in particular, receive a fair price for their 
produce (Nicholls and Opal 2005, Blythman 2004). In this sense, Nicholls (2005) 
argues that fairtrade represents a market-driven response to trade inequalities, by 
reconnecting producer and consumer interests and positioning ethical trade as a 
premium brand value for many consumers. The Fairtrade label assures 
consumers that the product has been produced under certain criteria; including 
transparent and long-term trading relationships -  cooperation not competition -  
agreed minimum prices to cover the cost of production, environmentally 
responsible production, and a social premium for development in the local 
community (Barratt Brown 1993, Nicholls and Opal 2005). Fairtrade certified 
bananas were introduced in the UK in 2000, with most supplies coming from the 
Windward Islands (FF 2005b). However, the Fairtrade certification process is 
more focused on how products are traded in the marketplace (Russell 2007) and
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less concerned with ensuring better working conditions in the banana chain 
(IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005).
There are different procedures in place for label approval schemes, the 
certification and auditing o f standards, and the monitoring of codes, yet there are 
similar elements in all three systems. The SAN standards (incorporated in the 
RACP) include a range of worker rights; the right to organise, the right to a safe 
and clean working environment, the right to be paid at least the minimum wage, 
and access to medical care for workers and their families (SAN 2005). All o f 
these correspond to the principle elements of the ETI Base Code and, in part, 
align with the SA8000 Standard. The table below highlights some of the 
corresponding elements in the labour and environmental aspects of all three 
approaches to regulating corporate behaviour in the banana production chain.
Table 8.3 Comparison of certification, labelling schemes and codes of conduct
Rainforest Alliance Fairtrade Mark SA8000 Standard ETI Base Code
The right to 
organise
Freedom of 
association
Freedom of 
association
The right to a safe 
and clean 
environment
The company shall 
provide a safe and 
healthy working 
environment
Working conditions 
are safe and 
hygienic
The right to be paid 
at least the 
minimum wage
Guaranteed fair and 
stable price for 
farmers
Wages for a 
standard week shall 
always meet at least 
the legal or industry 
minimum
Living wages are 
paid
Source: SAN 2005, FF 2005a, SAI 2001, ETI 2005a
These systems differ in terms o f auditing and monitoring procedures. For 
instance, for a banana farm to be SA8000 certified there is a process of detailed 
checks made to establish whether a farm will meet the criteria stipulated in the 
standard. This is followed by a system of periodic audits to ensure on-going 
compliance. In essence, the Rainforest Alliance programme and the SA8000
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Standard are both about certifying farms, whereas the Fairtrade Mark is about a 
certified brand. By comparison, there is no formal certification or audit process 
for the ETI Base Code. Those producers committed to the principles of the code 
are expected to self-audit and the monitoring process is left to other ETI 
members: unions, NGOs and retailers, to check the code is being adhered to 
(Conversation Fairtrade Representative BM@CG1, April 2005; Interview ETI 
Representative DD@OG2, June 2006). Thus, it is understandable that there is 
some confusion as regards what certification and branded labels mean for workers 
in the banana sector and how they differ from other voluntary labour initiatives. 
Indeed, it was not altogether surprising when discussions with workers turned to 
the role and importance o f codes of conduct that all o f the various schemes 
seemed to merge into one for them. This situation appeared to be quite familiar to 
one farm supervisor, as indicated by this comment:
“There are lots o f different standards across all the farms, we try and 
standardise them for each area... this makes it easier for everyone to 
understand, but it is difficult to explain all the differences... they look 
the same to me too” (Interview BS@F21, February 2006).
One of the key concerns for many involved in the process of managing 
compliance to the various systems was the duplication o f effort required. A 
representative o f one o f the major banana TNCs suggested that the costs involved 
in administering all the different systems aimed at improving labour conditions, 
would in fact be best given directly to the worker, as this would “truly serve the 
interests of workers” (Interview Producer Executive DG@P5, March 2006).
8.1.3 International Labour Standards
As noted earlier, the ETI Base Code and the SA8000 Standard draw on a number 
of the ILO core conventions, chiefly Nos. 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182 
(Herbert 2005). However, these and additional conventions applicable to banana 
workers, such as (i) holidays without pay (convention 101), (ii) social security 
(minimum standards) (convention 102), and (iii) labour inspection and rural 
workers organisations (convention 129) have also been voluntarily ratified by
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Costa Rica (ILOLEX 2007). However, there are two conventions pertinent to 
social auditing that have thus far not been ratified in Costa Rica, which relate to 
plantations (convention 110) and occupational health and safety (convention 155) 
(Herbert 2005, ILOLEX 2007). In part, this may be due to the fact many 
workers’ rights are enshrined in the country’s Constitution and Labour Law or 
perhaps because the human rights abuses experienced in neighbouring Latin 
American countries, such as forced labour and child labour are less of a problem 
in Costa Rica (Human Rights Watch 2002).
8.2 Codes, Standards...W hat are they?
It was important during this study to ascertain whether the workers employed on 
banana farms in Costa Rica were aware of labour codes and standards, and if so, 
to determine how the codes impacted their working conditions. After all, the 
process o f informing employees of their rights also helps to place greater 
emphasis on the enforcement process (Jenkins et al. 2002). During the process of 
speaking to a number o f respondents regarding the communication o f codes, there 
was a noticeable reticence and unwillingness to answer direct questions relating to 
the matter. Also at times, there was a perceptible level o f anxiety displayed by 
respondents who did not wish to show a lack of knowledge or understanding of 
the codes or standards. As indicated by the comments detailed below, the first by 
a worker deployed in the field:
“We probably have been told about the codes... they [the companies] 
are always telling us about these things” (Interview COS@F21, 
February 2006).
And the second by a worker in the packhouse:
“We are always being told about the company values, our rights, and 
the audits” (Interview ROP@F22, February 2006).
Both respondents worked on adjacent farms operated by Chiquita and at each 
location the supervisory staff went to great lengths to explain the process of 
communication for workers regarding the codes and standards that had been
- 192-
introduced on the plantation. As illustrated by the comments of a supervisor 
overseeing the packing operation at the first farm:
“There is a full induction and training when people join... the codes 
and the company values are explained... and then the workers have to 
sign, to show they have been trained” (Interview BS@F21, February 
2006).
At that moment, the induction and training records of employees were presented 
by the supervisor for inspection, as if to offer proof of his statement. The 
response from other supervisors was much the same, including these additional 
comments by a supervisor working on the second farm:
“The codes and ILO conventions we tell workers about regularly... we 
talk about them on induction... [we] talk about the standards and the 
CSR programme” (Interview PS@F22, February 2006).
The only difference between the two farms was that the first was rented and 
managed by the producer, whilst the second was owned. Following a further farm 
visit the next day it became clear that a consistent story was emerging regarding 
the communication o f codes and standards by this TNC producer. The comments 
of a worker deployed in the field offer evidence of the great efforts being made to 
inform workers o f the labour codes applicable to them:
“We receive so many speeches... on codes... on values... I’m sure we 
have been told about them” (Interview AOB@F22, February 2006).
Such sentiments were echoed on farms operated by one of the other major TNC 
producers, as indicated by the following comments made by workers:
“I attended the lecture... I have been told about EurepGAP and 
SA8000, signed and referenced... and audits in farm, [I have] seen 
auditors on the farm... all training is recorded” (Interview KOP@F35, 
March 2006).
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codes are very important here... especially the SA8000, because 
Europe [the market] is very important to farms here” (Interview 
MOLP@F35, March 2006).
However, on a farm operated by a large independent producer, who supplied 
bananas to the UK market, the response to the same set o f questions regarding 
communication and knowledge of codes was less convincing, as illustrated by the 
comments o f a worker in the field:
“There is no information about the codes or who the customers 
[supermarkets] are... we are in the dark here. The companies tell us 
nothing... it is the way they like it” (Interview DOC@F24, March 
2006).
This is an indication perhaps that there were some differences regarding the 
communication o f codes from TNC operated farms to their associated growers; 
the secondary source o f supply for TNCs. Although some variation may be 
expected due to the relative size of the organisation -  large TNCs vs. smaller 
independent producers, the fact that the major TNCs are committed to sourcing 
product from growers who abide by the same codes makes this omission an 
important concern for those monitoring compliance. This may be why a 
supervisor on the same farm was quick to confirm “we have all the criteria for the 
codes, the ETI and the SA8000” (Interview RS@F23, March 2006), yet he was 
still unable to describe the process for informing workers o f their rights covered 
by the codes, which were required to be in place on the plantation.
During discussions regarding what the codes meant for workers and their views 
on such labour initiatives in the banana chain, it was suggested that codes had 
become synonymous with quality standards and demands for perfect fruit from 
the supermarkets. As noted by a worker employed in a packhouse on one farm:
“We get told about the codes, told on induction, but also in training... 
and the standards we have to make; the bruising o f the fruit is bad, 
and it [the fruit] must be high quality because the UK won’t take it 
otherwise” (Interview ROP@F22, February 2006).
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The implication is that the most important standards on the farm are those 
associated with quality. The importance of quality was reiterated by a supervisor 
on the same farm, who stated:
“The ETI [code] is very similar to the SA8000 [standard]... but what 
is needed depends on the label, the supermarket. They have the last 
say” (Interview MS@F22, February 2006).
To some extent this raises a further concern as regards what awareness o f codes 
and standards actually means for workers on a banana plantation. Knowledge of 
such labour initiatives does not necessarily mean the worker has some form of 
insurance policy or mechanism by which to call ‘foul’ when codes are not being 
complied with. This is one o f the chief criticisms made by trade unions and 
NGOs, and one of the key reservations voiced by social activist groups when 
codes were first introduced (Hale and Shaw 2001, Auret and Barrientos 2006).
8.3 The Realities of Employment
There were several key areas of focus during the investigation, which included (i) 
safe and hygienic working conditions, (ii) employment freely chosen, (iii) 
payment o f a living wage, (iv) absence o f discrimination, and (v) freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining. The following testimony is 
presented within the context o f the relative principles of the ETI Base Code and 
the criteria stipulated in the SA8000 Standard.
8.3.1 Safe and Hygienic Working Conditions
A safe and healthy environment to work in was one o f the first topics of debate 
raised with respondents in relation to an understanding o f how voluntary labour 
initiatives impacted their lives and work on banana plantations. There was much 
discussion regarding the application process of agro-chemicals and pesticides, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, but there were also other risks that concerned 
workers; the danger o f accident and injury. This was particularly worrisome for 
those operating in the field, as noted by a worker responsible for harvesting the 
fruit:
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“Accidents do tend to happen in harvesting and pruning and we are a 
long way from the packhouse... if  there is an accident we have to look 
for the supervisor, he has the first aid box” (Interview AOB@F22, 
February 2006).
The provision o f equipment and medical services was confirmed by one of the 
quality controllers:
“Safety equipment is provided - gloves, boots and aprons and every 
Friday after 12.00, the doctor comes and you can have a consultation, 
the family too, and the medicines are provided” (Interview 
LOQ@F23, March 2006).
There were many similar comments, particularly with regard to the provision of 
equipment and weekly medical visit. Yet it was clear there were more concerns 
regarding accidents in the field due to the great distances from the packhouse 
where more extensive medical help was at hand. This adds to the already 
precarious nature o f work in the field -  the handling and application process of 
agro-chemicals -  discussed in the previous chapter. However, one of the ways to 
alleviate such dangers for workers would be to change the composition of the 
industry (Nichols 1997). Plantation production in Latin America could imitate 
the methods employed by small growers in the Caribbean, such as organic banana 
farming where the use o f agro-chemicals is far more limited. In some ways, it is 
the drive o f the major TNC producers to create the perfectly presented high- 
yielding banana coupled with the price pressures from supermarkets that make 
workers vulnerable to injury. These are pressures of production that companies 
often perpetuate in the name of competitiveness, but which can equally be viewed 
as putting profit before safety (Nichols 1997).
8.3.2 Employment is freely Chosen
The right to freely choose employment or no forced labour as is stipulated in the 
SA8000 Standard. There seemed little concern over this principle, certainly there 
was little evidence to suggest workers were forced or compelled to work in any 
given job or on a particular farm. The concentration and the number of farms in
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the locale appeared to offer the opportunity to change employment, as noted by a 
respondent working in the packhouse on a TNC operated farm:
“I move around from one farm to the next, its good to change... my 
brother works here and I like it better for now” (Interview FOP@F31, 
March 2006).
A respondent who works in the field on a farm managed by another TNC 
producer confirmed this almost transient situation:
“I work here for a season, I go home and then come back again... 
sometimes to this farm, maybe another, there is always work for me” 
(Interview GOH@F21, February 2006).
It was suggested that the above behaviour was quite typical, particularly when the 
worker is a migrant. Migrant labour, notably Nicaraguans, go home for a couple 
of months to spend time with their family and then return to work for nine or ten 
months, a situation that is repeated over the years (Interview Producer CSR 
Manager RC@P2, February 2006). This seems to be accepted practice, but it also 
demonstrates the temporary nature of work on banana plantations, and the 
potential problem for migrant workers who lack the necessary papers to legally 
work in the country. There was a sense that migrant workers suited the 
companies, which could have been due to their concerns over production costs. 
Certainly, the unpredictability o f market demand is somewhat smoothed by 
employing a more temporary workforce. It was also suggested that migrants were 
cheaper to employ, particularly when they lacked the necessary work papers. 
(Interview Union Local Secretary CS@S2, March 2006). Migrants lacking 
official recognition in Costa Rica are referred to as indocumentados, or 
undocumented aliens (Wiley 1995). Without the proper documentation, migrant 
workers are not entitled to claim state welfare benefits and thus, companies are 
not obliged to make social security contributions on their behalf (Interview Union 
Local Secretary CS@S2, March 2006).
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However, many respondents seemed genuinely happy with the nature of their 
work, as suggested by these workers operating in the field on a farm owned by an 
independent producer:
“Here, we can express our feelings to the boss, communication is 
good... we can work in peace... other farms are like the devil, pushing 
you and pushing” (Interview ROC@F26, March 2006).
“Compared to all the big farms this is much better, it is small, 
everyone works together. The administration is more relaxed and the 
workers are allowed to do things themselves” (Interview 
COHP@F26, March 2006).
The above independent producer was contracted to supply Fairtrade bananas to 
one of the smaller UK supermarket groups. However, such sentiments were not 
limited just to this farm, as illustrated by the comments o f a worker operating in a 
packhouse o f a unit managed by one of the major TNCs. The respondent listed 
three reasons why he liked working on this particular farm:
“I live close by, I have a good relationship with other workers and I 
like the work... there is a much closer working relationship [here]... it 
is friendlier... the administration, they are closer and you can talk 
freely” (Interview DOP@F31, March 2006).
However, there are some indications that certain issues do exist regarding the 
principle of freedom of employment. Firstly, workers may be free to move from 
plantation to plantation, but there are still employment constraints such as 
education, experience (agricultural workers have a certain skill set which is not 
always transferable to other labour markets), and nationality status (a particular 
problem for migrant labour and the Nicaraguan harvesting teams). Secondly, 
workers are not free to move from farm to farm when they are legally bonded in 
some way to their employers. On some farms, housing is provided with the job, 
and the security of the home for workers and their families is dependent on 
keeping the job. Thirdly, there are economic constraints which can prevent 
workers ending their employment or accepting a job on another farm. Each
- 198-
producer has their own wage structure and some pay higher rates than others. 
Costa Rica has a minimum wage for agricultural workers, but on those farms 
visited pay rates were always higher than the minimum wage. They also varied 
due to the different piece-rate systems for quality and productivity bonuses. 
Fourthly, workers may have financial and social obligations that limit their ability 
to move from place to place, an example of which is the constraint of repaying 
loans acquired through the solidarism system. Loans that are issued from a 
solidarista association on one plantation are seemingly not transferable to 
associations on other plantations. Thus, in reality there are only degrees of 
freedom, dependent on the existing terms of employment, the economic situation, 
the labour market (alternative/different work opportunities), and the mobility of 
the worker.
8.3.3 Payment o f  a Living Wage
The terminology for wages differs a little between the ETI Base Code and 
SA8000 Standard. For the former, the stipulation is that ‘living wages are paid’ 
and for the latter that ‘compensation/wages at the legal and industry norm’ are 
paid. The subject o f wages is often a contentious one and as such, questions 
regarding the topic can be difficult to phrase. Some workers were quite candid 
regarding the matter o f their wages and the hours worked to earn them, others less 
so. Also, this proved a difficult subject to broach with supervisors and farm 
managers, who would not be drawn on the subject and would only state that the 
legal minimum wage was always paid, and that anyway many workers made more 
than this each day. Some workers confirmed this to be the case, as noted by the 
comments below:
“The relationships between workers here is good, also the salary is 
much better... about 75% this year are getting bonuses, approximately 
8 -10% more than they [the harvest team] would be getting normally” 
(Interview ROQ@F32, March 2006).
“There are no problems with the social conditions here, salaries are 
regulated more or less... we can check our wages every day to make
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sure they are right. The wages are put up on the [notice] board, so 
everyone can see” (Interview JOPP@F25, March 2006).
Also it seems when there is little work on the plantation, workers still have some 
guarantee o f a wage, as noted by a packhouse worker:
“There are days when there is no w ork... it just depends on the orders, 
but they [the companies] still have to pay us for the day. But it is just 
the minimum [daily] wage and that is less than normal... it is not 
enough” (Interview LOS@F31, March 2006).
All o f the above workers were employed on farms managed by major TNC 
producers. In Costa Rica, minimum wages are set by law and those applicable on 
banana plantations include one established for non-qualified workers and another 
for semi-qualified agricultural workers. At the time of the research, the minimum 
wage for semi-qualified agricultural workers was 4,452 colones a working day, 
(defined as eight hours), which is equivalent to approximately 9 US dollars. 
However, in discussions conducted off-site of the plantation, more critical 
comments were made by respondents regarding the remuneration process adopted 
by the companies. For instance, a harvest worker who was employed on one of 
the independent farms which supplied two of the major TNCs claimed:
“In this district they [the companies] have a monopoly and do 
whatever they want, they don’t pay the end of the year, the thirteenth 
salary for the social benefit so we don’t receive this and it is part of 
our legal entitlement... then we don’t have our social protection... also 
we don’t get holidays paid for and [they] don’t pay dismissal pay or 
minimum wage” (Focus Group LOH@FG23, March 2006).
In exploring this topic a little further, it appeared that the problems experienced 
by this particular group o f workers started in 2002, when the latest round of price 
cutting spearheaded by Wal-Mart and its subsidiary ASDA in the UK, led to the 
plummeting of the retail price o f bananas. The exclusive supply deal made by 
Wal-Mart with Del Monte was cited as the problem, as this arrangement had 
resulted in a steep drop in the price o f a case of bananas. It was claimed that the 
only way this reduced price could be met, was for workers to be fired and rehired
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on seasonal contracts. However, the new contract would invariably run for just 
48 weeks and then a worker would be laid off, on the basis that there was no more 
work to do. This meant that the final salary payment of the year could not be paid 
and under the provision of the country’s labour law, a worker would therefore no 
longer be entitled to any of the usual welfare benefits. After only a few weeks, 
when work was suddenly available again, workers would be employed on the 
same seasonal contract. It was claimed that this was a way for companies to 
reduce their costs, because they didn’t have to pay social security contributions to 
the state on behalf o f the worker. It was also suggested that this process was now 
well established and there seemed to be no way of escaping the cycle of working 
for 48 weeks, only to lose the very benefits workers were entitled to under the 
country’s Labour Code.
Criticisms were also raised regarding the minimum wage. Some claimed they 
were paid the wage rate for non-qualified work, rather than at the higher and more 
appropriate rate for semi-agricultural workers. Two croppers also complained 
about the way their salaries were structured. Most work on plantations is 
piecework and croppers are paid by the number of hectares they tend. The 
problem revolved around one o f the planting areas being recently reclassified with 
the subsequent reduction in the number of hectares being attributed to the 
croppers. In the cropper’s view, the planting area was the same, but the 
reclassification of the area resulted in them being paid less. They could only 
conclude that incorrect measurements had been used, but now they would either 
have to tend an additional area to maintain the same salary or earn less. Many 
workers stated their salaries had fallen over the last decade, with the situation 
getting very much worse over the last few years. However, the remuneration 
structure for the majority o f banana workers is not only based on individual 
piecework. For harvesters and those employed in the packhouse, a team-based 
system is in operation. In this regard, payments are based on quality and output -  
the amount o f fruit that is picked to meet certain criteria -  as described by a 
worker responsible for checking the fruit on arrival at a packhouse:
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“The quality of the fruit picked determines the percentage o f pay... 
there are three grades 100 to 95 -  green, 94 to 90 -  blue and below 90 
-  red... if  there are many below red then the supervisor has to speak to 
the harvest team... this is not good” (Interview ROQ@F24, March 
2006)
It is only when the team pulls together that the individual workers complete the 
work, and finish on time, or earn a bonus payment. As one worker who is 
employed on another farm stated:
“ ...working hours are 6am to 2 or 3pm... but sometimes not all the 
workers are hard workers and the lazy people hold back the rate and 
then we all have to stay later... some are not as fast, but they pack the 
same amount o f fruit, so the same salary, this is not always fair... I 
check the quality of the fruit as I pack and I am still faster” (Interview 
JOPP@F22, March 2006).
A number o f issues were raised by workers regarding salary structure and the 
temporary nature o f the employment contracts, but surprisingly, no one talked 
about these problems in terms of collective agreements or indeed the lack of such 
agreements. Potentially this is due to lack of union presence in the banana sector 
in Costa Rica and the lack o f union members on farms. Interestingly, most 
banana workers always referred to the country’s Constitution and the Labour Law 
as their protection; the expectation being that the state would take care of workers 
rights.
8.3.4 Absence o f Discrimination
No discrimination is practised and remuneration is equal regardless of occupation, 
sex and age. The work on a plantation is divided between the field and the 
packhouse, and there was a definite gender split between the two. Indeed, there 
was only one woman observed working in the field on the twelve farms visited. 
But there was no indication this was due to women being inherently discriminated 
against. There appeared to be little evidence of sexual discrimination, and if there 
were any such incidences they were quickly dealt with, as suggested by a female 
worker in the packhouse on a farm owned by a TNC producer:
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“One woman here complained about a supervisor [male]... she 
reported him to the m anager... but he has gone now, but I don’t know 
where” (Interview AOS@F31, March 2006).
However, it could be argued that the way work activities are constructed on the 
farm (between the field and the packhouse) helps to create a divide in terms o f the 
jobs that men and women do. This may not be covert discrimination on the part 
of the company, but rather a situation where the work itself requires certain skill 
sets and therefore suits men and women differently. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the work in the field is very physical and requires great strength to pick 
and haul the fruit to the packhouse, which men seem best able to do. Whilst in 
the packhouse, trimming the fruit requires a delicate touch, which seems to suit 
women better. However, there did seem to be some discrimination as far as age 
was concerned, many respondents complained that over a certain age they could 
no longer find work on farms, the comment below is indicative of many. The 
respondent worked on a small independent farm and claimed:
“Banana companies don’t hire anyone over 45 years old, the older 
workers they have to work for sub-contractors, or on the small farms” 
(Interview BOC@FG23, March 2006).
But it is not only older workers who are discriminated against in this way, it 
appears that non-Costa Rican workers were also limited to ‘contracted’ work or 
casual work. The majority o f migrant workers on banana plantations are 
Nicaraguan (Nicas), who tend to be employed at lower rates than the legal 
minimum wage and in the worst positions, according to a local union 
representative. Mostly, these economic migrants work in the field and there is a 
clear distinction between them and the Costa Rican (Tico) workers. As discussed 
in Chapter Six, there is a long history o f disagreement between Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica, and the discrimination faced by Nicas is rife in Costa Rican society. 
They are accused o f all the ills that have befallen Costa Rica during the last 
decade and many Ticos are ashamed to be in contact with them, as they are 
considered to be second class citizens (Trejos 2000, Sandbrook et al. 2007). The
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Ticos construct their identity around the paleness o f their skin, and from this 
perspective are critical o f their dark-skinned neighbours, ‘No seas N ica’ (don’t be 
an idiot) is a common insult in Costa Rica (Bail 2007). The degree o f discomfort 
between the two groups was often evident on farms visited, which was possibly 
due to their different culture and even the different way they spoke Spanish. It is 
difficult to see how labour codes o f conduct can overcome the historical 
differences and the tendency to discriminate between two very different sets of 
workers.
8.3.5 Freedom o f Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
Both the ETI Base Code and the SA8000 Standard include the element ‘freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining’, which accordingly corporate 
entities engaged in the global supply chain agree to abide by (ETI 2005b, SAI 
2005). Also, the law in Costa Rica is structured to support workers’ rights 
regarding freedom of association. The Labour Code stipulates that workers have 
the right to form an association and join a trade union (Donato Monge and Rojas 
Bolanos 1987). But there are difficulties with freedom o f association in the 
banana sector, which dates back to the industrial relations problems of post­
colonial conflict between the labour movement and foreign-owned multinational 
companies (Bendell 2001, Chapman 2007). In Costa Rica, trade unions have long 
lost their dominance as the banana worker’s representative (Frundt 1998, Frank 
2005b). The growing decline in union membership has been much attributed to 
the rise o f Solidarismo (Frundt 1998, Bendell 2001, Frank 2005b), which 
reorganised the labour market around individual, rather than collective contracts 
(Sandbrook et al. 2007). This is a situation which a union official suggested best 
suited the companies rather than the workers (Interview Union Local Secretary 
CS@S2, March 2006).
During the 1980s and 1990s, solidarista associations grew rapidly in the banana 
sector by offering employees financial incentives in exchange for a commitment 
not to strike (Frundt 1998, Wilson 1998). Following the ‘pull-out’ of the United 
Fruit Company from the Pacific coast of Costa Rica to Panama in the mid-1980s,
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banana companies turned to Solidarismo to try and resolve industrial disputes 
through ‘dialogue’ (article in the Tico Times 1999, cited in Bendell 2001). By 
1987, a solidarista association had successfully outflanked one o f the most radical 
unions, the militant communist Atlantic Coast banana workers (Frundt 1998). 
The association employed the law to its advantage, since a solidarista required 
just five members to form a ‘permanent committee’ between association and 
employer (Frundt 1998). Workers who joined were represented by the permanent 
committees which effectively bypassed the unions (Frundt 1998). In 1984, 
banana unions counted 18,000 members, but three years later banana unions were 
almost wiped out by the ‘bogus company union system’ o f Solidarismo (Frank 
2005b: 12). Although Solidarismo has been much heralded for ‘creating harmony 
in the workplace’ and the benefits it offer to workers, there has also been some 
criticism of the system (Bendell 2001: 36). Critics have accused the system of 
undermining the role o f unions in the workplace (Frundt 1998, Frank 2005b, 
Sandbrook et al. 2007). As stated by Bemudez, “Solidarismo prevents true 
representation for workers in banana production” and “it is a barrier to collective 
bargaining”. Bemudez, one o f the system’s foremost critics, claims the banana 
TNCs stand accused o f “fuelling  the growth of solidarista associations while 
trying to crush the unions” (Interview Gilberth Bemudez Umana, Union Regional 
Coordinator: COLSIBA, February 2006 - emphasis as stated).
Freedom of association and the right o f workers to be represented in the 
workplace was a key topic o f discussion with respondents on the banana farms 
visited. The replies to questions on this matter were often similar, with displays 
of great national pride and confidence, particularly as regards the role o f the state 
in protecting workers’ rights. This was indicated by the comments of these 
respondents who worked in the field on a farm managed by Chiquita, the first by 
a cropper who stated:
“We have permanent committees here on the farm and there is a
Constitution, a minimum wage and the workers’ code is included in
the law” (Interview GOC@F23, February 2006).
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And the second, a harvester who added his comments:
“We have the right to be a member of a workers’ association, 
Solidarismo, a union and the law protects us, it is in the Constitution” 
(Interview AOH@F23, March 2006).
During these discussions, the respondents would often reiterate the fact that their 
rights as workers were enshrined in law. There was also a great respect shown for 
the ‘permanent committee’ as their appointed representative. One of the nuances 
of the country’s Labour Law is that workers can choose to be represented by trade 
unions, permanent committees (PCs) or both; a situation unique to Costa Rica in 
the Latin American banana sector. As noted by a worker in the packhouse on a 
farm operated by another o f the major TNCs:
“There is no need for unions here, because they [the companies] have 
SA8000 and ISO-14001, w e’re paid above the legal minimum and we 
do not have unions here... no union leaders have been to this farm” 
(Interview DOS@F33, March 2006).
However, at times responses to questions regarding the role of unions were 
mixed, both between the divisions o f workforce; the field and the packhouse, and 
between workers doing the same job on the same farm. Two respondents 
employed on a farm managed by the same TNC commented as follows:
“Companies must, should be more open to unions... I don’t think we 
are well represented... the worker really has no freedom and can not 
be open... what I ’m saying today, I can be fired for tomorrow” (Focus 
Group POC@FG21, March 2006).
Whereas the second worker in the field employed to carry out exactly the same 
duties and asked the same set of questions regarding freedom of association and 
union membership displayed a somewhat different perspective, suggesting it was 
up to the individual to choose:
“The supervisor says we are free to join a union, but in reality it does 
not happen. There are permanent committees here, but we don’t want 
the company to think for us, or the union, we want to think for
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ourselves” (Focus Group LOC@FG21, March 2006). [Permanent 
committees and solidarista associations are often referred to as the 
company choice].
Similar comments regarding the role of permanent committees came from other 
respondents. The first from a worker in the field, who stated:
“Sometimes the farm doesn’t pay extra monies [related to quality], but 
the permanent committee helps, they get it for us... we don’t always 
know who the members o f the committee are... but they represent the 
workers” (Interview JOH@F23, March 2006).
And a worker who is a permanent committee representative operating in the 
packhouse, claimed:
“The permanent committee can make changes... it has the freedom to 
make changes across the packhouse... over the last two years the plant 
has been reorganised... we were involved in that” (Interview 
DOSP@F24, March 2006).
However, during the discussions in focus groups conducted with respondents 
drawn from the locale where farms were owned by independent producers 
supplying Dole, Del Monte and Fyffes, there was a mix of comments regarding 
permanent committees. The respondents listed a number o f criticisms regarding 
the role o f permanent committees and the lack of real freedom to join a union or 
form other associations, as illustrated by the testimony o f a field worker:
“Companies bribe any permanent committee members, they make 
things easier for that worker, and he is put in charge o f office 
administration - chambear [an easy job]. They [companies] emphasise 
in Europe that the worker can have freedom of association, but it is 
not real... we are currently trying to organise a union, but there are lots 
o f problems, companies say they will close down the farms and 
people will lose their jobs” (Focus Group POC@FG21, March 2006).
As far as the principle o f freedom of association was concerned, the reality on the 
ground proved to be a bit o f a conundrum with some workers preferring 
permanent committees and solidarista associations, whilst others saw themselves
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as being subjugated by the company and believed the only way to change this was 
to belong to a union. The latter position unsurprisingly is corroborated by the 
statement o f Bemudez, a coordinator from COLSIBA:
“Salaries have been slashed over the last number o f years...and the 
workers have no way to fight it, the permanent committees don’t have 
any power and Solidarismo is not allowed by law to act in collective 
bargaining, the only way is the union and this is the message we try to 
give to the workers... but the companies don’t like us saying these 
things” (Interview Gilberth Bemudez Umana, Union Regional 
Coordinator: COLSIBA, February 2006).
In some ways the unions feel they are being made to pay for experiences o f the 
past, as suggested by the comments o f a local union official:
“Because o f the strike action in the 1980s pushed by banana unions, 
the unions have been punished... the 80s was when the workers gained 
the most, now [their] rights are diminishing, because the negotiation 
process is organised by Solidarismo and the company... any worker 
that criticises this method will be dismissed... workers with a bit of 
conscience feel that their rights are being taken away, they denounce 
the direct agreements and this is how Sindicatos [unions] hear about 
the situation... almost like a natural process when this point of upset 
happens, this is when again the worker joins the union” (Interview 
Union Local Secretary CS@S2, March 2006).
Such sentiments resonated with the comments made almost a year earlier at the 
Second International Banana Conference in Brussels.
There were further varied responses to the role o f solidarista associations, 
particularly with regard to the benefits they provided, as noted by the comments 
below. The first, by a worker employed in the field:
“[Solidarismo] is a social association, you can save money or if  you 
need credit, you get money for medicines... its like a security system, 
you get a back up payment for losing your job” (Interview JOH@F23, 
March 2006)
The second, by a worker on the same farm:
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“The company puts money into the association [Solidarismo]... when 
a relative dies, it [Solidarismo] pays for days off for your relative’s 
funeral” (Interview LOQ@F23, March 2006)
There were also comments made as to how solidarista associations compared with 
unions. During a debate on the subject in one o f the focus groups conducted, a 
participant highlighted some differences between the two:
“The main reason why people join Solidarismo is the saving fund, 
they find it appealing... they get money back, it is like a savings 
scheme, but not with the union, their money is gone for ever” (Focus 
Group COHP@FG21, March 2006).
A view agreed by another participant, who suggested:
“Everything that goes to unions goes to leaders for meetings and for 
travelling around... Solidarismo gives loans, a lower rate than the 
banks, unions offer none o f this... workers get loans for a new bicycle, 
television or to send their children to school in San Jose for a good 
education” (Interview LA@F34, March 2006).
However, within the same focus group, there were also participants who were 
critical o f the associations, as noted by the comment of one employed on the same 
farm as the two previous commentators:
“Solidarismo acts like a bank, loans have 21% interest rate, the main 
purpose o f Solidarismo is to make profit not solidarity... lots of people 
borrow from this bank, 50 to 70% of the members are in debt and 
sometimes receive no salary because they have so much debt” (Focus 
Group LOC@FG21, March 2006).
Clearly, solidarista associations are not trade unions and this is where the 
dilemma lies for some social actors in the chain. The differing position of the 
various actors involved is covered in more detail in the following chapter. 
However, the testimony o f workers’ employed on farms operated by Chiquita 
indicated a more passive attitude to the need for unions, as noted by one 
supervisor, “permanent committees act for us, we don’t need unions” (Interview
-209-
D0S@ F21, February 2006). This was a belief which was supported by a 
permanent committee representative who worked in the packhouse, who stated:
“There are no unions on this farm because we have a permanent 
committee... here workers only have little problems, maybe with the 
infrastructure... [Cable] towers fall over... we need more bridges in the 
field [for harvest]... in packing there are less difficulties... the system 
works, I raise problems with the supervisors, the manager, it all gets 
sorted... if  not, then the formal process begins... it is raised as a point 
on the agenda” [for the next PC meeting] (Interview JOPP@F22, 
February 2006).
As unions are a key constituent o f the labour framework agreement in place with 
Chiquita, these comments prompt the question of how fully informed workers are 
of such agreements and their benefits.
8.4 A Producer and Union Labour Initiative
Chiquita’s adoption o f an IFA was bom out of a series o f CSR commitments 
which were intended to improve the company’s image and reputation. In 1995, 
Chiquita was voted one o f the ten worst corporations by Multinational Monitor 
(Mokhiber and Wheat 1995). Following a series of allegations o f political 
entanglements, suppressing labour rights and chemical misuse, Chiquita 
introduced a comprehensive CSR programme in the late-1990s (Chiquita 2001a, 
Were 2003). Chiquita’s journey o f ethical policy started with its engagement with 
the Rainforest Alliance and the SA8000 certification o f all its owned-farms in 
Latin America (Chiquita 2005a, RA 2006b). However, the most dynamic 
development to follow was the signing of a groundbreaking labour rights 
agreement with the IUF and COLSIBA -  an affiliation o f banana workers’ unions 
in Latin America -  on June 14th 2001 (Chiquita 2005b). Although the agreement 
affirms the same ILO core conventions as those included in the SA8000 Standard 
and Chiquita’s own corporate Code o f Conduct, there is an important distinction 
in the agreement -  the inclusion o f a formal Review Committee, which has the 
responsibility to oversee the company’s adherence to the conventions (Zalla
2001). Through the agreement, Chiquita, one of the largest employers of
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unionised workers in Latin America, reaffirmed its commitment to respect 
workers’ right to freedom of association (Chiquita 2001a, IUF 2001).
The agreement was considered momentous at the time, as stated by Ron Oswald 
the IUF’s general secretary, who described it as “historic in the truest sense” and a 
real “possibility for workers and employers to seek a new basis for the resolution 
of problems” in an industry that had a history o f confrontation (IUF 2001: 1). It 
was also viewed by Chiquita as a means to ensure effective labour management 
relations (Chiquita 2001a). The IFA agreement aligned with the principles laid 
out in Chiquita’s CSR strategy, which continued to be seen as critical to the 
company’s success. As stated by the company chairman and chief executive 
officer Fernando Aquirre in 2005, “corporate responsibility continues to be woven 
into every major decision we make as a company” (Chiquita 2005b: 2).
However, as highlighted by Oswald, in one regard the agreement is not truly 
international, because it doesn’t apply to all o f Chiquita’s business operations; the 
agreement is only applicable to banana workers on Latin American plantations 
and does not apply to production workers employed in other Chiquita operations 
around the globe (Interview Ron Oswald, General Secretary: IUF, October 2007). 
Chiquita has a number o f fresh fruit packing operations, specifically in the US 
and Europe, which are excluded (Chiquita 2006a).
In June 2006, five years after signing the breakthrough agreement, the IFA 
signatories -  the IUF, COLSIBA and Chiquita -  met to review the overall impact 
o f the agreement. Both the IUF and COLSIBA noted the successes achieved 
during the period the framework agreement had been in force, but they also raised 
a number o f ongoing and unresolved issues with the senior Chiquita management 
(IUF 2006). The ‘across the table’ discussions were felt to be constructive and 
opportune, as noted by the comments o f Oswald:
“Whilst Chiquita will still make decisions that we and our members 
will have problems with and will rightly oppose, we and COLSIBA 
have been able to successfully resolve a number o f issues arising from 
these decisions in favour o f our members... we have also seen our
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members use the agreement to increase union membership in the 
company and in its suppliers in a number of cases” (IUF 2006: 1).
Only a few months previously however, I had raised the topic o f the IFA with 
union representatives in Costa Rica and their responses were somewhat mixed. 
The local union official suggested that:
“The IFA has been broken and violated so many times we want to tear 
it up... in practice there is no freedom of association... there are still 
hygiene and occupational hazards... IF As are discredited here in Costa 
Rica... complaints are made, but social auditors and members of the 
companies make the mistake of having interviews with workers in the 
company offices, this influences the workers, so they don’t say the 
way it really is on the farm” (Interview Union Local Secretary 
CS@S2, March 2006).
Given the breakthrough this agreement was meant to be in terms o f union 
engagement, a representative of COLSIBA was not unsurprisingly a little more 
circumspect in his comments regarding the matter. He agreed there were some 
difficulties at times, but nonetheless claimed the IFA was the best way to engage 
with the US-banana TNCs in the future (Conversation Union Representative 
GO@ Sl, February 2006). Although, as noted by Frank (2005b) part of the 
problem when looking at the opportunity from a union perspective, is that the 
majority o f unionised workers are employed on Chiquita owned and managed 
plantations. This begs the question as to whether targeting other major companies 
in the sector is feasible. The experience o f the IUF in this matter appears to 
indicate otherwise, with Oswald suggesting Dole viewed SA8000 certification as 
the way forward and Del Monte had so few union members as to be less than 
interested (Interview Ron Oswald, General Secretary: IUF, October 2007).
The question o f union membership on farms operated by Chiquita was raised 
during discussions with workers. But not one union member could be found or a 
positive response garnered in respect o f the role o f trade unions in advancing the 
rights o f workers or improving conditions on the plantation. Although a Chiquita
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representative involved in the CSR programme in Costa Rica did suggest this was 
not unusual:
“There is less than 5 percent of our [the company’s] workforce who 
are union m em bers... workers here are not interested in being part of 
a union, they have permanent committees and solidarista 
associations... and the history o f unions in this country is not good. In 
the ‘80s many workers lost their jobs, the unions wouldn’t end the 
strikes and the farms deteriorated, then the workers and the towns 
were left with nothing” (Interview CSR Manager, February 2006).
The battles between unions and producers, and the ensuing strikes in the 1980s 
were often cited as examples o f why unions were not a good thing, both by 
workers and farm administrators. This is illustrated by the following comment 
made by a worker employed on a farm managed by Chiquita:
“In the 1980s many jobs went to Panama, because the workers on the 
Pacific coast were part o f the unions and they pushed and pushed, and 
the companies closed down the farms and went to Panama, where 
there were workers that didn’t belong to unions. Many jobs were lost, 
unions lose jobs and that is why there aren’t unions here any more” 
(Interview GOC@F22, February 2006).
This was confirmed by a supervisor responsible for the packhouse, who said:
“It seems that a worker who is a member of a syndicate [union] is 
often viewed by other workers as a ‘difficult’ worker, who makes 
difficult situations or may raise too many issues. Often these workers 
will be avoided, because they make trouble sometimes... workers do 
not want to go on strike, there are problems sometimes, but the 
supervisor or the manager will normally help. Workers want to work 
and look after their families” (Interview VS@F21, February 2006).
It was somewhat strange to consider that nearly twenty-five years after such 
events, there could still be a feeling o f unease towards trade unions. Unions, and 
being a member o f a union, were cited as synonymous with job insecurity and a 
loss of employment. Certainly the stories regarding this period had an air of folk­
lore about them, and there was a great deal of difficulty in determining the hard 
cold facts o f the matter. To a degree, such anti-union sentiments were indicative
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of the lack o f awareness and knowledge of the joint agreement between Chiquita 
and the regional union organisation COLSIBA. On each occasion when questions 
were posed regarding the role and impact of the IFA in terms o f the working 
conditions on farms, there was unsureness on the part of respondents. Rarely did 
a respondent indicate any knowledge regarding the agreement, and even when 
there was a hint o f recognition, the understanding was somewhat limited to a 
vague recollection o f something to do with the company and the unions 
(Fieldnotes, Feb-April 2006). The IUF recognises this problem and suggests low 
union membership in Costa Rica is due to the dominant ‘Solidarismo’ system.
This form o f w orkers’ representation system is often described as a type of 
‘yellow unionism’ and it stands accused of ‘systematically squeezing’ union 
rights in the banana sector, like many other sectors in the country (IUF 2006: 1). 
In response, and in the spirit o f the IFA, Chiquita has engaged in a number of 
meetings with unions that represent a small proportion o f workers in owned and 
managed (sub-contracted) farms and in principle has agreed to support a union 
organisation pilot on plantations in Costa Rica (Chiquita 2006b, IUF 2006). As 
noted by Oswald, such examples show significant progress and, albeit not all the 
union’s requirements are met, the process does allow for the defence o f members’ 
interests and the potential for a ‘share o f the benefits which otherwise would often 
accrue exclusively to the company and its shareholders’ (IUF 2006: 2).
8.5 Conclusion
The discussion and testimonies o f workers regarding voluntary codes of conduct 
and where applicable the international framework agreement, in many ways did 
not reflect what was expected. Certainly it differed from the situation described 
in corporate reports, and from statements made by certification bodies and 
alliances promoting these voluntary initiatives. In many instances, there was little 
or no awareness o f codes and standards, and even when there was some 
knowledge or understanding, workers still seemed unsure how their situation 
could be improved beyond the rights enshrined in the country’s Constitution or 
Labour Law. Also, workers showed little regard for the process o f social
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auditing, believing the system to be ‘stage m anaged’ and largely designed to give 
the appearance that codes were being adhered to — the means o f ‘pandering’ to the 
supermarkets and their customers. Interestingly, there was less confidence shown 
in the ETI Base Code than the other initiatives in  place, and this is the one code 
that is not audited per se. It was suggested by a representative of a major TNC 
producer that this was because the code “just repeats what is already in place”, 
whilst adding another process o f checking and form filling that built more cost 
into the business (Interview Producer Compliance Manager MCM@P5, March 
2006). It was also described as being “like a dog with no teeth” (Conversation 
Union Representative G O@ Sl, February 2006). It may be inferred from these 
comments that this particular vehicle for improving conditions in the banana 
chain was not working well. It is true that monitoring o f the code is dependent on 
ETI members; trade unions, NGOs, producers and supermarkets, but there is little 
evidence to suggest that these actors do not take their responsibilities seriously.
However, the evidence presented in this chapter does show there is unevenness 
and inconsistency in the way different producers comply with the various 
voluntary initiatives. It is difficult to ascertain whether this is due to a lack of 
commitment by some producers to certain o f the initiatives operating in the 
banana chain and there is a sense that demands from some actors in the chain to 
adopt certain initiatives have led to an overload. Certainly, the general belief 
expressed by representatives o f the banana TNCs was that the variety o f labour 
codes and standards being implemented on banana plantations added both 
complexity and cost to their operations. It was often suggested that the monies 
involved could be better spent more directly in the quest to improve the labour 
conditions on plantations (Interviews: Producer CSR Manager RC@P2, February 
2006; Producer Technical Manager RT@P1, March 2006). There is considerable 
hype and publicity in Northern markets regarding the promotion (by 
supermarkets) and the adoption (by producers) o f  codes and standards, but maybe 
the question needs to be raised as to whether some o f these initiatives are a matter 
of ‘style over substance’.
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It is becoming clearer that the level of commitment and type o f initiative being 
implemented on banana plantations is not the only significant point in the debate 
on these forms o f labour regulation in global supply chains. One of the key 
difficulties that emerges, with so many different codes, standards and (where 
applicable) framework agreements, is how to assess their value. Generally 
speaking, all draw on the principles o f the ILO core conventions. It is virtually 
impossible to make a fair assessment of the impact of any one individual action 
(code, standard or IFA). Consequently, it is difficult to credit any one initiative 
with improving the labour conditions on banana plantations or of protecting 
workers’ rights. However, on those farms where the ETI Base Code, SA8000 
Standard and an IFA were applicable, the overall situation o f workers appeared to 
be better. Also, there was a greater understanding shown by workers of the 
structures that were in place to support and improve their employment condition. 
Indeed, there were times when workers claimed their situation was improved by 
the combination o f all three forms o f labour initiative being implemented. It 
would seem that where both corporations and unions seek to regulate the supply 
chain via formal agreements, there then appears to be a stronger 
acknowledgement o f labour rights.
The realisation that this is the case, suggests the best way forward is to consider 
the impact o f the cumulative effect o f such forms of regulation, and the question 
of whether ‘m ore’ is actually ‘m ore’. That is, will the adoption o f a variety of 
voluntary labour initiatives and an IFA in the future, draw more attention to the 
plight o f workers, and ultimately help to generate greater change and 
improvement in the working conditions on banana plantations. This raises further 
questions o f how labour regulation and future governance is structured in global 
supply chains, and how the many actors engaged in the chain can help shape it, 
which is the focus o f discussion in the following chapter.
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Chapter Nine
Corporate Social Responsibility: The Reality
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are a number o f codes o f conduct 
applicable in the banana supply chain. Based on social and environmental 
criteria, these voluntary commitments are inherently linked to the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies o f companies engaged in the chain. Indeed, codes 
of conduct are one o f the main tools used by companies to assure other social 
actors that they are ‘responsible’ citizens (Jenkins et al. 2002, Hopkins 2004). 
The US-banana TNC producers and the UK supermarket groups have both 
adopted a number o f codes and standards in their operations which demonstrate 
their CSR credentials in this way, and report periodically on their socially 
responsible programmes and performance. However, one o f the key objectives of 
this research is to ascertain whether voluntary initiatives improve the conditions 
faced by workers in the production o f bananas for export, that is, the reality of 
codes. By doing so, the intention is also to identify how other actors involved in 
the chain oversee the implementation o f these CSR policy tools. As suggested by 
the list o f participants who attended the Second International Banana Conference 
(IBCII) in April 2005, there is a diverse group of social actors involved in the 
global banana supply chain, including nation-states, trade unions, NGOs and civil 
society groups. Many o f these actors need assurance that codes, as a form of 
labour governance in the chain, actually make a difference to the conditions 
experienced by workers (Christopherson and Lillie 2005, Soederberg 2005).
Governance is concerned with the ‘rules’ of the chain, how they are made and 
enforced, and ultimately who ‘drives’ the chain (Gereffi 1999, Tallontire and 
Greenhalgh 2005). In the first instance, the matter o f governance raises the 
question o f who controls the labour process in an industrialised operation 
(Soederberg 2005). This is an important consideration, because the modes of 
control are associated with the social relations in the chain (Raynolds and Murray
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1998, Ortiz 2002). As shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, there are two major 
tools o f labour control in the banana chain; work contracts and employment 
practices, both o f which are directly managed by corporations (producers). 
However, more recent attention to how labour conditions in certain segments of 
the global supply chain are being managed has resulted in other parties in the 
chain, chiefly the supermarket groups, asserting their influence. The main aim of 
this chapter is to explore the impact both corporate actors (producers and 
supermarkets) have in relation to governance in the banana supply chain. The 
chapter will also examine the role o f other social actor groups, which either 
participate in or oversee the process o f governance in supply chains. These 
include the nation-state, trade unions, NGOs, civil society groups and consumers. 
In this way, a better understanding will be gained of the influence each group has 
on the labour conditions o f banana workers in Costa Rica. Following this, other 
parties deemed to be more peripheral to the chain, such as audit and certification 
groups are considered. In order to situate this aspect o f the governance process in 
the debate, the social auditing practices inherent in the chain, which monitor 
compliance o f the codes and standards, are also briefly discussed.
By following this approach and drawing on earlier discussions, a path will be laid 
to debate voluntary versus regulatory labour controls and help determine what the 
future holds for codes o f conduct in global supply chains. The key questions this 
chapter raises are: (i) how are forms of governance (codes of conduct) 
implemented and verified in the production operation o f the global banana chain, 
(ii) what is the governing role o f the various actors involved in the chain, (iii) are 
codes a reaction to political and social pressure or are they a devolution of 
government responsibilities to others, and finally (iv) is there a need for a shift in 
governance structures from voluntary to regulatory in global supply chains.
9.1 Governance of the Banana Chain
During the 1990s, supermarket groups in the UK invested heavily in the 
development o f their supply chains and increased greatly their control and 
monitoring of suppliers/producers (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Hughes 2005).
-218-
As noted by Kaplinsky (2000) power in a global supply chain can be exercised in 
various forms, from ensuring certain circumstances are maintained along the 
chain, to actively coordinating the activities within the chain to ensure that the 
intended outcome is achieved. As discussed in Chapter Two, supermarkets took 
greater control of the consumer product offer (product quality, packaging and 
merchandising, and promotion and price) during the 1980s and 1990s and as such, 
were able to extend their influence in the global supply chains of their supply base 
(Wrigley and Lowe 2002, Kotler 2003). During the last decade, the growing 
dominance o f supermarkets has continued through the insistence of certain 
standards being introduced in the production activity o f the chain (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000, Hughes 2005). Some standards are legislated, such as EU 
directives on food safety, whilst others like labour codes o f conduct are voluntary. 
Even in strongly organised and integrated supply chains that are dominated by a 
few major TNCs, like the banana sector, there is little option but to comply with 
the dictates o f the major supermarket groups (Interviews: Producer Technical 
Manager RT@P1, March 2006; Producer Compliance Manager MCM@P5, 
March 2006).
However, the supermarket retailer is an internal form of ‘governor’ and there are 
other groups o f social actors that play a part in governing the chain. As noted by 
Raynolds and Murray (1998) the banana chain involves more than just economic 
actors; there are political and social actors too. There are also growing numbers 
of external parties which play a role in the governance structure and process for 
global supply chains. Third-party auditors and certification bodies fall into this 
category, but although their role may be viewed as peripheral and somewhat 
passive, they are a critical control point for verifying the implementation o f codes 
in the production operation o f global supply chains. As it was suggested by a 
third-party auditor:
“We are not just ticking boxes, saying companies are compliant... we 
look for practical ways to help them [the producers]... we make 
recommendations, how the system can be managed better. But that 
doesn’t mean every time the audit gets passed. When there is non­
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compliance, it is recorded... and yes farms are decertified, it happens” 
(Interview Oliver Bach, Audit Manager: RA, March 2006).
Interestingly, the topic o f de-certification and what measures could be taken by 
actors involved in the banana chain regarding the non-compliance o f codes was 
very much on the agenda at the IBCII event in April 2005. Discussions on the 
matter centred on the failings o f the monitoring process, as noted by one 
rapporteur:
“Progress on the ground is limited, there are no cases o f de­
certification. .. these standards are not really being monitored, there 
are still poor conditions on the plantation... the initiatives [codes] 
don’t raise the standards. Also unions are left out o f the process and 
workers have no complaints process, many union members are 
imprisoned and there are many non-unionised plantations in Latin 
America. It seems as if  little is being done to address the participation 
o f the union, companies [producers] manage the spot checks and the 
certification procedures well, but this does not necessarily improve 
standards” (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005).
There are a number o f propriety codes, industry codes and internationally 
recognised standards applicable in the banana production chain, which are 
monitored through varying processes. The differences and the role of those 
various social actors involved in the monitoring process (both internal and 
external) are summarised in the table overleaf.
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Table 9.1 Implementation and monitoring process in the banana supply chain
Internal Parties 
(Producers, 
Supermarkets)
External Parties 
(Government, Audit 
and Certification 
Groups, NGOS)
Multi-lateral 
Enforcement 
(Producer and 
Trade Unions)
Implementation • Propriety Codes 
(producers and 
supermarkets)
• SA8000 (producers)
• ETI Base Code 
(producers and 
supermarkets)
• IFAs (producer)
Monitoring / 
Verification
• Propriety Codes 
(producers and 
supermarkets)
• SA8000 (producers)
• ETI Base Code 
(producers and 
supermarkets)
• Propriety Codes 
(audit groups)
. SA8000 
(certification 
groups)
. IFAs
(producer and trade 
unions)
Source: Interviews: Supermarket Buyers and Technical Managers, Feb-June 2005; Producer 
Technical Managers Feb-April 2006
9.1.1 Initiation and Implementation
One of the main reasons supermarkets audit the supply chain for bananas is the 
fact that fresh produce (fruit and vegetables) is marketed and sold as their own 
brand. In the first instance, the supermarket group itself must provide proof of 
compliance to EU regulation regarding food hygiene and safety for branded 
goods, not the supplier or the producer. This means that bananas, like all other 
products in this category, are subject to the supermarkets’ due-diligence 
procedures for food safety (Interviews: Retail Technical Manager ST@T2, April 
2005; Retail Technical Manager CT@T4, May 2005; Retail CSR Manager 
DC@T5, June 2005). Hence, the recent addition o f further checks to ensure that 
suppliers are consistent with supermarket CSR policies and comply with 
voluntary codes and standards, fit naturally into an already established audit 
protocol (Interviews: Retail Technical Manager ST@T2, April 2005; Retail Buyer 
GB@T1, April 2005; Retail CSR Manager DC@T5, June 2005). In addition,
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suppliers producing for or exporting to the European market are governed by EU 
food regulation and are legally obliged to follow certain criteria, thus the 
introduction o f EurepGAP (now GLOBALGAP) and ISO standards. In this 
regard, suppliers and producers also have a culture of auditing, and employ 
technical accounting staff for the purpose. Due to the introduction o f labour 
codes and standards on banana plantations, technical staffs have acquired the 
extended brief o f social accounting, and conduct preliminary checks on farms 
prior to a formal social audit or certification visit by external parties (Interviews: 
Producer Technical Manager RT@P1, March 2006; Producer Compliance 
Manager MCM@P5, March 2006).
However, as can be observed from Table 9.1, the obvious omissions from the 
parties (social actors) involved in the verification process o f codes and standards, 
are the workers themselves. One o f the most often repeated criticisms of codes 
made by unions and civil society groups is that workers are not fundamentally 
part of the process; codes are initiated without consultation and implemented in a 
top-down fashion by companies. In addition, the topic o f monitoring is an area of 
some discontent; both trade unions and workers raised this issue during the IBCII 
event (IBCII Forum Discussions, April 2005). The argument was that workers 
and unions are not involved in the process and other actors (NGOs, civil society 
groups), considered as representative and impartial by workers and unions, are 
denied a role by the companies (IBCII Forum Discussions, April 2005). The 
counter claim made by producers in this respect, is that third-party auditors and 
certification bodies are independent and by default, are therefore impartial 
(Interviews: Producer CSR Manager RC@P2, February 2006; Producer Technical 
Manager RT@P1, March 2006; Producer Compliance Manager MCM@P5, 
March 2006).
9.1.2 Monitoring and Verification
Codes and standards ultimately depend on human monitoring and verification for 
proper and fully effective implementation (Beek 1998b, Jenkins et al. 2002). Who 
does the monitoring and verification, when and how, are the questions that many
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social actors are constantly debating. Theses questions are ultimately o f a 
political nature (self-interested) as different actors have a varying stake in the 
global supply chain for bananas. According to Beek (1998b), the implementation 
process for labour codes o f conduct should include all those actions required of 
the parties involved to transform the code from an intention or ideal to a reality in 
the production location. Monitoring is part o f the implementation process; it is 
the activity o f regularly collecting data to check performance against certain 
criteria. In order to implement a code it needs to be communicated and 
understood, which is particularly important when a code ‘seeks to guarantee 
workers’ organisational rights and freedoms’ (Beek 1998b: 8). To ensure codes 
are effective and management and employees are compliant, producers have 
initiated ‘internal’ social auditing functions.
However, the need to prove publicly that codes are being adhered to has 
influenced the development and deployment of ‘external’ systems of verification 
(Jenkins et al. 2002, O ’Rouke 2002). In this regard, corporations can be audited 
by a number o f independent certification companies, which O ’Brien (2002) 
suggests in some ways professionalises codes, because dedicated firms are used 
for monitoring. The process also leads to the criticism that one corporate entity 
ensures the compliance o f another and that trade unions are excluded in this 
approach to monitoring (O ’Brien 2002). However, third-party groups such as the 
Rainforest Alliance (RA) are viewed as conducting meaningful monitoring by 
certain social actors in the chain, notably by developmental NGOs and 
environmental campaigners. This is largely because the RA is seen as 
independent o f the producers (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Corporate 
actors state the impartiality o f auditors is the best means o f gaining the trust of 
employees and civil society groups in the monitoring process (Beek 1998b). The 
third party makes unannounced spot checks and interviews workers on a 
confidential basis. However, trade unions and some NGOs have been most vocal 
in their criticism o f this approach. Both groups have suggested that these audit 
checks are often stage-managed; that workers are prepared and groomed for the 
questions they are asked (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). There are also
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claims that workers are being instructed what to say regarding certain o f the 
principles incorporated in the codes. One example cited was that workers are told 
to say they have ‘freedom of association’ even though union-members are clearly 
discriminated against by some producers (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). 
This is one o f the reasons, unions claim, they are not given a role in the 
monitoring process and why they are excluded from the auditing process. In 
addition, there is no opportunity for unions, NGOs or workers to make statements 
which can be included in the audit report, or an opportunity to raise complaints 
(IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005).
The various social actors engaged in the debate on voluntary labour initiatives 
seem to be struggling to agree on the best approach to verify codes of conduct. In 
1999, the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) attempted to examine the ways 
commercial organisations monitored and verified labour conditions by 
establishing a Banana Pilot Project (BPP), which they launched in Costa Rica in 
2001. The BPP used the ETI Base Code as the guiding principle against which 
operational practices were deemed acceptable. The aim o f the pilot was to test the 
criteria and approach o f the commercial auditors involved in the process of 
verifying the principles applicable to the code (Interview ETI Representative 
DD@OG2, June 2006). However, the pilot was soon abandoned, following a 
failure to fully engage the participants involved, namely the producers and trade 
unions (Interviews: Gilberth Bemudez Umana, Union Regional Coordinator: 
COLSIBA, February 2006; Producer Technical Manager RT@P1, March 2006).
However, workers did largely associate codes with the checks carried out by 
company managers and visitors from overseas supermarkets. They also viewed 
codes in the context o f the farm audit, as noted by these workers:
“We receive so many speeches on codes... we know all about 
SA8000, they [the auditors] come and ask us questions. They ask us 
about the hours we work, what time we finish each day... there are a 
lot o f questions, it takes a long time” (Interview AOB@F22, February 
2006).
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“I have seen auditors from SA8000, they ask lots o f questions, then 
afterwards the audits are put up on the notice board” (Interview 
HOP@F23, February 2006).
“People come all the time and ask us questions, just like you. They 
ask about the codes but not what it is like to work here... they don’t 
ask how hard we work” (Interview DOC@F24, March 2006).
It was clear from speaking to some workers on the subject o f auditing, that they 
did not view the process favourably. On the other hand, producers seemed to be 
of the belief that the best way to ensure compliance with codes is to monitor the 
situation continually. As noted by a representative o f one of the major TNC 
producers:
“Monitoring helps corroborate and verify the code is operating on 
every farm, on each plantation. We complete all the checks, then the 
[third-party] auditor comes and he also checks... then we can be sure 
the codes are working” (Interview RC@P2, February 2006).
However, there was some positive feedback from workers regarding the outcome 
of an audit, as noted by a worker in the packhouse on a farm owned by Chiquita, 
who said:
“I have seen auditors from SA8000 they ask lots o f questions... the 
audits o f Rainforest Alliance and SA8000 are put up on the notice 
board afterwards. We can see if  there are problems and what the 
supervisor must do” (Interview HOP@F22, February 2006).
This indicates that workers on some farms are able to see the results o f an audit 
and any possible non-compliance. According to the local CSR representative, the 
permanent committee members (worker’s representatives on the farm) would then 
take up any issues (Interview RC@P2, February 2006). Whether issues o f non- 
compliance are addressed or changes made in the operation to correct problems is 
difficult to assess. Some workers suggest that they were not and that the audit 
was just a paper exercise, as claimed by a participant in one workshop:
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“Social accounting comes and then the company fills their records, 
they [the company] prepare for this... but nothing really changes” 
(Focus Group BOC@FG23, March 2006).
One o f the ways suggested to legitimise the social audit process is to have them 
verified by NGOs (local and international), trade unions, and indeed workers 
themselves (Auret and Barrientos 2006). However, having spoken to 
representatives o f these groups, this does not seem to be a likely prospect for the 
near future. This belief is based on the knowledge that it would be almost 
impossible to gain the agreement o f supermarkets and producers to accept the 
involvement o f other actors in the chain, as this would be considered interference 
in their affairs (Interviews: Gilberth Bemudez Umana, Union Regional 
Coordinator: COLSIBA, February 2006; NGO Local Organiser VC@ OGl, 
February 2006; Union Local Secretary CS@S2, March 2006).
9.2 The ‘Actors’ of Governance in Global Supply Chains
In principle, the development o f vertically integrated global supply chains should 
aid the process o f governance. Previously when produce was grown and 
distributed via open markets it was more difficult to trace the origins and the 
nature o f its production (Barrientos and Dolan 2006). The relations between the 
various social actors within the chain were less visible in fragmented markets and 
as such, gave rise to the possibility o f concealing poor labour conditions in the 
production process (Barrientos and Dolan 2006). In well-integrated supply 
chains, this is not so much the case as there is the opportunity to link any adverse 
impact o f certain conditions in production to specific groups o f actors 
(producers/supermarkets) (Barrientos and Dolan 2006). It could be argued that, 
given the range o f social actors involved in the global banana supply chain, it may 
be difficult to ascertain where governance lies. However, as suggested in earlier 
chapters, each group o f actors has a varying degree o f influence within the chain. 
The purpose o f exploring the role o f each group at this point is to prepare the 
ground for the more critical debate o f what future governance in the global 
banana supply chain could look like and who may be responsible for it.
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9.2.1 The Corporates (Supermarkets and Producers)
Supermarkets and producers have come under increased pressure to improve 
labour conditions in global supply chains. Consequently, they have embraced a 
range o f voluntary initiatives, including codes o f conduct and certifiable 
standards. It was made clear in all my interviews with supermarkets and 
producers involved in the banana chain, that company brand position was 
important. To some extent the changes in the branding o f both corporate actors, 
as regards fairtrade and certified ethical bananas, reflects this. Yet supermarket 
groups are still reluctant to acknowledge the negative impact o f their own buying 
practices (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Supermarkets are regularly 
accused o f placing conflicting demands on producers; on the one hand 
supermarkets want tightly managed coordinated supply schedules and ever lower 
prices, and on the other, producers are expected to respect workers rights and 
comply with labour initiatives (codes and standards) (Interviews: Producer 
Technical Manager RT@P1, March 2006; Producer Compliance Manager 
MCM@P5, March 2006). As suggested by an organiser from a local NGO in 
Costa Rica:
“There is no point in having codes o f conduct if  the supermarkets 
keep forcing the prices down... this makes it impossible to pay a living 
wage... it is the supply contract that influences the companies 
[producers] ability to abide by the code” (Interview NGO Local 
Organiser V D @ O G l, February 2006).
The stringent requirements and the intense pressure placed on suppliers/producers 
by the UK supermarket groups have been a concern for some time (Blythman 
2004, Young 2004, Bevan 2005, Simms 2007). Recently in the UK, the 
Competition Commission initiated an investigation into the dominance of 
supermarkets in food retailing, which includes an analysis o f the control which 
supermarkets exert over their supply base (Competition Commission 2006a). The 
UK Competition Commission is an independent public body established by the 
Competition Act 1998 and replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 
1999 (Competition Commission 2006b). Thus far, there have been criticisms 
posted to the Competition Commission website from suppliers. These include
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comments regarding the power wielded by supermarket buyers over the ‘product 
specification’ and ‘packaging’, while at the same time pushing the risk o f 
managing sales and pricing down the chain. In addition, supermarkets have been 
criticised for a lack o f formal contracts and security o f trade (Competition 
Commission 2007). The criticisms are made in light o f the lengths supermarkets 
go to maintain a comparative advantage in their businesses. Certainly such 
behaviour indicates that the relationship between supermarkets and their supply 
base is not an equitable one (Competition Commission 2007). This is a 
suggestion supported in a recent report published by Action Aid (2007), a 
developmental NGO, which recounts the ‘bullying’ presence o f supermarkets in 
international horticultural chains, and the subsequent impact on labour.
The ETI, recognising the limitations o f its Base Code as well as other voluntary 
labour initiatives, initiated in 2003 a three-year programme to investigate 
members’ efforts to implement its code in certain supply chains, one o f which 
was the Costa Rican banana chain. The impact assessment conducted by the 
Institute o f Development Studies, Sussex University, included interviews with 
workers, suppliers, agents and other stakeholders in global supply chains 
(Barrientos and Smith 2006). In October 2006, the impact assessment team 
reported that in Costa Rica the Base Code had most impact on the issue o f health 
and safety, but there was little progress in relation to freedom o f association 
(Smith 2006). Supermarket purchasing practices were highlighted as one of the 
many factors limiting the impact o f the code (Barrientos and Smith 2006). 
Suppliers and producers often cited the downward pressure on price and lead 
times exercised by the supermarkets as limiting their ability to improve labour 
practices (Barrientos and Smith 2006). According to Action Aid (2007), this is a 
problem o f the ETI corporate members’ focus on trying to ensure suppliers 
comply with codes o f conduct, rather than addressing the ways retailers set the 
trading terms. Action Aid (2007) suggests that suppliers unable to comply with 
both the terms o f trade and the buyer’s ethical code have to find ways to cheat 
audits. In this regard, the World Bank (2003) has advised that buyers address the
-228 -
mixed messages they send to suppliers -  demands for compliance to good labour 
practices coupled with demands for lower prices and shorter lead times.
However, suppliers/producers also have their critics in terms o f their role in 
promoting ethical behaviour in the chain. Chiquita was the first TNC to engage in 
a certification programme in 1994, and was one o f the first major producers to 
adopt voluntary codes o f conduct in 2001 (Zalla 2001). Yet recently, workers and 
their representatives accused Chiquita o f a breach in health and safety on a 
plantation in Costa Rica -  allowing the application o f agro-chemicals while 
workers were harvesting fruit close by (Banana Link 2007a). The harvest team 
(consisting of three workers) claimed to be working in an area assigned by their 
supervisor, when they noticed a team manually spraying the fruit with a 
nematicide (Banana Link 2007a). Having received their instructions of the 
number o f bananas to harvest that day, the team apparently decided to continue 
working in the area, until they fell ill shortly afterwards (COLSIBA 2007). 
According to Banana Link (2007a), who appealed on the workers’ behalf, the 
workers reported the incident because they believed their supervisors had been 
irresponsible. The w orkers’ complaint was heard and their explanation taken into 
consideration by the farm management, who responded by dismissing the workers 
(Discussion Chiquita Representative, August 2007). Chiquita claimed the 
workers continued to work in the area despite repeated warnings that fumigation 
was taking place (Discussion Chiquita Representative, August 2007). Chiquita 
defended its position by stating that the workers involved committed a serious 
health and safety infraction, by defying instructions not to go into the area where 
the aerial spraying was taking place. After investigating the matter further and 
drawing on the IFAs’ labour review process, Chiquita attempted to resolve the 
dispute locally. Given the circumstances, it was argued that the workers should 
be reinstated (Discussion Chiquita Representative, August 2007). However, 
Chiquita issued a statement highlighting the fact that the dismissals followed its 
occupational health and safety procedures embodied in its Code o f Conduct and 
were within the parameters o f the Labour Law in Costa Rica (Chiquita 2007). 
The associated bad publicity surrounding this issue clearly shows the difficulties
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of managing and being seen-to-be managing procedures linked to codes o f 
conduct. This instance was a particularly sensitive issue for Chiquita, as it is 
committed to operating as a socially responsible company (Discussion Chiquita 
Representative, August 2007).
Another example o f conflicting images and the experience o f codes implemented 
in the banana chain concerns the producer Dole. In 2000, Dole collected the 
Ethical Workplace Award and in 2005, the company’s CSR report stressed the 
organisation’s commitment to maintaining the highest ethical standards 
throughout its worldwide operations (Dole 2005b). Yet in September 2006, 
US/LEAP25 accused Dole o f celebrating its 50th birthday in Costa Rica by 
refusing workers on its own and its suppliers’ plantations the right to association -  
to form and join a trade union. Dole and Del Monte were both heavily criticised 
at the IBCII event in April 2005, chiefly for not recognising unions and 
acknowledging the opportunity to adopt an IFA in their businesses. Some 
participants at the conference claimed the lack of interest in labour framework 
agreements as indicative o f the producers’ strong ‘anti-union’ position (IBCII 
Forum Discussion, April 2005).
The above discussion indicates why corporations with greater visibility and/or 
control in a global supply chain are more likely to be exposed to bad publicity. In 
some respects, this crystallises the challenge facing supermarkets and producers 
involved in the global banana trade; namely how to live up to a stated policy of 
social responsibility.
9.2.2 The Nation-State
With the advent o f globalisation and the dramatic rise o f multinational and 
transnational corporations, the central importance o f various ‘national systems’
25 US/LEAP is a non-profit organisation that supports workers’ rights in Central America, and was 
one of the key organisers o f the IBCII event in April 2005 (IBCII 2004).
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(of finance, production, innovation and labour relations) is often considered to be 
under siege as business practices rapidly internationalise (Hirst and Thompson 
1999). It has always been the preserve of the nation-state to address issues such 
as living standards, poverty, exploitation, unemployment and how to assist social 
development in general (Hirst and Thompson 1999, Hopkins 2004). Whilst in 
some respects, globalisation has eroded the power of the state and its capacity for 
governance has changed, it remains a ‘pivotal institution’ for creating the 
conditions for effective international governance (Eiger and Edwards 1999, 
Soederberg 2005). In addition, Hopkins (2004) suggests that states will continue 
to play a major role in economic and social development, which will increasingly 
be in partnership with private and non-governmental actors.
As discussed in Chapter Six, the role o f the state in Costa Rica has depended, in 
large measure, on the need to develop strong export markets and maintain a solid 
base o f foreign exchange. This requirement has been a prime driver for the state’s 
involvement in the economic affairs o f the country. The development and growth 
of the banana sector and the economic history of the country are closely linked. 
For over a hundred years, successive administrations in Costa Rica have secured 
advantages for banana producers, while the sector has helped provide a steady 
stream of earnings in foreign currencies and employment opportunities (Itzigsohn 
2000, Sandbrook et a l  2007). As Evans (2003) suggests, states can help markets 
function, because the market needs predicable rules (like financial regulation) and 
collective goods (an integrated transport system), which states are in the best 
position to provide. By extension, states can also help promote workers’ rights 
and improved conditions in global supply chains. As noted by Frundt (1998) one 
o f the inherent links between the state and labour rights is trade. However, the 
impact of globalisation has eroded the power of the state in terms of its ability to 
regulate labour relations and in turn, is limiting the potential power o f organised 
labour to influence such regulation (Eiger and Edwards 1999).
Voluntary initiatives offer an opportunity to police labour standards in global 
production systems where the state is often unable to regulate (Jenkins et al.
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2002). As a representative from the producer Dole suggested, national standards 
are not being enforced, but voluntary codes are flourishing because o f retailer and 
consumer pressure and as such, states are being replaced (Conversation Sylvain 
Cuperlier, CSR Director: Dole, April 2005). From this perspective, how a state 
responds to workers depends not only on how the labour market is structured, but 
also on the nature o f the industry and the policies (CSR programmes and codes) 
operating within it (Ortiz 2002). The form and timing o f market (capitalist) 
development also frames the nature o f state intervention and the mechanisms 
employed (Burawoy 1985, Frundt 2005).
The Costa Rican Constitution and the Labour Law provide social guarantees -  
social security benefits and workers rights. Nevertheless, a local union official 
claimed the legislature did not uphold these entitlements, and that the Ministry for 
Labour had too few resources to check what was really happening on plantations:
“The government just sees the trade, dollars only make the 
headlines... the workers take all the rubbish, a mule has more attention 
than the worker” (Interview Union Local Secretary CS@S2, March
2006).
The Ministry of Labour is meant to oversee compliance with the country’s Labour 
Law, but a report by the National Ombudsman o f Costa Rica reported at the end 
of 2005 that the Labour Inspectorate was unable to do the job that the law 
stipulates it should (IJSA 2004). The level of commitment by the state to uphold 
the labour laws in Costa Rica is hard to determine. However, drawing on earlier 
discussions it would appear that there has, and continues to be, a strong 
relationship between the government o f the country and the banana sector.
During discussions at the IBCII event on the matter o f IFAs, few government 
officials appeared to be willing to comment on the poor up-take of IFAs by other 
major producers (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). A representative of one 
of the major producers suggested that this was because governments were fearful 
of supporting union activity on their own doorstep (Conversation Producer 
Representative, April 2005). In an aside, a representative o f a UK-based union
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outlined a conversation he had with a minister in Costa Rica during a fact-finding 
visit. He was part of a UK trade union delegation that visited Costa Rica in 2004, 
the aim of which was to observe and document working conditions on banana 
farms and assess repression o f unions (Conversation GMB Representative, April
2005). Apparently, the minister confirmed that the state could do nothing because 
the country needed the multi-nationals and there were no laws to control them -  
the indication being that these corporations could do what they liked. The 
General, Municipal and Boilermakers Union (GMB) representative went on to say 
that all producers in the country claimed they were complying with codes and 
standards, but the reality was quite different. As the state was powerless to 
intervene, this was clearly a case of ‘neoliberalism gone m ad’ in his view 
(Conversation GMB Union Representative, April 2005). This was not the first 
time during the course o f the conference that participants called the role of the 
nation-state into question. A representative o f a NGO based in Central America 
had earlier suggested ‘the role o f the state had been completely superseded by 
business’:
“Governments have abandoned their responsibilities to the people, 
they are like the private sector, there has been a merger between 
government and the private sector... companies now rule the country” 
(Presentation, IBCII April 2005).
As discussed in Chapter Six, successive governments in Costa Rica have fostered 
and supported the banana sector through a number o f different means, including 
the provision of state lands for production, import duty relief on production 
materials, and reduced taxes on banana exports. As noted by a representative of 
the National Banana Corporation, CORBANA:
“The international competitiveness o f the banana industry is 
paramount and it must be maintained if we are to have a future. We 
have to manage costs, because we are more expensive than Colombia 
and Ecuador. Last year we were the number two supplier to the UK 
market, now we are third and Colombia is second” (Interview Trade 
Association Manager JC@CA1, April 2006).
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Certainly, the state in Costa Rica depends largely on the production o f bananas 
for export and the foreign exchange it provides. However, a union official 
suggested that the state supported the industry so strongly because there were 
many government officials and Legislative Assembly members who were banana 
producers themselves. The union official went on to say that this was a key 
reason for the failure o f the government and the Ministry o f Labour to pressurise 
producers to conform to labour standards on banana plantations (Interview Union 
Local Secretary CS@S2, March 2006).
9.2.3 Trade Unions
In many ways, a group o f actors that would be considered key in terms of 
governance in production chains were relatively absent during the explosion of 
global supply chains in the 1990s, namely the trade unions. There are a number 
of reasons cited for this: the national characteristics o f unions and the lack of 
cross-border collaboration, the decline in union membership, the rise o f NGOs 
acting in the name o f human rights (including workers rights), and the fact that 
some trade unions struggled to understand their role in a globalised market 
(Waddington 1999, Frundt 2004, Brecher et al. 2006, Mason 2007). The decline 
in union density and their bargaining power has largely been attributed to the 
processes associated with globalisation (Frundt 2004, Brecher et al. 2006, Mason
2007). The pressures that unions are used to placing on national governments 
have largely been superseded by the globalisation of business, which is no longer 
territorially bound (Waddington 1999, Brecher et al. 2006, Mason 2007). 
Traditional forms of union organising based on secure factory employment fail to 
work in the context o f a casualised and dispersed labour force (Hale and Shaw 
2001). In some respects this is an erosion of the very basis upon which organised 
labour traditionally evolved (Riisgaard 2004). Some unions have responded to 
the changing landscape with intermittent attempts at international cooperation, but 
the obstacles are great (Brecher et al. 2006). No matter how strong a national 
union may be, in markets where there is an oversupply o f goods or when an 
opportunity arises to shift production to another location, a union’s power is 
severely weakened (Smith 2003, Brecher et al. 2006).
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In Costa Rica, unions are confronted with both the possibility o f companies 
relocating production and the problem of a low membership rate. We have seen 
that one of the real difficulties unions face in the country is how to blot out the 
memories o f the militant union conflicts with foreign multinationals during the 
1980s, which resulted in strikes, farm closures and “the evacuation o f both 
companies and jobs” (Interview Producer CSR Manager RC@P2, February
2006). Another challenge is the emergence of other worker representative 
groups; permanent committees and Solidarista Associations, which have usurped 
unions over the last two decades. However, as unions try to re-establish a hold 
and try to resist the loss o f worker protections won over fifty years o f combative 
struggle (Frundt 2005), the new process for securing workers’ rights has emerged 
-  company codes and standards. Codes, Frundt (2004) suggests, are at best the 
product o f ‘multi-stakeholders’ and at worst, merely serve class interests. 
However, Frundt (2004: 37) acknowledges that corporate codes may ‘offer the 
potential for improving work conditions and perhaps even the space for union 
organisation’, whilst at the same time recognises the danger o f codes being used 
to gloss over the repressive working conditions in the south ‘due to their 
“northern” origins’. Thus faced with the reality o f globalised production and all 
that comes with it, such as flexible and often informal labour, unions are placed in 
a compromised position (Jenkins et al. 2002, Frundt 2004). They face the 
dilemma o f whether to maintain traditional labour campaigns or embrace 
company codes -  in the hope that workers will benefit in the immediate future 
(Frundt 2004).
The view that unions remain ‘ambivalent’ as regards the onrush of codes and 
standards being introduced in global supply chains is therefore understandable 
(Frundt 2004: 36). For some trade unionists, there is the matter o f ‘autonomy’, 
that is should unions collaborate with companies in this way (Hale and Shaw 
2001). For others, there are doubts as to whether these voluntary initiatives are a 
real commitment to making an improvement in labour conditions or simply an 
‘empty’ public relations exercise (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). For 
some trade unionists codes are not enough, preferring instead to see a compulsory
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arrangement enshrined in law, whereby ILO core conventions are enforced. The 
belief is that when the conventions are made compulsory and policed accordingly 
by a UN entity, ‘freedom of association’ will truly exist (IBCII Forum 
Discussion, April 2005). As noted by one union organiser:
“The requirement being asked for is compulsory unions, codes of 
conduct are voluntary and don’t work. ISO standards and codes are 
preferred by producers and retailers to an IFA agreement, because 
they can defend their own position, they are not interested in 
reorganising the whole industry or getting it unionised, they just wish 
to defend their own position... companies ultimately only care about 
their shareholders. Producers aren’t necessarily interested in 
supporting the growth o f union membership either, they just want to 
protect their own positive image to their customers, shareholders and 
other outside bodies... producers will always move on if  they wish 
to... they can just declare the farm bankrupt and move on” (Interview 
BD@S4, April 2005).
O f course, the difficulty here is how a UN agency or other groups representing 
workers’ rights can oversee and police a global supply chain. However, there are 
other opportunities for unions to create a more international role for themselves 
(Mason 2007). One route is through a new form of governance in global supply 
chains; International Framework Agreements (IFAs). As noted by Riisgaard 
(2004), a way for organised labour to carve a space in a dispersed environment 
and secure workers’ rights is through the introduction of IFAs. The key 
difference compared with other labour initiatives (codes and standards) is that 
IFAs are negotiated with unions and include some form of union participation in 
the implementation and monitoring processes (Brecher et al. 2006).
It has been suggested that the IFA agreed between the COLSIBA/ IUF unions and 
Chiquita grew out o f the coordinated campaigns o f banana unions and solidarity 
groups in major consumer markets (the US and the EU), which were targeted at 
both supermarket groups and consumers (US/LEAP 2001, Riisgaard 2004). The 
role o f COLSIBA as the regional coordinating body for unions managing across a 
spectrum of political interests was central to this event. There were a number of 
national unions in Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama and Columbia,
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which had strong political ties on both sides of the traditional communist/left and 
the liberal divide. COLSIBA helped to facilitate cooperation across these 
national unions, which enabled this brave and historic agreement to come about 
(Riisgaard 2004). The IFA as a form of labour cooperation in the banana chain is 
heralded not least because it is multi-laterally enforced (Riisgaard 2004).
However, other producer companies have not shown much interest in this form of 
agreement. During a debate on codes and the different levels o f corporate 
engagement in the IBCII event, the failure of others to adopt IFAs became a key 
discussion point. One o f the reasons given was that, in practice, the IFA agreed 
between Chiquita and the COLSIBA/IUF unions was not working. It was also 
mooted that some producers were avoiding IFAs because they did not wish to 
have union representation and freedom of association on their plantations (IBCII 
Forum Discussion, April 2005). In their defence, producers claimed there was 
limited support for unions from the majority o f governments in Latin America, as 
unions were often politicised and thus their ‘hands were tied’. This explanation 
did not prevent the accusations o f ‘anti-unionism’ being directed at the TNC 
producers Dole and Del Monte during the debate (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 
2005). To some degree, such sentiments were echoed in an IFA review meeting 
in June 2006, when Oswald suggested that there was a marked difference in the 
agreement in place with Chiquita and the negotiations conducted with other major 
international banana companies; the ‘empty rhetoric’ o f some producers as it was 
described (IUF 2006: 3).
Such circumstances make it difficult to predict the future prospects of unions as 
regards the vanguard o f workers’ interests. A possible way forward would be for 
unions to forge strategic partnerships with related actors involved in the 
governance process o f global supply chains. However, one of the stumbling 
blocks o f this approach Frundt (2004) suggests is legitimacy -  that is, whose role 
is it to negotiate with companies on behalf o f workers. NGOs can be allies to 
unions in securing worker’s rights, but some NGOs are seen as undermining local 
unions by not recognising the role o f unions as the representatives of workers.
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Riisgaard (2005) suggests NGOs do this by endorsing codes that do not secure 
basic workers’ rights or by entering into discussions with companies regarding the 
monitoring o f codes, which effectively permits companies to avoid negotiation 
with employees or their representatives. In this respect, unions may view NGOs 
as competing with them as ‘governors’ in the chain (Frundt 2004, Riisgaard
2005). However, other actors in the chain, including NGOs and civil society 
groups, which helped to ‘open the doors’ for regional and local trade unions, have 
attributed the adoption o f an IFA by Chiquita to their sustained campaign (IBCII 
Forum Discussion, April 2005).
9.2.4 Non-Governmental Organisations
Over the last two decades, there has been an upsurge in the number and influence 
o f NGOs (Riisgaard 2005, Mason 2007). NGOs have engaged with a number of 
issues including w orkers’ rights, a concern that in the past would have typically 
been the preserve o f the labour movement (Riisgaard 2005). Developmental 
NGOs have responded to the ‘plight’ of the worker by extending their remit from 
macro-development assistance to a direct relationship with workers in the global 
workplace (Jenkins et al. 2002). Many NGOs are becoming household names 
and increasingly more influential in international affairs, which may provide 
unions with the opportunity o f collaboration (Riisgaard 2005). O f course, the key 
question is how  -  what are the possibilities and limitations? In some respects, the 
International Banana Conference forum is a perfect example o f the possibility and 
a model for the future. As noted by Bemudez (COLSIBA), who acted on the 
IBCII organising committee:
“We need more o f these multilateral conferences to make our voices 
heard... this is the forum, here are the right conditions to express 
different views -  small farmers, institutions, unions, NGOs, civil 
organisations... then we can discuss each perspective o f the problem, 
to share understanding, make proposals and build a consensus to 
move forward -  this would result in a winning side” (Presentation,
IBCII April 2005, emphasis as stated).
There are clear possibilities for alliances between NGOs and unions in the process 
of securing basic w orkers’ rights, but they can also generate responses that work
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against labour interests, as Riisgaard (2005) and Frundt (2004) suggest labour 
codes do. For example Riisgaard claims companies have embraced codes not 
only to safeguard against public opinion, but also as a means to sidestep demands 
for unionisation. Frundt highlights the struggle unions are facing in terms of 
commanding the central role as the sole representative o f workers’ interests, as 
codes simply stipulate the right to freely associate, as opposed to the recognition 
of unions in this function. In Costa Rica in particular, other forms o f worker 
representation exist, such as the state-sponsored Solidarista Associations and 
permanent committees, which compete with unions. However, trade unions and 
NGOs are drawn together at times against a common enemy (Field notes, Feb- 
April 2006). Both are critical o f corporate power in global supply chains and 
have campaigned together to promote ethical sourcing practices (Barrientos and 
Dolan 2006). In addition, both trade unions and developmental NGOs were 
instrumental in the creation of the ETI Base Code (ETI 1998). Nevertheless, both 
groups acknowledged in discussions, the weaknesses o f voluntary labour 
initiatives and the companies failure to genuinely support freedom of association 
and promote collective bargaining.
However, there did appear to be less respect for some of the NGOs campaigning 
on behalf o f banana workers in Costa Rica, as indicated by the comments of a 
harvest worker who is a permanent committee representative:
“All NGOs are only interested in making money themselves... they 
catch hold o f an issue, make a big fuss but this doesn’t help the 
workers. NGOs are mobilised by money and publicity, for example 
we have a big strike to defend rights, but the only people that stand 
there when the police come are union representatives” (Focus Group 
COHP@FG21, March 2006).
There were other similar statements regarding the role o f NGOs and their 
campaigning activities aimed at improving conditions for workers, with many 
suggesting that Northern-based NGOs had little engagement with banana workers 
on the ground.
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9.2.5 Consumers
Modem developments in food retailing have made consumers more reliant on the 
large supermarket groups for year-round supply of quality foods (Harvey et al. 
2002, Wrigley and Lowe 2002). During this process, consumers have also 
become more conscious of the environmental and social impacts o f global 
sourcing (Fmndt 2005, Barrientos and Dolan 2006). Consumers have voiced their 
concerns regarding health and safety, equitable wages and workers’ conditions in 
global supply chains. They have been mobilised by campaigners (NGOs and civil 
society groups) to force, through the agency of the supermarkets, large producers 
to alter cultivation methods and to change their strategies regarding labour 
conditions (Fmndt 2005, Barrientos and Dolan 2006). Customers are now 
avoiding what they see as socially irresponsible products and those companies 
that have allegedly acted irresponsibly in their actions related to the production 
operation o f global supply chains (Hopkins 2004, Fmndt 2005). It was clear from 
discussions conducted at the IBCII event, that ‘the consumer’ was considered to 
have a pivotal role in terms o f improving the ‘worker’s lot’ on banana plantations. 
Discussions relating to the ‘living wage’ exemplified this point with comments 
such as:
“Retailers are strong but fragile, they are sensitive to consumers 
reactions... the banana is the fruit o f misery, the only way is to get the 
consumer to deal with fair prices, otherwise we will end up with 
misery” (Union representative, IBCII 2005).
Calls for action made by unions were supported by NGOs, as noted by the 
comments o f a representative from Oxfam:
“We need a dialogue with supermarkets so that we can have the tme 
costs reflected in the price to the consumers... we need to use the 
experience o f unions to develop a dialogue” (Oxfam representative,
IBCII 2005).
A representative from a consumers’ association was also vocal on this matter:
“Bananas are cheaper in the importer country than the producing 
country... but the key person is the consumer... always the same
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bullets from the retailers -  that the consumer w on’t pay more, but the 
channel to reach the consumer is the social activist” (Consumers’ 
Association representative, IBCII 2005).
However, the problem of price and what the consumer is prepared to pay remains 
an unsolved one. Jorge Sauma of CORBANA suggested that the best way 
forward was to put aside the argument that “the retailer takes too large a share of 
the price” and concentrate on “a higher price for bananas at the supermarket 
checkout” (Interview Jorge Sauma, Director: CORBANA, April 2006). 
Somewhat ironically it was a representative of a major TNC producer attending 
the IBCII event who publicly declared, “it doesn’t matter what changes there are 
at the retail price, suppliers do not benefit -  everything is dictated by the market 
and the supermarkets” (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Consumer 
influence in terms o f pressurising supermarkets to improve labour conditions on 
banana plantations was a subject raised with union organisers, but whilst 
acknowledging the role o f consumers and consumer action, one union official 
suggested the benefits gained can be short lived:
“We have a number o f actions pending against the companies for 
illegal labour practices and poor conditions for the workers... but 
informing the banana customer, this is the important channel... we 
have to communicate the issues, [the] customer is an important ally 
for the banana. There was a campaign launched against Del Monte in 
the 1980s and UK customers were sent a letter asking for justice for 
the banana workers. Two tons o f rotten bananas were dumped at an 
office o f Del Monte in London. Then Del Monte searched out the 
union to sort out a global agreement, but three months later the 
agreement was violated” (Interview Union Local Secretary CS@S2, 
March 2006).
However, other stakeholders in the chain still see the consumer as a key actor in 
the fight for better conditions on banana plantations, as noted by a harvest worker:
“Customers can make changes for banana workers... we need 
customers in the UK to wake up to the plight o f the banana worker” 
(Focus Group COHP@FG21, March 2006)
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There have been a number of shopping surveys conducted in the UK, which show 
consumer propensity to buy ethically (The Co-operative Group 2004). Recently 
the Co-operative Group approached its customers, a total survey o f 100,000 
people, to express their views on food ethical policy and to prioritise areas for 
future action. This latest research shows that consumers ranked the area o f ethical 
trading (fairtrade and ‘sound’ sourcing) as the key area o f concern, above animal 
welfare and environmental impact (The Co-operative Group 2008). 
Nevertheless, the sticking point for more equitable trade always seems to be the 
price consumers are prepared to pay (The Co-operative Group 2004). If they 
were prepared to pay more to alleviate some of the difficulties associated with 
poor labour conditions in global supply chains, this may be a way forward. 
However, to ensure customer confidence this would require assurances from the 
supermarkets that increased retail prices were not actually swelling their profits, 
which may require a level o f transparency in the supermarkets’ cost structure that 
would be improbable in a competitive market.
9.3 A Gathering of the ‘Actors’ of Governance
As noted earlier, one o f the key aims o f the IBCII event in April 2005 was to 
establish a dialogue that could help reverse the ‘race to the bottom’ as far as 
workers’ rights and conditions were concerned, by creating a form of socio­
economic equity (IBCII Observations, April 2005). As such, the conference paid 
particular attention to the socio-economic issues in the industry, such as 
overproduction, low producer prices, human rights, and the role of trade union 
organisations; while also examining specific initiatives, which might alleviate the 
impact o f the socio-economic crisis. This was a concerted effort, which in many 
ways would represent an important test case for international trade in agriculture, 
because the problems facing the banana industry are similar to other agricultural 
sectors; global oversupply combined with a concentration o f market power in the 
hands o f a small number o f international supermarket retailers (Lines 2005). 
Such a situation reduces the bargaining power o f both the producers and the 
export-producing countries who receive a declining share o f the final market price 
of their goods (Lines 2005). This in turn affects the wages and labour conditions
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of banana workers and the loss of basic rights acquired by workers during the 
previous decade (IBCII 2004, Lines 2005).
One o f the key concerns voiced during the IBCII proceedings was how to tackle 
the issue o f fair prices in the industry. This was because it was strongly believed 
that fairer prices would lead to a ‘living wage’, which would in turn help to 
reverse the race to the bottom (IBCII 2004). The issue o f a living wage was 
raised in the very first interactive plenary o f the conference by a representative of 
Banana Link (NGO). The representative alleged that the banana TNCs were 
pulling out o f the Atlantic Coast producing countries, where wages were 
relatively high and workers were unionised, to grow bananas in the Pacific Coast 
and West African regions where production was cheaper and the labour force 
more fragmented (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Anne-Claire Chambron 
o f EUROBAN and Alistair Smith o f Banana Link argued this was a calculated 
move by the TNCs to break independent trade union organisations and casualise 
the banana plantation work force (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). 
Chambron highlighted this point during a discussion in the conference:
“In Costa Rica where trade unions have secured monthly wages of 
around US$100-200, they are dismissing workers only to reemploy 
them on an individual basis on short-term contracts with lower 
wages... Colombia, once the envy o f its neighbouring banana export 
countries, now faces a similar fate” (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 
2005).
Smith continued that Dole, the world’s biggest fruit company, had abandoned 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, sold up in Colombia, and cut wages overnight in Costa 
Rica -  from where it was threatening to pull out should the proposed new EU 
banana regime be introduced (the new system o f EU tariffs scheduled for January
2006) (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). Smith suggested that Dole was 
shifting its sourcing o f bananas to the Pacific Coast and that there were rumours 
o f African and Brazilian expansion. He added that Del Monte had unveiled new 
plantations in northeast Brazil, whilst Chiquita was withdrawing from the Atlantic
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Coast in Costa Rica and was holding tough negotiations with unions in Panama 
and Honduras (IBCII Forum  Discussion, April 2005).
Compared to the First International Banana Conference (IBCI) held in 1998, there 
were tangible differences in the tone and tempo o f the debate, as noted by some of 
the participants who had attended both conferences:
“This is all very anti-corporate, last time we [the producers] were 
included in organising the event, setting the agenda, we helped decide 
the issues, were part o f the planning process... now we are here just 
as the fa ll-guys” (Conversation Producer representative, April 2005 - 
emphasis as stated).
The US-banana TNCs came under considerable fire from key lobby groups during 
the plenary sessions o f the conference, with both trade unions and NGOs 
lambasting the producers for forcing down the wages o f plantation workers in 
order to ensure their own profits under the pressures o f the increased purchasing 
power o f the m ajor superm arket groups (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). 
This evolved into a ‘nam ing and sham ing’ o f the key TNC producers and claims 
by the organising com m ittee that their adoption o f codes and certification 
schemes was no substitute for labour legislation and enforcement (IBCII Forum 
Discussion, April 2005). A representative o f the union COLSIBA, German 
Zepeda raised the issue o f  the role o f unions on the opening day o f the IBCII 
event:
“Unions are the only vehicle to improve workers conditions... to 
ensure decent treatm ent where work is concerned, to provide a decent 
salary, access to health care and an acceptable standard o f living in 
our country. W e need a union, we need initiatives to gain collective 
agreements, we need to reinforce the strength o f unions, we need to 
guarantee com pliance w ith ILO conventions... we m ustn’t give 
ground to com panies where minim um  standards aren’t being adhered 
to ... we need constant work to be carried out by unions to address 
these issues” (Presentation, IBCII April 2005).
These comments were indicative o f the feelings and general atmosphere that had 
surfaced in, and pervaded the conference. A startling divide emerged between the
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small growers, the unions and the big TNC producers. The TNC producers were 
accused o f ruining the industry by causing problems o f oversupply in the market 
and failing to prevent the supermarkets from continually lowering buying costs, 
which subsequently drove labour conditions down. However, the most criticised 
group were the supermarkets, particularly as regards lower market prices and the 
downward spiral o f workers’ conditions. The supermarkets were seen as the key 
detractors, in terms o f improving the conditions o f workers, because they 
regularly engaged in ‘price w ars’ (IBCII Forum Discussion, April 2005). The 
organising committee issued a statement from the conference, calling for a delay 
to any changes in the EU tariff system and demanding a full evaluation of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts of different tarification and supply 
management scenarios for EU banana imports by the European Commission 
(Graham 2005, IBCII 2005a). This statement was made together with a plea to 
the Latin American and ACP banana-exporting countries to give priority to the 
process o f negotiation (both amongst themselves and the EU) and with the 
participation o f  the civil society actors present in the conference, to build 
consensus on the issue (Graham 2005). However, one o f the key requirements, 
stipulated for the future survival o f the sector, was a multi-stakeholder forum to 
tackle the issues and ensure a sustainable industry, a stable market, the rights of 
workers, and for the supermarkets to be engaged in a dialogue for developing 
mechanisms which would guarantee fairer prices (Graham 2005, IBCII 2005a).
9.4 Conclusion
The argument made in this chapter draws on a number o f key points. The first is 
that control in the banana global supply chain has moved up the chain to the 
supermarket group. As such, supermarkets have become a key decision-maker in 
the way global supply chains are governed, and the second is that the ‘right’ to 
govern is unequally distributed in the chain (with control largely in the hands of 
corporates). In some regards, the influence o f supermarkets in the chain -  buyer- 
driven -  should be beneficial for workers, insomuch as supermarkets, in their 
dominant position, are able to apply pressure on producers to improve the labour 
conditions in any given supply chain. However, the efficiency of the chain
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(economies o f scale for both corporate actors) and the benefits to consumers (of 
lower prices) seems to dictate the conditions for workers in the banana production 
chain. The introduction o f codes has led to a private regulatory regime for global 
supply chains, which is unenforceable, even by the consumer. Other actors in the 
chain, including trade unions, NGOs, civil society groups and political agitators 
are struggling to keep the more powerful actors (corporates) at bay. In an era of 
globalised markets, this means that unions in particular, have to change their 
approach to their role as workers’ advocate, not least because of the potential 
danger o f NGOs filling the ‘industrial relations’ space and the competitive 
position o f organisations like Solidarismo in Central America, which can fulfil the 
role o f representing workers, albeit less effectively according to some. The state 
and banana producers have embedded the Solidarismo model on banana 
plantations in Costa Rica, so together they have promoted a system which permits 
a more flexible and controllable labour situation. In essence, Solidarista 
Associations represent the corporatist model of state and business working 
together, to the potential detriment o f the labour condition.
As noted in this chapter and Chapter Six, permanent committees (the workers’ 
representative group) are not able to act for workers in the collective bargaining 
process. Permanent committee members have no or very little contact with their 
counterparts on other farms, their role is solely to deal with issues and complaints 
on the farm where they are employed. Yet the comments made by workers 
regarding the role o f permanent committees and Solidarista Associations were 
positive overall. By comparison, many workers showed a real reluctance to join a 
union. However, for those workers who did wish to form an association in terms 
of a trade union, there appeared to be some discouragement from both the state 
and the major producers. Since the introduction and accelerated growth of 
Solidarismo, unions have been at a disadvantage in Costa Rica.
As regards the state in Costa Rica, it faces the same difficulties as other countries 
engaged in export production, which is how to maintain its flow o f foreign 
exchange and promote an industry in a competitive market, where labour is a
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significant cost o f production. In a free and globalised market, competition is 
fierce and high wage rates are a threat to an export market, because they can lead 
to higher product prices, lower returns on capital due to lower product demand, 
and ultimately higher unemployment. Costa Rica may have diversified its 
industrial base, but banana production is still a large contributor to the country’s 
foreign exchange and a big employer in the province of Limon. Costa Rica has 
traditionally promoted economic and social development, but like other banana 
producer-countries it has had to adapt to market forces. The need to be 
competitive in the country’s two major export markets, the US and the EU, 
highlights the dilemma for the Costa Rican state, o f how to maintain the social 
guarantees it has historically promoted whilst at the same time supporting the 
export trade o f bananas. This may explain why some respondents have suggested 
that the model o f social protection in Costa Rica is not enforced and that the legal 
system ignores the plight o f banana workers. The threat that some producers may 
relocate their production operation to other countries, particularly to West Africa 
where jurisdictions on labour standards are deemed to be lower, and the 
presumption that costs will be lower for similar production output, has not helped 
the position o f the nation-state. The international banana pricing crisis during the 
1990s squeezed producers’ profit margins and in response the TNCs relocated 
some o f their production to reduce their operating costs. The global banana 
market is undergoing similar problems today, and the lowering o f banana prices 
places the Costa Rican state under an obligation to maintain favourable conditions 
to ensure that the major TNC producers do not relocate again.
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Chapter Ten 
Discussion and Conclusion
Introduction
This final chapter o f the thesis discusses the main findings described in Chapters 
Seven to Nine. It begins with revisiting the main theme of the thesis and 
continues to answer each o f the four research questions presented in Chapter 
Four. The analytical arguments discussed in each o f the data chapters will be 
presented in response to these questions. This will be followed by a discussion on 
the possible impact o f the current research on existing or future policy, and will 
conclude with a few final thoughts.
10.1 The Main Theme of the Thesis
The main interest o f the thesis is the role of corporate actors in the global banana 
supply chain. The fundamental theme of the research is the position of UK 
supermarket groups in the chain and the level of influence they are able to wield 
with regard to working conditions in the production operation of the chain. As 
described in Chapter Two, supermarket groups have emerged as a dominant force 
in the UK food retailing market and are able to command a position o f authority 
over their supply base. However, the banana chain is not a typical buyer-driven 
chain. The chain has other powerful actors at the supply end of the chain, the US - 
banana TNC producers. This is exemplified in Chapter Three, where attention is 
drawn to the fact that, like the UK supermarkets, the US-banana TNCs operate in 
a market which has the characteristics o f an oligopoly. In attempting to ascertain 
the role o f supermarkets in persuading their supply base to adopt codes of 
conduct, it is worth bearing in mind that the TNC producers also have a degree of 
power in the chain. There are also other social actors with a degree of influence 
in the global banana supply chain that need to be considered, including trade 
unions, governments, NGOs and civil society groups. The complexity of the 
global banana industry and the numerous stakeholder groups involved in the chain 
make for an interesting research study.
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10.2 Returning to the Research Questions
One o f the key questions the thesis attempts to answer is: Does the adoption of 
codes o f conduct improve labour conditions on banana plantations?
The operational practices involved in the production of bananas for export have 
changed over the course o f time, and with them so has the nature o f work and 
employment. On banana plantations today, labour is structured to suit the 
producer’s need to ensure high quality fruit, maintain high production yields, 
meet short order lead-times, and reduce costs. The demands on producers largely 
emanate from the market and create different pressure points along the supply 
chain. These pressures include the need to pack all the fruit harvested on the 
same day to ensure best quality, the race to the port to load the ship that must be 
quickly turned around to maintain delivery schedules in the destination market, 
and ultimately the need to be a low-cost operator to meet the pricing criteria of the 
supermarket groups. Such requirements place a huge pressure on the supply 
chain, which is often transferred to the workers involved in the production 
process. As claimed by workers, their representatives and campaigners in the 
discussion forum o f the Second International Banana Conference (IBCII) in April 
2005, allowing the market to rule has resulted in low wages, compulsory 
overtime, hazardous conditions, and a lack of job security in the banana industry. 
These are some o f the very conditions that codes of conduct are intended to 
prevent.
Indeed, some o f the responses from banana workers to questions relating to the 
tasks they perform indicate the failure o f codes to ensure acceptable working 
practices on plantations. As highlighted in Chapter Seven, where the key 
activities o f plantation production are explained, there are instances when health 
and safety precautions are set aside, either by workers or farm managers. 
Workers describe how they would remove protective clothing, masks and gloves, 
because they felt the protective wear made their job more difficult. In addition, 
managers responsible for clearing the field in readiness for the overhead spraying 
of agro-chemicals admitted they were often too busy or distracted by other 
responsibilities to make all the necessary checks to ensure all workers had left the 
field. Failure to act in this way may ensure the efficiency o f the harvest operation
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and maintain production output, but such behaviour falls foul o f the principles 
detailed in both the ETI Base Code and the SA8000 Standard. These scenarios 
were openly discussed by workers on many of the farms visited, and there was no 
clear indication that one producer was more able than another to prevent such 
situations arising. A CSR Manager and a Compliance Manger, each representing 
different TNC producers in Costa Rica, acknowledged that there were times when 
commercial pressures prevailed and shortcuts were taken in the production 
process. To an extent, it seemed as if  producers were complicit in the failure to 
adhere to codes, because they recognised such behaviour while stating they were 
powerless to change the situation. The difficulty o f altering behaviour on the 
ground so to speak, can be a problem when implementing change in any work 
environment, but encouraging workers to accept new ways of working that are 
compliant with the health and safety principle of the codes seemed to be quite a 
challenge for some producers. The point that companies do not always choose 
the easiest solution for workers in such circumstances, often preferring instead to 
take the most cost effective route is well made in Chapter Seven. The increased 
application o f agro-chemicals is concerned with improving production yields and 
the introduction o f protective clothing for workers may comply with the 
accompanying regulation for the handling o f chemicals, but the equipment can 
still be a hindrance to completing the work required. O f course, an alternative for 
the producer would be to find other ways o f increasing production output, which 
would negate or lower the usage o f such materials. In this way, the application of 
fungicides and nematicides would not impinge upon the work to be done, such as 
the harvesting o f the crop between bouts o f aerial spraying.
The second question the thesis attempts to answer is: In whose best interest is it to 
adopt codes and other voluntary initiatives, such as International Framework 
Agreements (IFAs).
Do codes suit companies, nation-states, workers, worker representatives, NGOs or 
indeed consumers? In Chapter Nine, the discussion focuses on the numerous 
actors as stakeholder groups involved in the global banana supply chain and the 
reality o f social responsibility policies enacted by companies. The chapter 
highlights the fact that each group o f social actors involved has a different level of
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influence in the chain. There is strong evidence to suggest that demands made by 
supermarket groups are paramount and what supermarkets want, they tend to get. 
One o f the key trading requirements stipulated by UK supermarket groups to their 
suppliers is that they have to abide by the principles outlined in the ETI Base 
Code. As detailed in Chapter Eight, all the major UK supermarkets subscribe to 
this voluntary code, as do some o f the producers in the sector, for instance 
Chiquita, Del Monte and Fyffes. Dole is the only major producer that places its 
commitment solely on the SA8000 Standard as a means o f overseeing labour 
conditions on banana farms.
Discussions in Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine tend to suggest that codes reflect 
the interests o f business and the nation-state and only in part, those of workers. 
As noted in these chapters, there are aspects of the trading arrangement between 
supermarkets and producers which affect the ways in which codes are adhered to. 
Producers are expected to both improve labour conditions and support the 
reduction o f prices in the marketplace -  a difficult balance to strike. In the past, 
the large US-banana TNC producers in Costa Rica were as powerful as the 
nation-state, but now the so-called ‘Lords o f the Chain’ govern them. In recent 
years, the intense price competition between the major UK supermarket groups 
has resulted in a number o f price wars and the heavy discounting o f bananas. 
When one supermarket group cuts prices, competitors quickly follow regardless 
of the impact this has on the banana supply chain. The heavy discounting of 
bananas in 2002, 2005 and 2006 was initiated by ASDA, but Tesco, Sainsbury’s 
and Morrisons quickly followed suit and much o f the costs were passed onto the 
producers. Low prices in the marketplace erode the achievements made through 
CSR programmes and codes o f conduct. The supermarkets at the top o f the chain 
place pressure on the producers, who in turn pass it on to the worker at the bottom 
of the chain. Such pressure is bound to create a downward spiral o f working 
conditions on banana plantations. The producers have to balance their own 
financial accounts and, typically, the only means o f achieving this objective is to 
increase productivity and reduce production costs, o f which labour is a core 
component. It is understandable therefore, that some producers claim the 
supermarkets are culpable in the ‘race to the bottom’ in the industry. In essence,
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the producers claim that the UK supermarkets’ buying practices are helping to 
perpetuate a cycle of low wages and job insecurity on banana plantations.
However, both the TNC and independent producers are also accused o f affecting 
workers’ pay, employment rights and working conditions through the cost 
efficiencies they pursue in the banana production process. One o f the key 
complaints raised against the producers by respondents and participants involved 
in the study is that producers avoid providing legislative benefits to workers by 
subcontracting work or hiring temporary workers. Certainly, there were many 
instances when workers stated they had temporary contracts, particularly in the 
field, where there was a high percentage o f migrant labour. The interminable 
‘rolling three m onth’ is how it is described in Chapter Seven. Indeed the 
testimonies regarding permanent contracts detailed in the chapter illustrate what a 
prize a permanent contract is considered to be.
Trade unions and NGOs that have collaborated to develop codes o f conduct also 
seem less sure o f the benefits o f this form o f voluntary regulation. Observations 
made at the IBCII forum in April 2005 tend to suggest that codes have failed to 
live up to their expectations. One o f the common complaints about the ETI Base 
Code, which both trade unions and NGOs were instrumental in developing, is that 
there is no formal process for monitoring compliance to the code. The three-year 
ETI impact assessment exercise completed in 2006 was a limited survey and as 
such it is difficult to assess whether the majority o f ETI members are compliant 
with the code’s key principles.
The third question raised during the research process was: What do workers think 
about codes and IFAs?
Trying to ascertain what workers thought o f codes o f conduct proved problematic. 
Some o f the difficulties experienced related to the number o f codes which had 
been introduced on banana plantations, and the similarity o f the codes. Many 
workers were aware o f  the ILO core conventions, but were unaware o f how these 
principles translated into the codes. The level o f awareness and understanding by 
workers also varied depending on the producer company managing the farm. On 
the Chiquita farms, most o f the workers demonstrated they had some knowledge
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of the codes and standards that applied to them. However, it was unclear as to 
whether workers fully understood how the codes could improve their working 
conditions. As noted in Chapter Eight, two o f the biggest concerns for workers 
were temporary contracts and their rights regarding association, particularly in 
terms o f forming or being a member of a union. These concerns were the most 
contentious issues raised by workers and union officials when discussing codes.
In terms o f workers’ representatives and trade unions, there seemed to be an 
acceptance that codes were one way of promoting the fundamental rights o f 
workers. But union officials stated that they considered codes as complementary 
to other forms o f regulation, such as state legislation and the ILO conventions, 
and not a substitute. The suggestion was that there was a danger of codes being 
used as ‘window dressing’ by some corporations who wished to be seen as 
socially responsible. Union officials also criticised the way they had been 
excluded from the monitoring process o f codes. In this respect, unions preferred 
IFAs because this form o f labour control included a much clearer monitoring and 
reporting structure, and o f course, unions had a clear role in developing such 
agreements. However, it is still unclear if  such initiatives benefit workers or are 
valued by workers and their representatives, or indeed if  labour is able to be an 
active participant in the monitoring process for codes.
The final question the thesis attempts to answer is: Are IFAs a decisive step 
towards re-regulation?
What helps to distinguish the major producers observed in this study is the overall 
strategic intent o f the company and their resolve to make changes on the ground. 
Chiquita International is a good case in question: the company’s social 
responsibility programme which includes the adoption o f codes o f conduct is 
bolstered by the com pany’s commitment to go a step further than any other 
producer in the industry. The introduction of an IFA by Chiquita reinforces the 
changes that needed to be made to comply with the principles o f voluntary codes 
and the ILO core conventions, which the codes all draw upon. The discussion in 
Chapter Eight regarding the role o f the IFA and the impact it has made for 
workers employed on plantations owned or managed by Chiquita bears witness to 
this. Moreover, as respondents’ commentary in the chapter illustrates, there is a
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growing confidence that the attention Chiquita places on the communication of 
company values, codes and its commitment to the IFA is improving the workers’ 
position. Many o f the company’s workers responded favourably to questions 
regarding their employment conditions. In the field, workers seemed to 
appreciate their independence and the fact that their daily production targets were 
managed without harassment from supervisors. In the packhouse, workers 
appeared to value the opportunity o f being able to work in different sections and 
the variety o f tasks they could perform in the preparation and packing o f the fruit. 
However, one major player taking a strong position on labour conditions does not 
prevent violations o f workers’ rights by other producers in an industry. Until the 
supermarket groups recognise socially responsible behaviour in its supplier base 
and award supply contracts accordingly, there is little incentive for other 
producers to follow suit.
The International Banana Conference forum is illustrative not only of the 
complexity o f the sector, but also o f how an industry can attempt to self-regulate. 
This forum, if  it continues, has the capacity to drive the agenda towards a 
legislative model o f  governance. It could promote agreements between the 
corporate actors in the banana chain that recognise compliance with codes and 
other efforts to promote the welfare o f workers. A trade agreement or supply 
contract could be drawn up whereby codes are an intrinsic part o f doing business 
-  a sort o f preferential partnership for those companies committed to formalising 
commitments to codes o f conduct.
10.3 Future Impact of the Research
One of the key findings o f the research study is that codes o f conduct are not the 
panacea for improving labour conditions in global supply chains. As noted by a 
number o f respondents who commented on the role and value o f codes in this 
study, unacceptable working conditions remain on banana plantations. Many 
suggested that commitments made by both supermarkets and producers to abide 
by the principles outlined in codes did not prevent them from disregarding codes 
when it suited. Some respondents also stated that codes are merely 
demonstrations o f good intent, and while such commitments are voluntary and not 
enshrined in law, codes could never be anything else. In this respect, the research
-254-
points towards a requirement for some form of legislation, either at the level of 
the nation-state or the supranational, or indeed both. It was suggested at the 
IBCII forum in April 2005 that the industry needed an ombudsman o f some sort, 
possibly a United Nations agency, which would work in tandem with the World 
Trade Organisation to link labour standards with trade. In this way, labour 
conditions could be encapsulated in the market opportunity and real inroads could 
be made in improving the workers’ situation. This would, of course, entail a 
further level o f regulation that may be opposed by some key stakeholders in the 
banana chain. Although the research study did provide evidence that without 
such legislation companies that are committed to a CSR programme do, on 
balance, uphold codes o f conduct.
However, compliance to these voluntary measures o f labour control in global 
supply chains is still a cost to business that some companies will not or cannot 
subscribe to. The way forward therefore, may be a more regulated approach, 
which would create a ‘level playing field’ and help to prevent a ‘race to the 
bottom ’. Just like any other form of legislation in the food industry, supermarkets 
and producers would be obliged to comply, and the cost o f managing the supply 
chain with prescribed conditions for workers would be the same for all 
businesses. This may negate the competitive advantage that some companies 
believe an ethical sourcing policy offers, but it may improve labour conditions on 
banana plantations across the industry. This may prove more constructive than 
individual corporate action, such as the commitment made by Sainsbury’s, 
Waitrose and the Co-operative Group to source only Fairtrade bananas, which 
according to some industry commentators has actually worsened the employment 
position and security o f workers on Latin American plantations. As discussed in 
Chapter Eight, this is partially due to the certification process and the criteria used 
for assigning the Fairtrade label.
However, other respondents argued that with greater transparency and multi­
stakeholder engagement, such as the introduction of a participatory audit to 
include workers, unions and NGOs, codes o f conduct could do so much more. 
Who is ultimately responsible for the labour conditions in global supply chains, 
and who is authorised to police or govern the production operation o f the chain,
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are thus questions to be wrestled with. What is evident from this research study is 
that the regulation o f labour falls somewhere between the market and the state. 
What this means for the future of ethical trade is dependent on the consumer and 
the active campaigning o f NGOs and civil society groups, and the will o f the state 
to adopt a more dynamic role in the ethical sourcing debate.
As regards the future role of trade unionism, there is an opportunity to promote 
the success o f the Chiquita-COLSIBA-IUF agreement in the banana sector by 
promoting its success and encouraging other TNC producers to draw up such an 
agreement. There is also the possibility o f embedding IFAs in the CSR 
programmes o f supermarket groups in the way that the ETI Base Code is a key 
requirement for producers wishing to supply the UK retail market. Trade Unions 
and civil society groups could also work more closely together and campaign for 
more rigorous codes that include workers in the initiation and development 
process o f the standards implemented in their workplace.
However, this should not exclude the state from continuing to develop legislation 
and uphold guarantees to protect the fundamental rights o f their citizens. Codes 
o f conduct should not be a substitute for state legislation or indeed a duplication 
o f an already established structure o f social guarantees. The possibility of 
corporate self-regulation as a replacement for institutional governance is a real 
concern. In some respects, this study demonstrates the changing role o f the Costa 
Rican state, the lessening o f its authority, and the limitation of international 
institutions in terms o f governing the banana chain. Companies who appear to be 
driving a self-regulation agenda have overtaken both these groups of social actors. 
This raises the question o f whether workers’ rights can only be fully realised 
when supermarket groups are prepared to address their own behaviours (buying 
practices) or will w orkers’ attempts to improve their conditions be continually 
undermined by the downward costs pressures in the market. This is possibly, 
where the consumer can play a major role. If consumers are made more aware of 
their own role in the pursuit o f cheap food and the repercussions this has for 
labour in global supply chains, there is an opportunity to influence supermarket- 
purchasing practices. Consumers are a critical stakeholder group for 
supermarkets and consumer disquiet will spur these behemoths to change their
-256-
behaviour. In this way, it may be possible for consumers to address the problems 
facing workers in the far-flung fields o f production.
10.4 Final Thoughts
Some o f the issues raised in this thesis, including the regulation o f labour 
practices are not new. What is new is the way that labour regulation has been 
reframed under the auspices of the corporation and the way private regulation is 
overtaking state and institutional regulation. Voluntary labour initiatives such as 
codes o f conduct and IFAs offer the possibility o f a springboard for new strategic 
alliances: between workers, their representatives, trade unions, NGOs, and civil 
society groups (those organisations campaigning on the workers’ behalf). The 
groundswell o f interest in ethical trade and labour initiatives provides one arena in 
which new coalitions are being developed. Nevertheless, my sense of the 
situation is that codes o f conduct and IFAs will only be truly effective when 
workers really understand the benefits they offer and are able to organise and 
represent themselves in the distant fields of production. In some respects, I 
believe that other stakeholders in the chain need to intensify the pressure placed 
on companies to behave ethically in their business practices. There is still a long 
way to go for all corporate actors in an industry to abide by the same set o f rules -  
for companies to enact governance in a consistent manner. It would seem that the 
conditions workers face in the production o f bananas for export varies too greatly, 
is dependant on the producer, and therefore the worker remains vulnerable. The 
only way this situation will change in the future is for better communication with 
the consumer as regards the conditions faced by workers. However, how 
ethically sourced bananas can be made distinct in the marketplace brings us back 
to the labelling question and the rigour behind the certification process o f these 
goods. Undoubtedly, if  greater confidence in these schemes could be achieved 
then a clearer distinction could be made between the ways different producers 
operate. This may also draw greater attention to the fact that supermarkets need 
to consider the impact o f their role in continually forcing prices down in a market, 
as such action only reinforces poor labour conditions for workers in global food 
supply chains.
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Appendix A
Conference Organisers of the IBCII 
EUROBAN -  the European Banana Action Network
EUROBAN is a coalition of trade unions (including IUF), environment and 
development NGOs and Fair-trade organisations in 13 European countries. 
EUROBAN was founded in 1994, and chiefly coordinates solidarity actions with 
plantation w orkers’ unions and small farmer groups in banana exporting countries.
COLSIBA -  Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros
COLSIBA is a regional co-ordinating body which brings together independent trade 
union organisations o f workers from the banana plantation sector and also from sugar, 
coffee, flowers and other agro-industrial activities -  in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia and Ecuador. COLSIBA comprises 10 
unitary organisations -  national co-ordinating bodies, national federations, individual 
trade unions, as well as rural workers and small farmer associations -  which together 
regroup 42 grassroots w orkers’ organisations and more than 45,000 organised men 
and women plantation workers. COLSIBA was founded in 1993.
WINFA -  Association of Caribbean Farmers
WINFA was established in 1982 to promote the social and economic welfare of small 
farmers in the Caribbean. It is a regional body made up o f independent producer 
groups, individual farmers and agro-processors in five islands (St. Vincent, St. Lucia, 
Grenada, Dominica and Martinique). Although not originally primarily concerned 
with bananas, it has become one o f the main protagonists in the debate over the future 
of the industry with the governments o f the islands.
IUF/UITA/IUL
The International Union o f Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco 
and Allied W orkers’ Associations (IUF) is an international federation o f trade unions 
representing workers employed in: agriculture and plantations, the preparation and 
manufacture of food and beverages, hotels, restaurants and catering services and all 
stages of tobacco processing. The IUF is composed of 336 trade unions in 120 
countries representing a combined membership of over 12 million workers. From its 
founding in 1920, international labour solidarity has been the IUF's guiding principle.
US/LEAP
The US Labor Education in the Americas Project (formerly the US Guatemala Labor 
Education Project) is an independent non-profit organisation that supports the basic 
rights o f workers in Central America, especially those who are employed directly or 
indirectly by US companies. US LEAP has been engaged in providing support work 
for banana workers since 1998.
EUROPEAN FAIRTRADE ORGANISATIONS
Further representatives in the IBC Preparatory Committee included a number o f fair­
trade organisations/networks, notably Oxfam International and FLO International.
(IBCII 2004)
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Appendix B
List of Countries Represented at the IBCII
The countries represented at the Second International Banana Conference (IBCII) in 
Brussels, April 2005 are detailed below:
Europe Latin America ACP 
(Africa, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific)
ROW  
(Rest of the 
World)
Belgium Columbia Barbados Canada
Czech Republic Cost Rica Cameroon Japan
Denmark Ecuador Dominican
Republic
Philippines
France Guatemala Ghana USA
Germany Honduras Grenada
Hungary Nicaragua Guadeloupe
Ireland Panama Haiti
Italy Peru Jamaica
Lithuania Martinique
Monaco Morocco
Netherlands St. Lucia
Spain St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Sweden Ivory Coast
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Source: IBCII 2004
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Appendix C
UK Sales Turnover by Supermarket Group for the Financial Year 2006/7
Supermarket Retailer Sales Turnover (£m)
Tesco PLC 32,665
ASDA Group Ltd* 15,276
J Sainsbury PLC 17,151
Wm Morrisons PLC 12,461
The Co-operative Group 7,334
Somerfield PLC** N/A
Waitrose Ltd*** N/A
Notes:
* ASDA Group Ltd. is owned by Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and reports its sales in US dollars. 
For the financial year-ending 31st December 2006, ASDA reported sales of $26.8billion, 
which at an exchange rate o f 1 USD to £0.57 translates to the above figure in pounds sterling 
(Key Note 2007b).
** Following a private-equity consortium buy-out in December 2005 Somerfield PLC no 
longer publishes annual sales figures, but in the financial year-ending April 2005 the group’s 
turnover was £4,676m (Key Note 2007b).
*** Waitrose Ltd. is part o f the John Lewis Partnership PLC and sales are published jointly 
for both trading operations. In the financial year-ending January 2007 the combined group’s 
sales were £6,376m (Key Note 2007b).
Source: Company Annual Reports 2006/7, Key Note 2007b.
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Appendix D
UK Market Share by Supermarket Group for the Financial Year 2006/7
Supermarket Retailer Market Share 
(% )
Tesco PLC 31.3
ASDA Group Ltd 16.7
J Sainsbury PLC 16.3
Wm Morrisons PLC 11.2
The Co-operative Group 4.5
Somerfield PLC 3.5
Waitrose Ltd 4.0
Source: Company Annual Reports 2006/7, Key Note 2007b.
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Appendix E
The ILO Core Conventions
No. 29: Forced Labour Convention, 1930
No. 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention, 1948
No. 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
No. 100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
No. 105: Abolition o f Forced Labour Convention, 1957
No. I l l :  Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958
No. 138: Minimum Age Convention, 1973
No. 182: W orst Forms o f Child Labour Convention, 1999
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Appendix F
Themed Questions
A. EMPLOYMENT
What work do you do? How has the work changed over the years? What training did 
you have for your job?
What are your working hours per day/week? How are you paid? How do you get paid 
for extra hours or overtime?
What work contract do you have? How many years have you worked on this 
plantation?
B. WORKING CONDITIONS
How would you describe working on the plantation? What do you like about working 
on the plantation? What don’t you like about working on the plantation?
What do you do if  you have work problems? Are there procedures for grievances or 
complaints on the plantation? How do these procedures work?
How are workers represented on the plantations? Which unions are represented here? 
What do the unions do for the workers?
How could working conditions on the plantation be improved?
C. LABOUR CODES OF CONDUCT
What Labour Codes o f Conduct have you heard about? Which Codes operate here?
How do these Codes benefit workers? What are the difficulties with Codes?
How do management respond to these Codes? What is the role of unions in respect of 
the codes?
D. INFORMATION ABOUT THE PLANTATION AND COMPANY
What is the size o f the plantation (hectares)? How many people work on the 
plantation, approximately? Are there living quarters or accommodation provided on 
the plantation?
Have you worked on other plantations? How is this plantation different to other 
plantations you have worked on or know about?
Is there anything else you would like to say?
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Appendix G
Reference Coding System
The coding system has been developed to ensure anonymity and confidentiality for those 
respondents and participants involved in the research study. However, the approach to coding 
has been constructed in such a way, it allows the author/analyst to identify the testimony 
made and link comments to a respondent’s occupation and the farm where employed. In the 
case of focus groups, participants are identified by their occupation and focus group number.
Phases of Research Activity (February-April 2006) Reference Number
1. Office meetings: 1
(Preparations for farm visits with producers, unions and NGOs)
2. 1st group of Farm visits 2
3. 2nd group o f Farm visits and Focus Groups 3
4. 3rd group of Farm visits 4
Group One: Workers (Obreros); Supervisor (Supervisores), Office Staff (Funcionarios y 
Personnales) and Farm Managers (Administrativos)
1st Letter 2nd Letter 3rd Letter 4th Letter Date
1st name 
initial
Employment
Role:
O -  Workers 
S -  Supervisors 
F -  Office Staff 
A -  Farm 
Manager
Job Type:
B -  Bagging 
C -  Cropping 
H -  Harvest 
S -  Selection 
P -  Packing 
Q -  Quality 
L -  Loading
Worker
Representative: 
P -  Permanent 
Committee 
S -  Solidarismo 
U -  Union
Farm/Finca (F) 
and phase 
reference (2,3 
or 4) and 
number based 
on order of 
visits in the 
phase
Month / year
Group Two: Banana Companies/Producers (Productores)
1st L etter 2 nd L etter @ D ate
1st name 
initial
Employment Role:
D -  Director 
C - C S R
CM -  Compliance Manager 
G -  General Manager (Country) 
L -  Lawyer 
Q -  Quality
T -  Technical Manager/Auditor
Producer/Productores (P) 
and number based on order 
of meeting respondents
Month / year
Group Three: Unions (Sindicatos)
1st L etter 2 nd L etter D ate
1 st name 
initial
Employment Role:
G -  General Co-ordinator 
0 -  Organiser
Union/Sindicatos (S) and 
number based on order o f  
meeting respondents
Month / year
Group Four: Solidarity Associations (Solidarismo)
1st L etter 2 nd L etter @ D ate
1st name 
initial
Employment Role:
G -  General Co-ordinator 
S -  Secretary (Social)
Solidarity Association/ 
Solidarista Asociacion (SA) 
and number based on order 
of meeting respondents
Month / year
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G roup Five: N on Governmental Organisations (Las Organizaciones N o G ubem am entales)
Is* Letter 2nd Letter @ Date
1st name 
initial
Employment Role:
D -  Director 
S -  Secretary (General) 
C -  Co-ordinator
NGO/ Las Organizaciones 
No Gubemamentales (OG) 
and number -  based on 
initial order o f meeting field 
respondents
Month / year
Group Six: Certification B odies (Certificacion Grupos)
1st Letter 2nd Letter @ Date
1 st name 
initial
Employment Role:
G -  General Co-ordinator 
M -  Manager 
S -  Secretary (Social)
Certification/Certifcacion 
Gmpos (C) and number 
based on initial order of 
meeting respondents
Month / year
Group Seven: University (Universtitades)
1st Letter 2nd Letter @ Date
1 st name 
initial
Employment Role:
D -  Director
I -  Investigator/Researcher 
P -  Professor 
S -  Secretary
University/Universtitades (U) 
and number -  based on initial 
order o f meeting field contacts
Month / year
Group Eight: Trade A ssociations (Com ercie la A sociacion)
1st Letter 2nd Letter Date
1 st name 
initial
Employment Role: 
D -  Director 
C -  Chief Executive 
S -  Secretary
Trade Assoc./ Comercie la 
Asociacion (A) and number -  
based on initial order of 
meeting field contacts / 
respondents
Month / year
G roup N ine: Focus Groups (Foque Grupo)
1st L etter 2nd L etter 3 rd L etter 4 th L etter ®  . . D ate
1st name 
initial
Employment
Role:
0  -  Workers 
S -  Supervisors 
F -  Office Staff 
P -  Personnel 
Manager 
A -  Farm 
Manager
Job Type:
B -  Bagging 
C -  Cropping 
H -  Harvest 
S -  Selection 
P -  Packing 
Q -  Quality 
L -  Loading
Worker 
Representative: 
P -  Permanent 
Committee 
S -  Solidarismo 
U -  Union
Focus Group 
(FG) plus 
number based 
on phase of 
fieldwork, 
and number 
based on 
sequence of  
focus groups
Month / year
G roup Ten: Supermarkets/Grocers (Tenderos)
1st Letter 2nd Letter m Date
1 st name 
initial
Employment Role: 
D -  Director 
B -  Buyer 
E -  Ethical Trading 
C - C S R
T -  Technologist
Supermarket/Tenderos (T) 
and number -  based on 
initial order o f meeting 
contacts/ respondents
Month / year
